rfc9684.original.xml   rfc9684.xml 
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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902"
docName="draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-21" number="9684" submissionType="IETF"
category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true"
updates="" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" version="3">
<front> <front>
<title abbrev="YANG-CHARRA for TPMs">A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Respons <!-- [rfced] Title. FYI, we have expanded the abbreviation TPM and added the abb
e-based Remote Attestation Procedures using TPMs</title> reviation CHARRA to the title. We have also updated the short title, which is di
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-23" splayed in the header of the PDF pages. Please let us know if any changes are n
/> ecessary.
Original:
A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation
Procedures using TPMs
YANG-CHARRA for TPMs
Current:
A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based Remote Attestation (CHARRA)
Procedures Using Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
YANG Data Model for CHARRA Procedures
-->
<title abbrev="YANG Data Model for CHARRA Procedures">A YANG Data Model for
Challenge-Response-Based Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Pl
atform Modules (TPMs)</title>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9684"/>
<author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz"> <author initials="H." surname="Birkholz" fullname="Henk Birkholz">
<organization abbrev="Fraunhofer SIT">Fraunhofer SIT</organization> <organization abbrev="Fraunhofer SIT">Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>Rheinstrasse 75</street> <street>Rheinstrasse 75</street>
<city>Darmstadt</city> <city>Darmstadt</city>
<code>64295</code> <code>64295</code>
<country>Germany</country> <country>Germany</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>henk.birkholz@ietf.contact</email> <email>henk.birkholz@ietf.contact</email>
skipping to change at line 56 skipping to change at line 78
<author initials="B." surname="Sulzen" fullname="Bill Sulzen"> <author initials="B." surname="Sulzen" fullname="Bill Sulzen">
<organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems</organization> <organization abbrev="Cisco">Cisco Systems</organization>
<address> <address>
<email>bsulzen@cisco.com</email> <email>bsulzen@cisco.com</email>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="L." surname="Xia" fullname="Liang Xia (Frank)"> <author initials="L." surname="Xia" fullname="Liang Xia (Frank)">
<organization abbrev="Huawei">Huawei Technologies</organization> <organization abbrev="Huawei">Huawei Technologies</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District</street> <extaddr>Yuhuatai District</extaddr>
<street>101 Software Avenue</street>
<city>Nanjing</city> <city>Nanjing</city>
<region>Jiangsu</region> <region>Jiangsu</region>
<code>210012</code> <code>210012</code>
<country>China</country> <country>China</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com</email> <email>Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com</email>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="T." surname="Laffey" fullname="Tom Laffey"> <author initials="T." surname="Laffey" fullname="Tom Laffey">
<organization abbrev="HPE">Hewlett Packard Enterprise</organization> <organization abbrev="HPE">Hewlett Packard Enterprise</organization>
skipping to change at line 79 skipping to change at line 102
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<author initials="G." surname="Fedorkow" fullname="Guy C. Fedorkow"> <author initials="G." surname="Fedorkow" fullname="Guy C. Fedorkow">
<organization abbrev="Juniper">Juniper Networks</organization> <organization abbrev="Juniper">Juniper Networks</organization>
<address> <address>
<postal> <postal>
<street>10 Technology Park Drive</street> <street>10 Technology Park Drive</street>
<city>Westford</city> <city>Westford</city>
<region>Massachusetts</region> <region>Massachusetts</region>
<code>01886</code> <code>01886</code>
<country>United States of America</country>
</postal> </postal>
<email>gfedorkow@juniper.net</email> <email>gfedorkow@juniper.net</email>
</address> </address>
</author> </author>
<date year="2024" month="July" day="29"/> <date year="2024" month="October"/>
<area>Security</area> <area>sec</area>
<workgroup>RATS Working Group</workgroup> <workgroup>rats</workgroup>
<keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>
<!-- [rfced] Please insert any keywords (beyond those that appear in the title)
for use on https://www.rfc-editor.org/search. -->
<keyword>example</keyword>
<abstract> <abstract>
<?line 236?> <!-- [rfced] Abstract. We having difficulty parsing the following. Does the sugg ested text clarify the requirements for the YANG module?
<t>This document defines YANG Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) and a few configurat Original:
ion nodes required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity measurements The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2
from a device, following the operational context defined in TPM-based Network D or TPM 2.0 as well as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or
evice Remote Integrity Verification. Complementary measurement logs are also pro equivalent hardware implementations that include the protected
vided by the YANG RPCs, originating from one or more roots of trust for measurem capabilities as provided by TPMs as well as a corresponding software
ent (RTMs). The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well stack, included in the device components of the composite device the
as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalent hardware implementati YANG server is running on.
ons that include the protected capabilities as provided by TPMs as well as a cor
responding software stack, included in the device components of the composite de Perhaps:
vice the YANG server is running on.</t> The defined module requires the inclusion of the following in the device
components of the composite device on which the YANG server is running:
at least one Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of either version 1.2 or 2.0
as well as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or an equivalent
hardware implementation that includes the protected capabilities as
provided by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack.
-->
<t>This document defines the YANG Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) and config
uration nodes that are required to retrieve attestation evidence about integrity
measurements from a device, following the operational context defined in RFC 96
83 "TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification". Complementary measu
rement logs originating from one or more Roots of Trust for Measurement (RTMs) a
re also provided by the YANG RPCs. The module defined requires at least one TPM
1.2 or TPM 2.0 as well as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or equivalen
t hardware implementations that include the protected capabilities as provided b
y TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack, included in the device compone
nts of the composite device the YANG server is running on.</t>
</abstract> </abstract>
</front> </front>
<middle> <middle>
<?line 240?> <section anchor="introduction">
<section anchor="introduction">
<name>Introduction</name> <name>Introduction</name>
<t>This document is based on the general terminology defined in the <xref <t>This document is based on the general terminology defined in Remote ATt
target="RFC9334"/> and uses the operational context defined in <xref target="I-D estation procedureS (RATS) architecture <xref target="RFC9334"/> and uses the op
.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"/> as well as the interaction model a erational context defined in <xref target="RFC9683"/> as well as the interaction
nd information elements defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interac model and information elements defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference
tion-models"/>. The currently supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the -interaction-models"/>. The currently supported hardware security modules (HSMs)
Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) <xref target="TPM1.2"/> and <xref target="TPM2. are the Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) <xref target="TPM1.2"/> <xref target="T
0"/> as specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple TPM PM2.0"/> as specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple
s in the case of a Composite Device, are required in order to use the YANG modul TPMs in the case of a composite device, is required in order to use the YANG mo
e defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a root of trust for storage (RTS dule defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a Root of Trust for Storage (
) in order to store system security measurement Evidence. And each TPM is used RTS) in order to store system security measurement Evidence. And each TPM is us
as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation Evidence ed as a Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) in order to retrieve attestation Evide
. This is done by using a YANG RPC to request a quote which exposes a rolling h nce. This is done by using a YANG RPC to request a quote that exposes a rolling
ash of the security measurements held internally within the TPM.</t> hash of the security measurements held internally within the TPM.</t>
<t>Specific terms imported from <xref target="RFC9334"/> and used in this <t>Specific terms imported from <xref target="RFC9334"/> and used in this
document include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence.</t> document include Attester, composite device, and Evidence.</t>
<t>Specific terms imported from <xref target="TPM2.0-Key"/> and used in th <t>Specific terms imported from <xref target="TPM2.0-Key"/> and used in th
is document include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Attest is document include Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Attesta
ation Identity Key (AIK), Local Attestation Key (LAK).</t> tion Identity Key (AIK), and Local Attestation Key (LAK).</t>
<section anchor="requirements-notation"> <section anchor="requirements-notation">
<name>Requirements notation</name> <name>Requirements Notation</name>
<t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL <t>
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
"MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>
described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, ",
and only when, they "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
appear in all capitals, as shown here. "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
<?line -6?> "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to
be
interpreted as described in BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref
target="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
shown here.
</t> </t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="the-yang-module-for-basic-remote-attestation-procedures"> <section anchor="the-yang-module-for-basic-remote-attestation-procedures">
<name>The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures</name> <name>The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures</name>
<t>One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides a ttestation Evidence via the YANG module defined in this document. The ietf-tpm-r emote-attestation YANG module enables a composite device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) archite cture <xref target="RFC9334"/>, and the corresponding challenge-response interac tion model defined in the <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-mode ls"/> document. A fresh nonce with an appropriate amount of entropy <xref target ="NIST-915121"/> MUST be supplied by the YANG client in order to enable a proof- of-freshness with respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester r unning the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay attacks . The method for communicating the relationship of each individual TPM to specif ic measured component within the Composite Device is out of the scope of this do cument.</t> <t>One or more TPMs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be embedded in a composite device that provides attestation Evidence via the YANG module defined in this document. The ietf-tpm-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the RATS architecture <xref targe t="RFC9334"/> and the corresponding challenge-response interaction model defined in <xref target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models"/>. A fresh nonce w ith an appropriate amount of entropy <xref target="NIST-915121"/> <bcp14>MUST</b cp14> be supplied by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness wit h respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each individual TPM to the specific measured component within the composite device is out of the scope of this document.</t>
<section anchor="yang-modules"> <section anchor="yang-modules">
<name>YANG Modules</name> <name>YANG Modules</name>
<t>In this section the several YANG modules are defined.</t> <t>In this section, the two YANG modules are defined.</t>
<section anchor="ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> <section anchor="ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<name>'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation'</name> <name>ietf-tpm-remote-attestation</name>
<t>This YANG module imports modules from <xref target="RFC6991"/> with <!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1. FYI, we have updated the following paragraph to incl
prefix 'yang', <xref target="RFC8348"/> with prefix 'hw', <xref target="I-D.iet ude the references that are used in the YANG module:
f-netconf-keystore"/> with prefix 'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' <xref target="r
ef-ietf-tcg-algs"/> with prefix 'taa'. Additionally, references are made to <xr Original:
ef target="RFC8032"/>, <xref target="RFC8017"/>, <xref target="RFC6933"/>, <xref This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',
target="TPM1.2-Commands"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0-Arch"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0- [RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [RFC9642] with prefix 'ks', and 'ietf-
Structures"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0-Key"/>, <xref target="TPM1.2-Structures"/>, tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'. Additionally,
<xref target="bios-log"/>, <xref target="BIOS-Log-Event-Type"/>, as well as <xre references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933],
f target="ima"/> and <xref target="netequip-boot-log"/>.</t> [TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key],
[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type], as well as
Appendix A and Appendix B.
Current (removing [RFC8032], RFC8017], Appendix A, and adding [CEL]):
This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',
[RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [RFC9642] with prefix 'ks', and 'ietf-
tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'. Additionally,
references are made to [RFC6933], [TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch],
[TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key], [TPM1.2-Structures], [BIOS-Log],
[BIOS-Log-Event-Type], and [CEL], as well as Appendix B.
-->
<t>This YANG module imports modules from <xref target="RFC6991"/> with
prefix 'yang', <xref target="RFC8348"/> with prefix 'hw', <xref target="RFC9642
"/> with prefix 'ks', and ietf-tcg-algs.yang <xref target="ref-ietf-tcg-algs"/>
with prefix 'taa'. Additionally, references are made to <xref target="RFC6933"/
>, <xref target="TPM1.2-Commands"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0-Arch"/>, <xref target=
"TPM2.0-Structures"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0-Key"/>, <xref target="TPM1.2-Structu
res"/>, <xref target="BIOS-Log"/>, <xref target="BIOS-Log-Event-Type"/>, and <xr
ef target="CEL"/>, as well as <xref target="netequip-boot-log"/>.</t>
<section anchor="features"> <section anchor="features">
<name>Features</name> <name>Features</name>
<t>This module supports the following features:</t> <t>This module supports the following features:</t>
<ul spacing="normal"> <dl spacing="normal">
<li>'mtpm': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support <dt>'mtpm':</dt><dd>Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can
remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in cases where mult support remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in cases wh
iple line cards are present, each with its own TPM.</li> ere multiple line cards are present, each with its own TPM.</dd>
<li>'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BI <dt>'bios':</dt><dd>Indicates that the device supports the retriev
OS/UEFI event logs. <xref target="bios-log"/></li> al of BIOS and Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) event logs <xref tar
<li>'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of eve get="BIOS-Log"/>.</dd>
nt logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA, see <xref target <dt>'ima':</dt><dd>Indicates that the device supports the retrieva
="ima"/>).</li> l of event logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA, see <xre
<li>'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrie f target="ima"/>).</dd>
val of netequip boot event logs. See <xref target="ima"/> and <xref target="nete <dt>'netequip_boot':</dt><dd>Indicates that the device supports th
quip-boot-log"/>.</li> e retrieval of netequip boot event logs. See Appendixes <xref target="ima" forma
</ul> t="counter"/> and <xref target="netequip-boot-log" format="counter"/>.</dd>
</dl>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="identities"> <section anchor="identities">
<name>Identities</name> <name>Identities</name>
<t>This module supports the following types of attestation event log s: 'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.</t> <t>This module supports the following types of attestation event log s: 'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="remote-procedure-calls-rpcs"> <section anchor="remote-procedure-calls-rpcs">
<name>Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)</name> <name>Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)</name>
<t>In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation p rocedures are defined.</t> <t>In the following sections, RPCs for attestation procedures for bo th TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 are defined.</t>
<section anchor="tpm12-challenge-response-attestation"> <section anchor="tpm12-challenge-response-attestation">
<name>'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation'</name> <name>tpm12-challenge-response-attestation</name>
<t>This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (<em>TPM <!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.3.1. The sentence below shows the first use of the a
Quote</em> operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the featur bbreviation "PCR". Does the expansion of the abbreviation along with adding the
e 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not provided, all TPM preposition "via" improve the clarity of the sentence?
1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is
as follows:</t> Original:
<sourcecode type="TREE"> This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor.
Perhaps:
This RPC allows a Verifier to request, via the _TPM Quote_ operation,
signed TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) from a cryptoprocessor
compliant with TPM 1.2.
-->
<t>This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (<em>TPM
Quote</em> operation) from a cryptoprocessor compliant with TPM 1.2. Where the f
eature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not provided, all
cryptoprocessors compliant with TPM 1.2 will respond. The YANG tree diagram of
this RPC is as follows:</t>
<!-- [rfced] FYI, we have updated the sourcecode type of the YANG trees to be ty
pe="yangtree", and we have updated the artwork tags to <sourcecode type="xml"> f
or the examples. Please let us know if any changes are necessary.
-->
<sourcecode type="yangtree">
+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}? +---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge
| +---w pcr-index* pcr | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
| {tpm:mtpm}? | {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* [] +--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref +--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary +--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="tpm20-challenge-response-attestation"> <section anchor="tpm20-challenge-response-attestation">
<name>'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'</name> <name>tpm20-challenge-response-attestation</name>
<t>This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (<em>TPM <t>This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (<em>TPM
Quote</em> operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the featur Quote</em> operation) from a cryptoprocessor compliant with TPM 2.0. Where the f
e 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not provided, all TPM eature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not provided, all
2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is cryptoprocessors compliant with TPM 2.0 will respond. The YANG tree diagram of
as follows:</t> this RPC is as follows:</t>
<sourcecode type="TREE"> <sourcecode type="yangtree">
+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}? +---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* [] | +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []
| | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref | | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
| | +---w pcr-index* pcr | | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
| {tpm:mtpm}? | {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro output +--ro output
skipping to change at line 182 skipping to change at line 257
+--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary +--ro TPMS_QUOTE_INFO binary
+--ro quote-signature? binary +--ro quote-signature? binary
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* [] +--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
+--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref +--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index] +--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
+--ro pcr-index pcr +--ro pcr-index pcr
+--ro pcr-value? binary +--ro pcr-value? binary
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
<t>An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-2 56 bank could look like the following:</t> <t>An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-2 56 bank could look like the following:</t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <rpc message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<tpm20-attestation-challenge <tpm20-attestation-challenge
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<certificate-name> <certificate-name>
(identifier of a TPM signature key with which the Attester is (identifier of a TPM signature key with which the Attester is
supposed to sign the attestation data) supposed to sign the attestation data)
</certificate-name> </certificate-name>
<nonce> <nonce>
0xe041307208d9f78f5b1bbecd19e2d152ad49de2fc5a7d8dbf769f6b8ffdeab9 0xe041307208d9f78f5b1bbecd19e2d152ad49de2fc5a7d8dbf769f6b8ffdeab9
</nonce> </nonce>
<tpm20-pcr-selection> <tpm20-pcr-selection>
<tpm20-hash-algo <tpm20-hash-algo
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs">
TPM_ALG_SHA256 TPM_ALG_SHA256
</tpm20-hash-algo> </tpm20-hash-algo>
<pcr-index>0</pcr-index> <pcr-index>0</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>1</pcr-index> <pcr-index>1</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>2</pcr-index> <pcr-index>2</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>3</pcr-index> <pcr-index>3</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>4</pcr-index> <pcr-index>4</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>5</pcr-index> <pcr-index>5</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>6</pcr-index> <pcr-index>6</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>7</pcr-index> <pcr-index>7</pcr-index>
</tpm20-pcr-selection> </tpm20-pcr-selection>
</tpm20-attestation-challenge> </tpm20-attestation-challenge>
</rpc> </rpc>
]]></artwork> ]]></sourcecode>
<t>A successful response could be formatted as follows:</t> <t>A successful response could be formatted as follows:</t>
<artwork><![CDATA[ <sourcecode type="xml"><![CDATA[
<rpc-reply message-id="101" <rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<tpm20-attestation-response <tpm20-attestation-response
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<certificate-name <certificate-name
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
(instance of Certificate name in the Keystore) (instance of certificate name in the keystore)
</certificate-name> </certificate-name>
<attestation-data> <attestation-data>
(raw attestation data, i.e., the TPM quote; this includes, (raw attestation data, i.e., the TPM quote; this includes,
among other information, a composite digest of requested PCRs, among other information, a composite digest of requested PCRs,
the nonce, and TPM 2.0 clock information.) the nonce, and TPM 2.0 clock information.)
</attestation-data> </attestation-data>
<quote-signature> <quote-signature>
(signature over attestation-data using the TPM key (signature over attestation-data using the TPM key
identified by sig-key-id) identified by sig-key-id)
</quote-signature> </quote-signature>
</tpm20-attestation-response> </tpm20-attestation-response>
</rpc-reply> </rpc-reply>
]]></artwork> ]]></sourcecode>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="log-retrieval"> <section anchor="log-retrieval">
<name>'log-retrieval'</name> <name>log-retrieval</name>
<t>This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the Evidence which was exte <t>This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the Evidence that was exten
nded into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:</t> ded into specific TPM PCRs. The YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:</t>
<sourcecode type="TREE"> <!--[rfced] Sections 2.1.1.4 and 2.1.1.5. May we align the log-retrieval, attest
er-supported-algos, and compute-nodes YANG trees flush left to make them consist
ent? -->
<sourcecode type="yangtree">
+---x log-retrieval +---x log-retrieval
+---w input +---w input
| +---w log-type identityref | +---w log-type identityref
| +---w log-selector* [] | +---w log-selector* []
| +---w name* string | +---w name* string
| +---w (index-type)? | +---w (index-type)?
| | +--:(last-entry) | | +--:(last-entry)
| | | +---w last-entry-value? binary | | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
| | +--:(index) | | +--:(index)
| | | +---w last-index-number? uint64 | | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
skipping to change at line 272 skipping to change at line 349
| +--ro event-type? uint32 | +--ro event-type? uint32
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr | +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro digest-list* [] | +--ro digest-list* []
| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref | | +--ro hash-algo? identityref
| | +--ro digest* binary | | +--ro digest* binary
| +--ro event-size? uint32 | +--ro event-size? uint32
| +--ro event-data* binary | +--ro event-data* binary
+--:(ima) {ima}? +--:(ima) {ima}?
| +--ro ima-event-logs | +--ro ima-event-logs
| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number] | +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint64 | +--ro event-number uint64
| +--ro ima-template? string | +--ro ima-template? string
| +--ro filename-hint? string | +--ro filename-hint? string
| +--ro filedata-hash? binary | +--ro filedata-hash? binary
| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash? binary | +--ro template-hash? binary
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr | +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro signature? binary | +--ro signature? binary
+--:(netequip_boot) {netequip_boot}? +--:(netequip_boot) {netequip_boot}?
+--ro boot-event-logs +--ro boot-event-logs
+--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number] +--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number]
+--ro event-number uint64 +--ro event-number uint64
+--ro ima-template? string +--ro ima-template? string
+--ro filename-hint? string +--ro filename-hint? string
+--ro filedata-hash? binary +--ro filedata-hash? binary
+--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash-algorithm? string +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash? binary +--ro template-hash? binary
+--ro pcr-index? pcr +--ro pcr-index? pcr
+--ro signature? binary +--ro signature? binary
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="data-nodes"> <section anchor="data-nodes">
<name>Data Nodes</name> <name>Data Nodes</name>
<t>This section provides a high level description of the data nodes containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG model. For mo re details, please see the YANG model itself in <xref target="ref-ietf-tpm-remot e-attestation"/>.</t> <t>This section provides a high-level description of the data nodes that contain the configuration and operational objects within the YANG data mode l. For more details, please see the YANG module itself in <xref target="ref-ietf -tpm-remote-attestation"/>.</t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>Container 'rats-support-structures':</dt> <dt>Container 'rats-support-structures':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>This houses the set of information relating to remote attesta tion for a device. This includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (such as line cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported across the platform.</t> <t>This houses the set of information relating to remote attesta tion for a device. This includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (suc h as line cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported across the platform.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>Container 'tpms':</dt> <dt>Container 'tpms':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>Provides configuration and operational details for each suppo rted TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which may be quoted, certific ates which are associated with that TPM, and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate i s associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified.</t> <t>This provides configuration and operational details for each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs that may be quoted, cert ificates that are associated with that TPM, and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates that are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is associated with a particular TPM Attestation Key, knowledge of the certifica te allows a specific TPM to be identified.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
<sourcecode type="TREE"> <sourcecode type="yangtree">
+--rw tpms +--rw tpms
+--rw tpm* [name] +--rw tpm* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--ro hardware-based boolean +--ro hardware-based boolean
+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro path? string +--ro path? string
+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}? +--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro manufacturer? string +--ro manufacturer? string
+--rw firmware-version identityref +--rw firmware-version identityref
+--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref {taa:tpm12}? +--rw tpm12-hash-algo? identityref {taa:tpm12}?
skipping to change at line 330 skipping to change at line 407
+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo] {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo] {taa:tpm20}?
| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref | +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref
| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr | +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr
+--ro status enumeration +--ro status enumeration
+--rw certificates +--rw certificates
+--rw certificate* [name] +--rw certificate* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}? +--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}?
+--rw type? enumeration +--rw type? enumeration
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
<t>container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash <dl>
algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. An operator will use <dt>Container 'attester-supported-algos':</dt>
this information to limit algorithms available for use by RPCs to just a desire <dd>
d set from the universe of all allowed hash algorithms by the TCG.</t> <t>This identifies which TCG hash algorithms are available for use
<sourcecode type="TREE"> on the Attesting platform. An operator will use this information to limit algor
ithms available for use by RPCs to just a desired set from the universe of all h
ash algorithms allowed by the TCG.</t>
</dd>
</dl>
<sourcecode type="yangtree">
+--rw attester-supported-algos +--rw attester-supported-algos
+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm12}? +--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm12}?
+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref {taa:tpm12}? +--rw tpm12-hash* identityref {taa:tpm12}?
+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm20}?
+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-hash* identityref {taa:tpm20}?
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
<t>container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM suppo <dl>
rted, this container maintains the set of information related to the compute nod <dt>Container 'compute-nodes':</dt>
e associated with a specific TPM. This allows each specific TPM to identify to w <dd>
hich 'compute-node' it belongs.</t> <t>When there is more than one TPM supported, this container main
<sourcecode type="TREE"> tains the set of information related to the compute node associated with a speci
fic TPM. This allows each specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it be
longs.</t>
</dd>
</dl>
<sourcecode type="yangtree">
+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}? +--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro compute-node* [node-id] +--ro compute-node* [node-id]
+--ro node-id string +--ro node-id string
+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro node-name? string +--ro node-name? string
+--ro node-location? string +--ro node-location? string
</sourcecode> </sourcecode>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="yang-module"> <section anchor="yang-module">
<name>YANG Module</name> <name>YANG Module</name>
<figure anchor="ref-ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> <figure anchor="ref-ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<sourcecode type="YANG"> <!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. FYI, we have updated the following to include both
&lt;CODE BEGINS&gt; file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang@24-07-29.yang" a description and a reference. Please let us know if any changes are necessary:
Original:
leaf event-type {
type uint32;
description
"BIOS Log Event Type:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
...
leaf-list event-data {
type binary;
description
"The event data. This is a binary structure
of size 'event-size'. For more on what
might be recorded within this object
see [bios-log] Section 9 which details
viable events which might be recorded.";
Current:
leaf event-type {
type uint32;
description
"BIOS log event type";
reference
"BIOS Log Event Type:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
...
leaf-list event-data {
type binary;
description
"The event data. This is a binary structure
of size 'event-size'. For more on what
might be recorded within this object
see BIOS-Log, Section 9, which details
viable events that might be recorded.";
reference
"BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
Section 9";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. FYI, in the YANG module, a reference called "ima-l
og" used the same URL as [CEL] <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/upl
oads/TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf>. We have updated the label to CEL:
Original:
feature ima {
description
"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes
the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get
hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for
one example of such an encoding.";
reference
"ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 5.1.6";
...
grouping ima-event {
description
"Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements";
reference
"ima-log:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3";
Current:
reference
"CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 5.1.6";
reference
"CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 4.3";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. We found the following description hard to parse.
We have updated some of the prepositions used. Please let us know if any changes
are necessary.
Original:
description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
subset the set of PCRs exposed by in the leaf-list
/tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
Current (adding "of" and removing "by"):
description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
subset of the set of PCRs exposed in the leaf-list
/tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. We found the following description hard to parse.
Does the suggested update convey the same meaning?
Original:
description
"The numbers of the PCRs that which are being tracked
with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition,
any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs
requested are a subset the set of PCR indexes selected
are available for that specific TPM.";
Possibly (adding "of" and updating "PCR indexes selected are available" to "sele
cted PCR indexes available"):
description
"The numbers of the PCRs that are being tracked
with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition,
any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs
requested are a subset of the set of selected PCR indexes
available for that specific TPM.";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. How may we clarify the description below? Is the l
eaf sig a blob or the 'sig' part of the Quote2 operation?
Original:
leaf sig {
type binary;
description
"The signed data blob, i.e., the signature
i.e., the 'sig' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation
result.";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. Please help us clarify the following description.
a) We could not find "ComponentIndex" within the YANG modules specified in th
is document, nor in the YANG modules imported by ietf-tpm-remote-attestation. Is
this the correct term?
b) Should "TPM" be plural?
c) Are smart NICs not covered because they are not a TPM?
Original:
rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm20";
description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
e.g. smart NICs, is not covered.";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. Please help us clarify the following description.
Is the TPMS_ATTEST structure part of the binary output of the TPM2_Quote, or is
it provided in addition to the TPM2_Quote? We could not find another mention of
the TPMS_ATTEST structure. Should there be a reference provided?
Original:
output {
list tpm20-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name";
description
"The binary output of TPM2_Quote from one TPM of the
node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure
including a length, encapsulated in a signature";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.1.6. FYI, we adjusted line lengths to fit in the 72-cha
racter limit.
-->
<sourcecode type="yang" name="ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2024-10-
22.yang" markers="true"><![CDATA[
module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation { module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang"
+ ":ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";
prefix tpm; prefix tpm;
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
} }
import ietf-hardware { import ietf-hardware {
prefix hw; prefix hw;
} }
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
} }
import ietf-tcg-algs { import ietf-tcg-algs {
prefix taa; prefix taa;
} }
organization organization
"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group"; "IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web : &lt;https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/&gt; "WG Web : <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
WG List : &lt;mailto:rats@ietf.org&gt; WG List : <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
Author : Eric Voit &lt;evoit@cisco.com&gt; Author : Eric Voit <evoit@cisco.com>
Author : Henk Birkholz &lt;henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt; Author : Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@ietf.contact>
Author : Michael Eckel &lt;michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de&gt; Author : Michael Eckel <michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Author : Shwetha Bhandari &lt;shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com&gt; Author : Shwetha Bhandari <shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com>
Author : Bill Sulzen &lt;bsulzen@cisco.com&gt; Author : Bill Sulzen <bsulzen@cisco.com>
Author : Liang Xia (Frank) &lt;frank.xialiang@huawei.com&gt; Author : Liang Xia (Frank) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
Author : Tom Laffey &lt;tom.laffey@hpe.com&gt; Author : Tom Laffey <tom.laffey@hpe.com>
Author : Guy Fedorkow &lt;gfedorkow@juniper.net&gt;"; Author : Guy Fedorkow <gfedorkow@juniper.net>";
description description
"A YANG module to enable a TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 based "A YANG module to enable remote attestation procedures based
remote attestation procedure using a challenge-response on TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 using a challenge-response
interaction model and the TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 Quote interaction model and the Quote primitive operations defined
primitive operations. by TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9684; see the
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC RFC itself for full legal notices.";
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-05-17 { revision 2024-10-22 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs)";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
feature mtpm { feature mtpm {
description description
"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple "The device supports the remote attestation of multiple
TPM based cryptoprocessors."; TPM-based cryptoprocessors.";
} }
feature bios { feature bios {
description description
"The device supports the bios logs."; "The device supports the BIOS logs.";
reference reference
"bios-log: "BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
Section 9.4.5.2"; Section 9.4.5.2";
} }
feature ima { feature ima {
description description
"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs. "The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each
the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get encodes the log entry contents as the specific measurements
hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for that get hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference
one example of such an encoding."; below for one example of such an encoding.";
reference reference
"ima-log: "CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 5.1.6"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 5.1.6";
} }
feature netequip_boot { feature netequip_boot {
description description
"The device supports the netequip_boot logs."; "The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";
reference reference
"netequip-boot-log: "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
RFC XXXX Appendix B"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs), Appendix B";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Typedefs */ /* Typedefs */
/*****************/ /*****************/
typedef pcr { typedef pcr {
type uint8 { type uint8 {
range "0..31"; range "0..31";
} }
description description
"Valid index number for a PCR. A {{TPM2.0}} compliant PCR index "Valid index number for a PCR. A PCR index compliant with
extends from 0-31. At this time a typical TPM would have no TPM 2.0 extends from 0-31. At this time, a typical TPM would
more than 32 PCRS."; have no more than 32 PCRs.";
} }
typedef compute-node-ref { typedef compute-node-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"
+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-id"; + "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-id";
} }
description description
"This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an "This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an
implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a
different YANG module node specifying hardware structures."; different YANG module node specifying hardware structures.";
} }
typedef certificate-name-ref { typedef certificate-name-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"
+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name"; + "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";
} }
description description
"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate."; "A type that allows identification of a TPM-based
certificate.";
} }
/******************/ /******************/
/* Identities */ /* Identities */
/******************/ /******************/
identity attested_event_log_type { identity attested_event_log_type {
description description
"Base identity allowing categorization of the reasons why an "Base identity allowing categorization of the reasons why an
attested measurement has been taken on an Attester."; attested measurement has been taken on an Attester.";
skipping to change at line 526 skipping to change at line 776
description description
"An event type associated with Network Equipment Boot."; "An event type associated with Network Equipment Boot.";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Groupings */ /* Groupings */
/*****************/ /*****************/
grouping tpm20-hash-algo { grouping tpm20-hash-algo {
description description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM2 PCRs. This "The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the PCRs compliant
must be from the list of platform supported options."; with TPM 2.0. This must be from the list of platform-
supported options.";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures' must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM2.0 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a PCR compliant with
must be one of those supported by a platform. TPM 2.0. This must be one of those supported by a platform.
Where this object does not appear, the default value of Where this object does not appear, the default value of
'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256' will apply."; 'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256' will apply.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-hash-algo { grouping tpm12-hash-algo {
description description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs."; "The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the PCRs compliant
with TPM 1.2.";
leaf tpm12-hash-algo { leaf tpm12-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures' must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm12-hash' { + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm12-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a PCR compliant with
MUST be one of those supported by a platform. TPM 1.2. This MUST be one of those supported by a platform.
Where this object does not appear, the default value of Where this object does not appear, the default value of
'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1' will apply."; 'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1' will apply.";
} }
} }
grouping nonce { grouping nonce {
description description
"A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use "A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use
as part of a replay-detection mechanism."; as part of a replay-detection mechanism.";
leaf nonce-value { leaf nonce-value {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A cryptographically generated random number which should "A cryptographically generated random number that should
not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random
number generation function. The random number MUST be number generation function. The random number MUST be
derived from an entropy source external to the Attester. derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.
Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256 Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or
binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer 256 binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if
binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be padded fewer binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be
with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the TPM. padded with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the
Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed TPM. Additionally, if more bytes are sent, the nonce will
to the most significant binary digits."; be trimmed to the most significant binary digits.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-pcr-selection { grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its "A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC). individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
The corresponding selection filter is represented in this The corresponding selection filter is represented in this
grouping."; grouping.";
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
subset the set of PCRs exposed by in the leaf-list subset of the set of PCRs exposed in the leaf-list
/tpm:rats-support-structures /tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs"; /tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
} }
} }
grouping tpm20-pcr-selection { grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed "A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are
together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection hashed together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2.
list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in The selection list of desired PCRs and the hash algorithm
this grouping."; is represented in this grouping.";
list tpm20-pcr-selection { list tpm20-pcr-selection {
unique "tpm20-hash-algo"; unique "tpm20-hash-algo";
description description
"Specifies the list of PCRs and Hash Algorithms that can be "Specifies the list of PCRs and hash algorithms that can be
returned within a TPM2B_DIGEST."; returned within a TPM2B_DIGEST.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf, Section 10.9.7";
uses tpm20-hash-algo; uses tpm20-hash-algo;
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The numbers of the PCRs that which are being tracked "The numbers of the PCRs that which are being tracked
with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition, with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition,
any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs
requested are a subset the set of PCR indexes selected requested are a subset the set of PCR indexes selected
are available for that specific TPM."; are available for that specific TPM.";
} }
skipping to change at line 647 skipping to change at line 902
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore."; "Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm-name { grouping tpm-name {
description description
"A unique TPM on a device."; "A unique TPM on a device.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device."; "Unique system-generated name for a TPM on a device.";
} }
} }
grouping node-uptime { grouping node-uptime {
description description
"Uptime in seconds of the node."; "Uptime in seconds of the node.";
leaf up-time { leaf up-time {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data"; "Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-attestation { grouping tpm12-attestation {
description description
"Contains an instance of TPM1.2 style signed cryptoprocessor "Contains an instance of cryptoprocessor measurements signed
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester according to TPM 1.2. It is supplemented by unsigned
information."; Attester information.";
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
leaf pcr-data { leaf pcr-data {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The value created and signed for the quote (type TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT), "The value created and signed for the quote
i.e., the 'pcrData' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; (type TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT), i.e., the 'pcrData' part of
a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
leaf version-info { leaf version-info {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The version info (type TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO), "The version info (type TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO),
i.e., the 'versionInfo' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; i.e., the 'versionInfo' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2
operation result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
leaf sig { leaf sig {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The signed data blob, i.e., the signature "The signed data blob, i.e., the signature,
i.e., the 'sig' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; i.e., the 'sig' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation
result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
} }
grouping tpm20-attestation { grouping tpm20-attestation {
description description
"Contains an instance of TPM2 style signed cryptoprocessor "Contains an instance of cryptoprocessor measurements signed
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester according to TPM 2.0. It is supplemented by unsigned
information."; Attester information.";
leaf quote-data { leaf quote-data {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A hash of the latest PCR values (and the hash algorithm used) "A hash of the latest PCR values (and the hash algorithm
which have been returned from an Attester for the selected PCRs used) that have been returned from an Attester for the
and Hash Algorithms."; selected PCRs and hash algorithms.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Rev116,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.12.1"; TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf, Section 10.12.1";
} }
leaf quote-signature { leaf quote-signature {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Quote signature returned by TPM Quote. The signature was "Quote signature returned by TPM Quote. The signature was
generated using the key associated with the generated using the key associated with the
certificate 'name'."; certificate 'name'.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Rev116,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 11.2.1"; TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf, Section 11.2.1";
} }
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
list unsigned-pcr-values { list unsigned-pcr-values {
description description
"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with "PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant
the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple with the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across
PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not multiple PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does
necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the not necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just
minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last the minimum set of PCR information that has changed since
received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier the last received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should
reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a a Verifier reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes
single PCR has changed? when only a single PCR has changed?
To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR
values, the Attester can provide these individual values via values, the Attester can provide these individual values via
'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to 'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to
what has previously been validated, it is possible for a what has previously been validated, it is possible for a
Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while
eliminating significant processing. Note that there should
significant processing. Note that there should never be a never be a result where an unsigned PCR value differs from
result where an unsigned PCR value differs from what may be what may be reconstructed from within the PCR quote and
reconstructed from the within the PCR quote and the event logs. the event logs.
If there is a difference, a signed result which has been If there is a difference, a signed result that has been
verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive."; verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";
uses tpm20-hash-algo; uses tpm20-hash-algo;
list pcr-values { list pcr-values {
key "pcr-index"; key "pcr-index";
description description
"List of one PCR bank."; "List of one PCR bank.";
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"PCR index number."; "PCR index number.";
} }
leaf pcr-value { leaf pcr-value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"PCR value."; "PCR value.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Rev116,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf,
Section 10.9.7";
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping log-identifier { grouping log-identifier {
description description
"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved."; "Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";
leaf log-type { leaf log-type {
type identityref { type identityref {
base attested_event_log_type; base attested_event_log_type;
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The corresponding measurement log type identity."; "The corresponding identity of the measurement log type.";
} }
} }
grouping boot-event-log { grouping boot-event-log {
description description
"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry "Defines a specific instance of an event log entry
and corresponding to the information used to and corresponding to the information used to
extend the PCR"; extend the PCR.";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Unique event number of this event which monotonically "Unique event number of this event, which monotonically
increases within a given event log. The maximum event increases within a given event log. The maximum event
number should not be reached, nor is wrapping back to number should not be reached, nor is wrapping back to
an earlier number supported."; an earlier number supported.";
} }
leaf event-type { leaf event-type {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"BIOS Log Event Type: "BIOS log event type.";
reference
"BIOS-Log-Event-Type:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1"; TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf, Section 10.4.1";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended.";
} }
list digest-list { list digest-list {
description description
"Hash of event data"; "Hash of event data.";
leaf hash-algo { leaf hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to compress the event data in "The hash scheme that is used to compress the event data in
each of the leaf-list digest items."; each of the leaf-list digest items.";
} }
leaf-list digest { leaf-list digest {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the "The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the
'hash-algo' against 'event data'."; 'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";
} }
} }
leaf event-size { leaf event-size {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Size of the event data"; "Size of the event data.";
} }
leaf-list event-data { leaf-list event-data {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The event data. This is a binary structure "The event data. This is a binary structure
of size 'event-size'. For more on what of size 'event-size'. For more on what
might be recorded within this object might be recorded within this object
see [bios-log] Section 9 which details see BIOS-Log, Section 9, which details
viable events which might be recorded."; viable events that might be recorded.";
reference
"BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_
v51.pdf, Section 9";
} }
} }
grouping bios-event-log { grouping bios-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI."; "Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
list bios-event-entry { list bios-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of TCG described event log "Ordered list of the TCG-described event log
that extended the PCRs in the order they that extended the PCRs in the order they
were logged"; were logged.";
uses boot-event-log; uses boot-event-log;
} }
} }
grouping ima-event { grouping ima-event {
description description
"Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements"; "Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements.";
reference reference
"ima-log: "CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 4.3";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"Unique event number of this event which monotonically "Unique event number of this event, which monotonically
increases. The maximum event number should not be increases. The maximum event number should not be
reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
supported."; supported.";
} }
leaf ima-template { leaf ima-template {
type string; type string;
description description
"Name of the template used for event logs "Name of the template used for event logs,
for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig"; e.g., ima, ima-ng, ima-sig.";
} }
leaf filename-hint { leaf filename-hint {
type string; type string;
description description
"File name (including the path) that was measured."; "File name (including the path) that was measured.";
} }
leaf filedata-hash { leaf filedata-hash {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Hash of filedata as updated based upon the "Hash of filedata as updated based upon the
filedata-hash-algorithm"; filedata-hash-algorithm.";
} }
leaf filedata-hash-algorithm { leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for filedata-hash"; "Algorithm used for filedata-hash.";
} }
leaf template-hash-algorithm { leaf template-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for template-hash"; "Algorithm used for template-hash.";
} }
leaf template-hash { leaf template-hash {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)"; "hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended.";
} }
leaf signature { leaf signature {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Digital file signature which provides a "Digital file signature that provides a
fingerprint for the file being measured."; fingerprint for the file being measured.";
} }
} }
grouping ima-event-log { grouping ima-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by IMA."; "Measurement log created by IMA.";
list ima-event-entry { list ima-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number"; "Ordered list of IMA event logs by event-number.";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log { grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network "Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The
Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In Network Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA
contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log format. In contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment
includes every measurable event from an Attester, including Boot log includes every measurable event from an Attester,
the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope including the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In
of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS essence, the scope of events represented in this format
events and IMA events."; combines the scope of BIOS events and IMA events.";
list boot-event-entry { list boot-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs "Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs
by event-number, using the IMA event format."; by event-number, using the IMA event format.";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping event-logs { grouping event-logs {
description description
"A selector for the log and its type."; "A selector for the log and its type.";
choice attested_event_log_type { choice attested_event_log_type {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Event log type determines the event logs content."; "Event log type determines the event log's content.";
case bios { case bios {
if-feature "bios"; if-feature "bios";
description description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs"; "BIOS/UEFI event logs.";
container bios-event-logs { container bios-event-logs {
description description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs"; "BIOS/UEFI event logs.";
uses bios-event-log; uses bios-event-log;
} }
} }
case ima { case ima {
if-feature "ima"; if-feature "ima";
description description
"IMA event logs."; "IMA event logs.";
container ima-event-logs { container ima-event-logs {
description description
"IMA event logs."; "IMA event logs.";
uses ima-event-log; uses ima-event-log;
} }
} }
case netequip_boot { case netequip_boot {
if-feature "netequip_boot"; if-feature "netequip_boot";
description description
"Network Equipment Boot event logs"; "Network Equipment Boot event logs.";
container boot-event-logs { container boot-event-logs {
description description
"Network equipment boot event logs."; "Network Equipment Boot event logs.";
uses network-equipment-boot-event-log; uses network-equipment-boot-event-log;
} }
} }
} }
} }
/**********************/ /**********************/
/* RPC operations */ /* RPC operations */
/**********************/ /**********************/
rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation { rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
description description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands made to the "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands made to
attesting device."; the attesting device.";
input { input {
container tpm12-attestation-challenge { container tpm12-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 1.2 structure definitions"; TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
uses tpm12-pcr-selection; uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
uses nonce; uses nonce;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
skipping to change at line 1026 skipping to change at line 1301
description description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with these certificate(s)."; TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
list tpm12-attestation-response { list tpm12-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name"; unique "certificate-name";
description description
"The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2, including "The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2,
the PCR selection and other associated attestation evidence including the PCR selection and other associated
metadata"; attestation evidence metadata.";
uses certificate-name-ref { uses certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Certificate associated with this tpm12-attestation."; "Certificate associated with this tpm12-attestation.";
} }
uses tpm12-attestation; uses tpm12-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation { rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
description description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG
module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices, module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices,
e.g. smart NICs, is not covered."; e.g., smart NICs are not covered.";
input { input {
container tpm20-attestation-challenge { container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 2.0 structure definitions"; TPM 2.0 structure definitions.";
uses nonce; uses nonce;
uses tpm20-pcr-selection; uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate."; error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";
skipping to change at line 1074 skipping to change at line 1349
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with the certificates."; TPMs associated with the certificates.";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
list tpm20-attestation-response { list tpm20-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name"; unique "certificate-name";
description description
"The binary output of TPM2_Quote from one TPM of the "The binary output of TPM2_Quote from one TPM of the
node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure node, which is identified by node-id. A TPMS_ATTEST
including a length, encapsulated in a signature"; structure including a length, encapsulated in a
signature.";
uses certificate-name-ref { uses certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation."; "Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";
} }
uses tpm20-attestation; uses tpm20-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc log-retrieval { rpc log-retrieval {
description description
"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing "Log entries are identified either via indices or by providing
the last line received. The number of lines returned can be the last line received. The number of lines returned can be
limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented."; limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";
input { input {
uses log-identifier; uses log-identifier;
list log-selector { list log-selector {
description description
"Only log entries which meet all the selection criteria "Only log entries that meet all of the provided selection
provided are to be returned by the RPC output."; criteria are to be returned by the RPC output.";
leaf-list name { leaf-list name {
type string; type string;
description description
"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this "Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this
object exists, a selection should pull only the objects object exists, a selection should pull only the objects
related to these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all related to these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all
qualifying TPMs that are 'hardware-based' equals true qualifying TPMs that are 'hardware-based' equals true
on the device are selected. When this selection on the device are selected. When this selection
criteria is provided, it will be considered as a logical criteria is provided, it will be considered as a logical
AND with any other selection criteria provided."; AND with any other selection criteria provided.";
} }
choice index-type { choice index-type {
description description
"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp."; "Last log entry received, log index number, or
timestamp.";
case last-entry { case last-entry {
description description
"The last entry of the log already retrieved."; "The last entry of the log already retrieved.";
leaf last-entry-value { leaf last-entry-value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Content of a log event which matches 1:1 with a "Content of a log event that matches 1:1 with a
unique event record contained within the log. Log unique event record contained within the log. Log
entries after this will be passed to the entries after this will be passed to the
requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique, requester. Note: if log entry values are not
this MUST return an error."; unique, this MUST return an error.";
} }
} }
case index { case index {
description description
"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or "Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or
zero."; zero.";
leaf last-index-number { leaf last-index-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"The last numeric index number of a log entry. "The last numeric index number of a log entry.
skipping to change at line 1159 skipping to change at line 1436
type uint16; type uint16;
description description
"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it "The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
means all of them."; means all of them.";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
container system-event-logs { container system-event-logs {
description description
"The requested data of the measurement event logs"; "The requested data of the measurement event logs.";
list node-data { list node-data {
unique "name"; unique "name";
description description
"Event logs of a node in a distributed system "Event logs of a node in a distributed system
identified by the node name"; identified by the node name.";
uses tpm-name; uses tpm-name;
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
container log-result { container log-result {
description description
"The requested entries of the corresponding log."; "The requested entries of the corresponding log.";
uses event-logs; uses event-logs;
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
/**************************************/ /****************************************/
/* Config &amp; Oper accessible nodes */ /* Config and Oper accessible nodes */
/**************************************/ /****************************************/
container rats-support-structures { container rats-support-structures {
description description
"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying "The datastore definition enabling Verifiers or Relying
parties to discover the information necessary to use the Parties to discover the information necessary to use the
remote attestation RPCs appropriately."; remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
container compute-nodes { container compute-nodes {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
description description
"Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this "Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this
composite device that support TPM operations."; composite device that support TPM operations.";
list compute-node { list compute-node {
key "node-id"; key "node-id";
unique "node-name"; unique "node-name";
config false; config false;
min-elements 2; min-elements 2;
description description
"A component within this composite device which "A component within this composite device that
supports TPM operations."; supports TPM operations.";
leaf node-id { leaf node-id {
type string; type string;
description description
"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number."; "ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";
} }
leaf node-physical-index { leaf node-physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib"; if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 { type int32 {
range "1..2147483647"; range "1..2147483647";
skipping to change at line 1242 skipping to change at line 1519
unique "path"; unique "path";
description description
"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS "A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS
can be conducted with."; can be conducted with.";
uses tpm-name; uses tpm-name;
leaf hardware-based { leaf hardware-based {
type boolean; type boolean;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"System generated indication of whether this is a "System-generated indication of whether this is a
hardware based TPM."; hardware-based TPM.";
} }
leaf physical-index { leaf physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib"; if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 { type int32 {
range "1..2147483647"; range "1..2147483647";
} }
config false; config false;
description description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM."; "The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
reference reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex"; "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
} }
leaf path { leaf path {
type string; type string;
config false; config false;
description description
"Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change "Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can
across reboots."; change across reboots.";
} }
leaf compute-node { leaf compute-node {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type compute-node-ref; type compute-node-ref;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM."; "Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";
} }
leaf manufacturer { leaf manufacturer {
skipping to change at line 1292 skipping to change at line 1569
description description
"Identifies the cryptoprocessor API set supported. This "Identifies the cryptoprocessor API set supported. This
is automatically configured by the device and should not is automatically configured by the device and should not
be changed."; be changed.";
} }
uses tpm12-hash-algo { uses tpm12-hash-algo {
when "derived-from-or-self(firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')"; when "derived-from-or-self(firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
refine "tpm12-hash-algo" { refine "tpm12-hash-algo" {
description description
"The hash algorithm overwrites the default used for PCRs "The hash algorithm overwrites the default used for
on this TPM1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor."; PCRs on this TPM1.2-compliant cryptoprocessor.";
} }
} }
leaf-list tpm12-pcrs { leaf-list tpm12-pcrs {
when when "derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, "
"derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')"; + "'taa:tpm12')";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The PCRs which may be extracted from this TPM1.2 "The PCRs that may be extracted from this TPM1.2-
compliant cryptoprocessor."; compliant cryptoprocessor.";
} }
list tpm20-pcr-bank { list tpm20-pcr-bank {
when when "derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, "
"derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, 'taa:tpm20')"; + "'taa:tpm20')";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
key "tpm20-hash-algo"; key "tpm20-hash-algo";
description description
"Specifies the list of PCRs that may be extracted for "Specifies the list of PCRs that may be extracted for
a specific Hash Algorithm on this TPM2 compliant a specific hash algorithm on this TPM2-compliant
cryptoprocessor. A bank is a set of PCRs which are cryptoprocessor. A bank is a set of PCRs that are
extended using a particular hash algorithm."; extended using a particular hash algorithm.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf,
Section 10.9.7";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos' + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a "The hash scheme actively being used to hash
one or more TPM2.0 PCRs."; one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";
} }
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type tpm:pcr; type tpm:pcr;
description description
"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted."; "Defines which TPM2.0 PCRs are available to be
extracted.";
} }
} }
leaf status { leaf status {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum operational { enum operational {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"The TPM currently is running normally and "The TPM currently is running normally and
is ready to accept and process TPM quotes."; is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Arch: "TPM2.0-Arch:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf Architecture, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf,
Section 12"; Section 12";
} }
enum non-operational { enum non-operational {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which "TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown, which
precludes the processing of TPM quotes."; precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";
} }
} }
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"TPM chip self-test status."; "TPM chip self-test status.";
} }
container certificates { container certificates {
description description
"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates "The TPM's certificates, including EK Certificates
and Attestation Key certificates."; and Attestation Key Certificates.";
list certificate { list certificate {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"Three types of certificates can be accessed via "Three types of certificates can be accessed via
this statement, including Initial Attestation this statement, including Initial Attestation
Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate, or
Endorsement Key Certificate."; Endorsement Key Certificate.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate "An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate
associated within key within a TPM."; associated with a key within a TPM.";
} }
leaf keystore-ref { leaf keystore-ref {
if-feature "ks:central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "ks:central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys";
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys"
+ "/ks:name"; + "/ks:asymmetric-key/ks:name";
} }
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate of an "A reference to a specific certificate of an
asymmetric key in the Keystore."; asymmetric key in the keystore.";
} }
leaf type { leaf type {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum endorsement-certificate { enum endorsement-certificate {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type."; "Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.11"; Section 3.11";
} }
enum initial-attestation-certificate { enum initial-attestation-certificate {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type."; "Initial Attestation Key (IAK) Certificate
type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
enum local-attestation-certificate { enum local-attestation-certificate {
value 2; value 2;
description description
"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type."; "Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
} }
description description
"Function supported by this certificate from within the "Function supported by this certificate from within
TPM."; the TPM.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
container attester-supported-algos { container attester-supported-algos {
description description
"Identifies which TPM algorithms are available for use on an "Identifies which TPM algorithms are available for use on an
attesting platform."; attesting platform.";
leaf-list tpm12-asymmetric-signing { leaf-list tpm12-asymmetric-signing {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric; base taa:asymmetric;
} }
description description
"Platform Supported TPM12 asymmetric algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM1.2 asymmetric algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm12-hash { leaf-list tpm12-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"Platform supported TPM12 hash algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM1.2 hash algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm20-asymmetric-signing { leaf-list tpm20-asymmetric-signing {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric; base taa:asymmetric;
} }
description description
"Platform Supported TPM20 asymmetric algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM2.0 asymmetric algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm20-hash { leaf-list tpm20-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"Platform supported TPM20 hash algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM2.0 hash algorithms.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
&lt;CODE ENDS&gt; ]]></sourcecode>
</sourcecode>
</figure> </figure>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="ietf-tcg-algs"> <section anchor="ietf-tcg-algs">
<name>'ietf-tcg-algs'</name> <name>ietf-tcg-algs</name>
<t>This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of <xref ta <!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.2. Please help us clarify the phrase "By including this
rget="TCG-Algos"/>, revision 1.32. By including this full table as a separate YA full table" in the following passage. Is Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] meant? FYI, we
NG file within this document, it is possible for other YANG models to leverage t have updated the introductory paragraph to reflect which references are used in
he contents of this model. Specific references to <xref target="RFC2104"/>, <xre the ietf-tcg-algs module:
f target="RFC8017"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-9797-1"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-979
7-2"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-10116"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-10118-3"/>, <xref Original:
target="ISO-IEC-14888-3"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-15946-1"/>, <xref target="ISO- This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of
IEC-18033-3"/>, <xref target="IEEE-Std-1363-2000"/>, <xref target="IEEE-Std-1363 [TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a
a-2004"/>, <xref target="NIST-PUB-FIPS-202"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-38C"/>, separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
<xref target="NIST-SP800-38D"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-38F"/>, <xref target=" YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific
NIST-SP800-56A"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-108"/>, <xref target="bios-log"/>, a references to [RFC2104], [RFC8017], [ISO-IEC-9797-1],
s well as <xref target="ima"/> and <xref target="netequip-boot-log"/> exist with [ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3],
in the YANG Model.</t> [ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3],
[IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202],
[NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F],
[NIST-SP800-56A], [NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], as well as Appendix A
and Appendix B exist within the YANG Model.
Current (removing version information, replacing "model" with "module", removing
[bios-log], Appendix A, and Appendix B, and adding [RFC8032], [TPM1.2-Structure
s], and [TPM2.0]):
This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of
[TCG-Algos]. By including this full table as a
separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
YANG modules to leverage the contents of this module. Specific
references to [TPM1.2-Structures], [TPM2.0], [RFC2104], [RFC8017],
[RFC8032], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], [ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116],
[ISO-IEC-10118-3], [ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1],
[ISO-IEC-18033-3], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004],
[NIST-FIPS-202], [NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D],
[NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-SP800-56A], and [NIST-SP800-108] exist
within the YANG module.
-->
<t>This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of <xref ta
rget="TCG-Algos"/>, revision 1.32. By including this full table as a separate YA
NG file within this document, it is possible for other YANG modules to leverage
the contents of this module. Specific references to <xref target="TPM1.2-Struct
ures"/>, <xref target="TPM2.0"/>, <xref target="RFC2104"/>, <xref target="RFC801
7"/>, <xref target="RFC8032"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-9797-1"/>, <xref target="I
SO-IEC-9797-2"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-10116"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-10118-3"
/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-14888-3"/>, <xref target="ISO-IEC-15946-1"/>, <xref ta
rget="ISO-IEC-18033-3"/>, <xref target="IEEE-Std-1363-2000"/>, <xref target="IEE
E-Std-1363a-2004"/>, <xref target="NIST-FIPS-202"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-38
C"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-38D"/>, <xref target="NIST-SP800-38F"/>, <xref ta
rget="NIST-SP800-56A"/>, and <xref target="NIST-SP800-108"/> exist within the YA
NG module.</t>
<section anchor="features-1"> <section anchor="features-1">
<name>Features</name> <name>Features</name>
<t>There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'. S upport for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be available on an Attester.</t> <t>There are two types of features supported: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'. S upport for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be available on an Attester.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="identities-1"> <section anchor="identities-1">
<name>Identities</name> <name>Identities</name>
<t>There are three types of identities in this model:</t> <t>There are three types of identities in this model:</t>
<ol spacing="normal" type="1"> <ol spacing="normal" type="1">
<li>Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these in clude: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing', 'anonymous_signing', 'encry ption_mode', 'method', and 'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are i n Table 2 of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/>.</li> <li>Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these in clude 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing', 'anonymous_signing', 'encryp tion_mode', 'method', and 'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2 of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/>.</li>
<li>API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'</li> <li>API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'</li>
<li>Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what cry ptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of API specification. I t is not required that an implementation of a specific TPM will support all algo rithm types. The contents of each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/>.</li> <li>Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines which cr yptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of API specification. It is not required that an implementation of a specific TPM will support all alg orithm types. The contents of each specific algorithm mirrors the contents of Ta ble 3 of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/>.</li>
</ol> </ol>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="ref-ietf-tcg-algs"> <section anchor="ref-ietf-tcg-algs">
<name>YANG Module</name> <name>YANG Module</name>
<sourcecode type="YANG"> <!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.2.3. Should the ALG_ID information move from the refere
&lt;CODE BEGINS&gt; file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-03-23.yang" nce to the description for each identity? For example:
Current:
description
"RSA algorithm.";
reference
"TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001";
Perhaps:
description
"RSA algorithm. ALG_ID: 0x0001.";
reference
"TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.2.3. Should the reference for identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256
also include ISO/IEC 10118-3?
Original:
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm";
reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
Perhaps:
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20;
base hash;
description
"The SHA-256 algorithm. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
reference
"TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST FIPS 202, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3";
-->
<!-- [rfced] Section 2.1.2.3. FYI, we have added references to the following. Pl
ease let us know if any changes are necessary.
Original:
feature tpm12 {
description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API
as per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf";
}
feature tpm20 {
description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf";
}
Current:
feature tpm12 {
description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API
per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures.";
reference
"TPM1.2-Structures: TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
}
feature tpm20 {
description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Architecture.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Arch: Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Architecture, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf,
Section 11.4";
-->
<sourcecode type="yang" markers="true" name="ietf-tcg-algs@2024-10-2
2.yang"><![CDATA[
module ietf-tcg-algs { module ietf-tcg-algs {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";
prefix taa; prefix taa;
organization organization
"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group"; "IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: &lt;https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/&gt; "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
WG List: &lt;mailto:rats@ietf.org&gt; WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
Author: Eric Voit &lt;mailto:evoit@cisco.com&gt;"; Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";
description description
"This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms. "This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
authors of the code. All rights reserved. NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself authors of the code. All rights reserved.
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all Relating to IETF Documents
capitals, as shown here."; (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
revision 2022-03-23 { This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9684; see the
RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2024-10-22 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs)";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
feature tpm12 { feature tpm12 {
description description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API "This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API
as per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures: per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures.";
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures reference
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- "TPM1.2-Structures: TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures,
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
} }
feature tpm20 { feature tpm20 {
description description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API "This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch: Architecture.";
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ reference
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf"; "TPM2.0-Arch: Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Architecture, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf,
Section 11.4";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Identities */ /* Identities */
/*****************/ /*****************/
identity asymmetric { identity asymmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and "A TCG-recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and
private key."; private key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub"; tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";
} }
identity symmetric { identity symmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key."; "A TCG-recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private
key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity hash { identity hash {
description description
"A TCG recognized hash algorithm that compresses input data to "A TCG-recognized hash algorithm that compresses input data to
a digest value or indicates a method that uses a hash."; a digest value or indicates a method that uses a hash.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity signing { identity signing {
description description
"A TCG recognized signing algorithm"; "A TCG-recognized signing algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity anonymous_signing { identity anonymous_signing {
description description
"A TCG recognized anonymous signing algorithm."; "A TCG-recognized anonymous signing algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity encryption_mode { identity encryption_mode {
description description
"A TCG recognized encryption mode."; "A TCG-recognized encryption mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity method { identity method {
description description
"A TCG recognized method such as a mask generation function."; "A TCG-recognized method such as a mask generation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity object_type { identity object_type {
description description
"A TCG recognized object type."; "A TCG-recognized object type.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 2";
} }
identity cryptoprocessor { identity cryptoprocessor {
description description
"Base identity identifying a crytoprocessor."; "Base identity identifying a crytoprocessor.";
} }
identity tpm12 { identity tpm12 {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM1.2."; "Supportable by a TPM 1.2.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Structures: "TPM1.2-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8"; TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
} }
identity tpm20 { identity tpm20 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM2."; "Supportable by a TPM 2.0";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf"; TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSA {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"RSA algorithm"; "RSA algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_TDES { identity TPM_ALG_TDES {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"Block cipher with various key sizes (Triple Data Encryption "Block cipher with various key sizes (Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm, commonly called Triple Data Encryption Standard) Algorithm, commonly called Triple Data Encryption Standard)
Note: was banned in TPM1.2 v94"; Note: Was banned in TPM 1.2, v94";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base hash; base hash;
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic "SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic
protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms
where protection is not required."; where protection is not required.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_HMAC { identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm"; "Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005"; ISO/IEC 9797-2, and
RFC 2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_AES { identity TPM_ALG_AES {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The AES algorithm with various key sizes"; "The AES algorithm with various key sizes.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_MGF1 { identity TPM_ALG_MGF1 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"hash-based mask-generation function"; "Hash-based mask-generation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
IEEE Std 1363-2000 and IEEE Std 1363a-2004. IEEE Std 1363-2000, and
IEEE Std 1363a-2004.
ALG_ID: 0x0007"; ALG_ID: 0x0007";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH { identity TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These "An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These
may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may
also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor
encrypting."; encrypting.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0008"; ALG_ID: 0x0008";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_XOR { identity TPM_ALG_XOR {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The XOR encryption algorithm."; "The XOR encryption algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x000A"; ALG_ID: 0x000A";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA256 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 256 algorithm"; "The SHA-256 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 384 algorithm"; "The SHA-384 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 512 algorithm"; "The SHA-512 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_NULL { identity TPM_ALG_NULL {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"NULL algorithm"; "Null algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0010"; ALG_ID: 0x0010";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM3_256 { identity TPM_ALG_SM3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SM3 hash algorithm."; "The ShangMi 3 (SM3) hash algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018. ALG_ID: 0x0012"; ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018. ALG_ID: 0x0012";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM4 { identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"SM4 symmetric block cipher"; "ShangMi 4 (SM4) symmetric block cipher.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0013"; ALG_ID: 0x0013";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2 "Signature algorithm defined in Section 8.2
(RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)"; (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAES { identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2 "Signature algorithm defined in Section 7.2
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)"; (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS { identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)"; "Padding algorithm defined in Section 8.1 (RSASSA-PSS)
of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0016"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0016";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_OAEP { identity TPM_ALG_OAEP {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 7.1 (RSASSA OAEP)"; "Padding algorithm defined in Section 7.1 (RSAES-OAEP)
of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0017"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0017";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDSA { identity TPM_ALG_ECDSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Signature algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)"; "Signature algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 14888-3. ALG_ID: 0x0018"; ISO/IEC 14888-3. ALG_ID: 0x0018";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDH { identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Secret sharing using ECC"; "Secret sharing using ECC.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019"; NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA { identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base anonymous_signing; base anonymous_signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme"; "Elliptic-curve-based, anonymous signing scheme.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x001A"; TCG TPM 2.0 Library. ALG_ID: 0x001A";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM2 { identity TPM_ALG_SM2 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
base method; base method;
description description
"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based, "SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,
signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange
protocol"; protocol.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001B"; ALG_ID: 0x001B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR { identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature"; "Elliptic-curve-based Schnorr signature.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001C"; ALG_ID: 0x001C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV { identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Two-phase elliptic-curve key"; "Two-phase elliptic-curve key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x001D"; NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x001D";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A { identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Concatenation key derivation function"; "Concatenation key derivation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1. NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) Section 5.8.1.
ALG_ID: 0x0020"; ALG_ID: 0x0020";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 { identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Key derivation function"; "Key derivation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021"; IEEE 1363a-2004, KDF2, Section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 { identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 {
base TPM_ALG_KDF2; base TPM_ALG_KDF2;
description description
"A key derivation method"; "A key derivation method.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3 and
NIST SP800-108 - Section 5.1 KDF. ALG_ID: 0x0022"; NIST SP800-108, Section 5.1, KDF. ALG_ID: 0x0022";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECC { identity TPM_ALG_ECC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"Prime field ECC"; "Prime field ECC.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023"; ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER { identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"Object type for a symmetric block cipher"; "Object type for a symmetric block cipher.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025"; TCG TPM 2.0 Library. ALG_ID: 0x0025";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA { identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The Camellia algorithm"; "The Camellia algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm"; "ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA-256 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 384 algorithm"; "The SHA-384 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0028"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0028";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 512 algorithm"; "The SHA-512 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0029"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0029";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CMAC { identity TPM_ALG_CMAC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"block Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)"; "Block Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 Algorithm 5. ALG_ID: 0x003F"; ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Algorithm 5. ALG_ID: 0x003F";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CTR { identity TPM_ALG_CTR {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Counter mode"; "Counter mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0040"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0040";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_OFB { identity TPM_ALG_OFB {
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Output Feedback mode"; "Output Feedback mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0041"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0041";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CBC { identity TPM_ALG_CBC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Cipher Block Chaining mode"; "Cipher Block Chaining mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0042"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0042";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CFB { identity TPM_ALG_CFB {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Cipher Feedback mode"; "Cipher Feedback mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECB { identity TPM_ALG_ECB {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Electronic Codebook mode"; "Electronic Codebook mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CCM { identity TPM_ALG_CCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication "Counter with Cipher Block Chaining--Message Authentication
Code (CCM)"; Code (CCM).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050"; NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_GCM { identity TPM_ALG_GCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)"; "Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38D. ALG_ID: 0x0051"; NIST SP800-38D. ALG_ID: 0x0051";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KW { identity TPM_ALG_KW {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"AES Key Wrap (KW)"; "AES Key Wrap (KW).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0052"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0052";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KWP { identity TPM_ALG_KWP {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)"; "AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_EAX { identity TPM_ALG_EAX {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Authenticated-Encryption Mode"; "Authenticated-Encryption Mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_EDDSA { identity TPM_ALG_EDDSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)"; "Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.32, Table 3, and
RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060"; RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";
} }
} }
&lt;CODE ENDS&gt; ]]></sourcecode>
</sourcecode> <t>Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by
<t>Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However, the full definition of Table 3 of <x
<tt>ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang</tt>. However, the full definition of Tabl ref target="TCG-Algos"/> will allow use by additional YANG specifications.</t>
e 3 of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/> will allow use by additional YANG specificatio
ns.</t>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"> <section anchor="iana-considerations">
<name>IANA Considerations</name> <name>IANA Considerations</name>
<t>This document registers the following namespace URIs in the <t>This document registers the following namespace URIs in the
<xref target="xml-registry"/> as per <xref target="RFC3688"/>:</t> <xref target="XML-Registry"/> per <xref target="RFC3688"/>:</t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>URI:</dt> <dt>URI:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation <t>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
</t> </t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>Registrant Contact:</dt> <dt>Registrant Contact:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>The IESG.</t> <t>The IESG.</t>
</dd> </dd>
skipping to change at line 2255 skipping to change at line 2665
<t>The IESG.</t> <t>The IESG.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>XML:</dt> <dt>XML:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.</t> <t>N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
<t>This document registers the following YANG modules in the <t>This document registers the following YANG modules in the
registry <xref target="yang-parameters"/> as per Section 14 of <xref target="RFC 6020"/>:</t> registry <xref target="YANG-Parameters"/> per <xref target="RFC6020" section="14 " sectionFormat="of"/>:</t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>Name:</dt> <dt>Name:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>ietf-tpm-remote-attestation <t>ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
</t> </t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>Namespace:</dt> <dt>Namespace:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation</t> <t>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation</t>
</dd> </dd>
skipping to change at line 2299 skipping to change at line 2709
<dt>Reference:</dt> <dt>Reference:</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form)</t> <t>draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form)</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"> <section anchor="security-considerations">
<name>Security Considerations</name> <name>Security Considerations</name>
<t>The YANG module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang specified in this docu <!-- [rfced] Section 4. The original Security Considerations section was missing
ment defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network manag paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 that are specified in the template found at <https://wik
ement protocols such as NETCONF <xref target="RFC6241"/> or RESTCONF <xref targe i.ietf.org/group/ops/yang-security-guidelines>. We have added paragraph 2. Pleas
t="RFC8040"/>. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the m e let us know if paragraphs 4 and 5 should also be added. -->
andatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) <xref target="RFC62 <t>The YANG module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang specified in this docu
42"/>. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secure ment defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed via network manag
transport is TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t> ement protocols such as NETCONF <xref target="RFC6241"/> or RESTCONF <xref targe
<t>There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are w t="RFC8040"/>. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the
ritable/creatable/deletable (i.e., <em>config true</em>, which is the default). mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) <xref target="RFC6
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network envir 242"/>. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the mandatory-to-implement secu
onments. Write operations (e.g., <em>edit-config</em>) to these data nodes witho re transport is TLS <xref target="RFC8446"/>.</t>
ut proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These are <t> The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) <xref target="RF
the subtrees and data nodes as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:</t> C8341"/> provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCON
F users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol
operations and content.
</t>
<t>There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are w
ritable/creatable/deletable (i.e., <em>config true</em>, which is the default).
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network envi
ronments. Write operations (e.g., <em>edit-config</em>) to these data nodes wit
hout proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. These
are the subtrees and data nodes as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:</t>
<dl> <dl>
<dt>Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos':</dt> <dt>Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>'tpm12-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing ', and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are not support ed by the underlying physical TPM installed by the equipment vendor. A vendor sh ould restrict the ability to configure unsupported algorithms.</t> <t>'tpm12-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing ', and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are not support ed by the underlying physical TPM installed by the equipment vendor. A vendor s hould restrict the ability to configure unsupported algorithms.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms':</dt> <dt>Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>'name': Although shown as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the config uration.</t> <t>'name': Although shown as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the config uration.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt/> <dt/>
<dd> <dd>
<t>'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction w hich are not being extended by system software. This could unnecessarily use TPM resources.</t> <t>'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs that are not bei ng extended by system software for extraction. This could unnecessarily use TPM resources.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt/> <dt/>
<dd> <dd>
<t>'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which doe s not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0 respectively. In such a case, calls to a n RPC requesting this specific certificate could result in either no response or a response for an unexpected TPM.</t> <t>'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate that does not correspond to an AIK within the TPM 1.2, or to an Attestation Key (AK) with in the TPM 2.0, respectively. In such a case, calls to an RPC requesting this sp ecific certificate could result in either no response or a response from an unex pected TPM.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation':</dt> <dt>RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>The receiver of the RPC response must verify that the certificate i s for an active AIK, i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party a s being able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.</t> <t>The receiver of the RPC response must verify that the certificate i s for an active AIK, i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party a s being able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation':</dt> <dt>RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>The receiver of the RPC response must verify that the certificate i s for an active AK, i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature wi thin the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted TPM 2.0.</t> <t>The receiver of the RPC response must verify that the certificate i s for an active AK, i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature wi thin the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted TPM 2.0.</t>
</dd> </dd>
<dt>RPC 'log-retrieval':</dt> <dt>RPC 'log-retrieval':</dt>
<dd> <dd>
<t>Requesting a large volume of logs from the Attester could require s ignificant system resources and create a denial of service.</t> <t>Requesting a large volume of logs from the Attester could require s ignificant system resources and create a denial of service.</t>
</dd> </dd>
</dl> </dl>
<t>Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that specific <t>Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal specific vers
versions of software and configurations of endpoints that could identify vulner ions of software and configurations of endpoints that could identify vulnerabili
abilities on those systems. Therefore, RPCs should be protected by NACM <xref ta ties on those systems. Therefore, RPCs should be protected by NACM <xref target
rget="RFC8341"/> with a default setting of deny-all to limit the extraction of a ="RFC8341"/> with a default setting of deny-all to limit the extraction of attes
ttestation data by only authorized Verifiers.</t> tation data by only authorized Verifiers.</t>
<t>For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when selecting <t>For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when selecting
specific algorithms. The introductory section of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/> high specific algorithms. The introductory section of <xref target="TCG-Algos"/> hig
lights that some algorithms should be considered legacy, and recommends implemen hlights that some algorithms should be considered legacy, and recommends impleme
ters and adopters diligently evaluate available information such as governmental nters and adopters diligently evaluate available information such as governmenta
, industrial, and academic research before selecting an algorithm for use.</t> l, industrial, and academic research before selecting an algorithm for use.</t>
</section> </section>
</middle> </middle>
<back> <back>
<displayreference target="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models" to="RATS-I
nteraction-Models"/>
<references> <references>
<name>References</name> <name>References</name>
<references> <references>
<name>Normative References</name> <name>Normative References</name>
<reference anchor="RFC2104">
<front>
<title>HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2104"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2104"/>
<author fullname="H. Krawczyk" initials="H." surname="Krawczyk"/>
<author fullname="M. Bellare" initials="M." surname="Bellare"/>
<author fullname="R. Canetti" initials="R." surname="Canetti"/>
<date month="February" year="1997"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes HMAC, a mechanism for message authentic
ation using cryptographic hash functions. HMAC can be used with any iterative cr
yptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1, in combination with a secret shared
key. The cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties of the underl
ying hash function. This memo provides information for the Internet community. T
his memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6020">
<front>
<title>YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6020"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6020"/>
<author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname=
"Bjorklund"/>
<date month="October" year="2010"/>
<abstract>
<t>YANG is a data modeling language used to model configuration an
d state data manipulated by the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF), NETCON
F remote procedure calls, and NETCONF notifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC3688">
<front>
<title>The IETF XML Registry</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3688"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3688"/>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="81"/>
<author fullname="M. Mealling" initials="M." surname="Mealling"/>
<date month="January" year="2004"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes an IANA maintained registry for IETF st
andards which use Extensible Markup Language (XML) related items such as Namespa
ces, Document Type Declarations (DTDs), Schemas, and Resource Description Framew
ork (RDF) Schemas.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6991">
<front>
<title>Common YANG Data Types</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6991"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6991"/>
<author fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" initials="J." role="editor" surn
ame="Schoenwaelder"/>
<date month="July" year="2013"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document introduces a collection of common data types to b
e used with the YANG data modeling language. This document obsoletes RFC 6021.</
t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8348">
<front>
<title>A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8348"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8348"/>
<author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>
<author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/>
<author fullname="J. Dong" initials="J." surname="Dong"/>
<author fullname="D. Romascanu" initials="D." surname="Romascanu"/>
<date month="March" year="2018"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document defines a YANG data model for the management of h
ardware on a single server.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6241">
<front>
<title>Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6241"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6241"/>
<author fullname="R. Enns" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Enns
"/>
<author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." role="editor" surname=
"Bjorklund"/>
<author fullname="J. Schoenwaelder" initials="J." role="editor" surn
ame="Schoenwaelder"/>
<author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." role="editor" surname="B
ierman"/>
<date month="June" year="2011"/>
<abstract>
<t>The Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) defined in this do
cument provides mechanisms to install, manipulate, and delete the configuration
of network devices. It uses an Extensible Markup Language (XML)-based data encod
ing for the configuration data as well as the protocol messages. The NETCONF pro
tocol operations are realized as remote procedure calls (RPCs). This document ob
soletes RFC 4741. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8040">
<front>
<title>RESTCONF Protocol</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8040"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8040"/>
<author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>
<author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/>
<author fullname="K. Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen"/>
<date month="January" year="2017"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes an HTTP-based protocol that provides a
programmatic interface for accessing data defined in YANG, using the datastore c
oncepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF).</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6242">
<front>
<title>Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure Shell (SSH)</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6242"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6242"/>
<author fullname="M. Wasserman" initials="M." surname="Wasserman"/>
<date month="June" year="2011"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes a method for invoking and running the N
etwork Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) within a Secure Shell (SSH) session as a
n SSH subsystem. This document obsoletes RFC 4742. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC6933">
<front>
<title>Entity MIB (Version 4)</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6933"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6933"/>
<author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>
<author fullname="D. Romascanu" initials="D." surname="Romascanu"/>
<author fullname="J. Quittek" initials="J." surname="Quittek"/>
<author fullname="M. Chandramouli" initials="M." surname="Chandramou
li"/>
<date month="May" year="2013"/>
<abstract>
<t>This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base
(MIB) for use with network management protocols in the Internet community. In pa
rticular, it describes managed objects used for managing multiple logical and ph
ysical entities managed by a single Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) ag
ent. This document specifies version 4 of the Entity MIB. This memo obsoletes ve
rsion 3 of the Entity MIB module published as RFC 4133.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8446">
<front>
<title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</titl
e>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
<author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
<date month="August" year="2018"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Secu
rity (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over t
he Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and m
essage forgery.</t>
<t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 50
77, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 im
plementations.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8341">
<front>
<title>Network Configuration Access Control Model</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8341"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8341"/>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="91"/>
<author fullname="A. Bierman" initials="A." surname="Bierman"/>
<author fullname="M. Bjorklund" initials="M." surname="Bjorklund"/>
<date month="March" year="2018"/>
<abstract>
<t>The standardization of network configuration interfaces for use
with the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) or the RESTCONF protocol requ
ires a structured and secure operating environment that promotes human usability
and multi-vendor interoperability. There is a need for standard mechanisms to r
estrict NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol access for particular users to a preconfigu
red subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
This document defines such an access control model.</t>
<t>This document obsoletes RFC 6536.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8032">
<front>
<title>Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8032"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8032"/>
<author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
<author fullname="I. Liusvaara" initials="I." surname="Liusvaara"/>
<date month="January" year="2017"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document describes elliptic curve signature scheme Edwards
-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA). The algorithm is instantiated with r
ecommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves. An example imp
lementation and test vectors are provided.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8017">
<front>
<title>PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8017"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8017"/>
<author fullname="K. Moriarty" initials="K." role="editor" surname="
Moriarty"/>
<author fullname="B. Kaliski" initials="B." surname="Kaliski"/>
<author fullname="J. Jonsson" initials="J." surname="Jonsson"/>
<author fullname="A. Rusch" initials="A." surname="Rusch"/>
<date month="November" year="2016"/>
<abstract>
<t>This document provides recommendations for the implementation o
f public-key cryptography based on the RSA algorithm, covering cryptographic pri
mitives, encryption schemes, signature schemes with appendix, and ASN.1 syntax f
or representing keys and for identifying the schemes.</t>
<t>This document represents a republication of PKCS #1 v2.2 from R
SA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) series. By publishing
this RFC, change control is transferred to the IETF.</t>
<t>This document also obsoletes RFC 3447.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC9334">
<front>
<title>Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture</title>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9334"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9334"/>
<author fullname="H. Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz"/>
<author fullname="D. Thaler" initials="D." surname="Thaler"/>
<author fullname="M. Richardson" initials="M." surname="Richardson"/
>
<author fullname="N. Smith" initials="N." surname="Smith"/>
<author fullname="W. Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan"/>
<date month="January" year="2023"/>
<abstract>
<t>In network protocol exchanges, it is often useful for one end o
f a communication to know whether the other end is in an intended operating stat
e. This document provides an architectural overview of the entities involved tha
t make such tests possible through the process of generating, conveying, and eva
luating evidentiary Claims. It provides a model that is neutral toward processor
architectures, the content of Claims, and protocols.</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore">
<front>
<title>A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore Operations</tit
le>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
-35"/>
<author fullname="Kent Watsen" initials="K." surname="Watsen">
<organization>Watsen Networks</organization>
</author>
<date day="16" month="March" year="2024"/>
<abstract>
<t> This document presents a YANG module called "ietf-keystore"
that
enables centralized configuration of both symmetric and asymmetric
keys. The secret value for both key types may be encrypted or
hidden. Asymmetric keys may be associated with certificates.
Notifications are sent when certificates are about to expire.
</t> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2104.xml"
</abstract> />
</front> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6020.xml"
</reference> />
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest"> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3688.xml"
<front> />
<title>TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification</title <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6991.xml"
> />
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-n <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8348.xml"
etwork-device-attest-14"/> />
<author fullname="Guy Fedorkow" initials="G." surname="Fedorkow"> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6241.xml"
<organization>Juniper Networks, Inc.</organization> />
</author> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8040.xml"
<author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit"> />
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6242.xml"
</author> />
<author fullname="Jessica Fitzgerald-McKay" initials="J." surname="F <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.6933.xml"
itzgerald-McKay"> />
<organization>National Security Agency</organization> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"
</author> />
<date day="22" month="March" year="2022"/> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8341.xml"
<abstract> />
<t> This document describes a workflow for remote attestation of <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8032.xml"
the />
integrity of firmware and software installed on network devices that <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8017.xml"
contain Trusted Platform Modules [TPM1.2], [TPM2.0], as defined by />
the Trusted Computing Group (TCG)), or equivalent hardware
implementations that include the protected capabilities, as provided <!-- [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] now RFC 9642 -->
by TPMs. <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9642.xml"
/>
<!-- [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] now RFC 9334 -->
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9334.xml"
/>
<!-- [I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] in REF; companion document
RFC 9683 -->
<reference anchor='RFC9683' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9683'>
<front>
<title>TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification</title>
<author initials='G' surname='Fedorkow' fullname='Guy Fedorkow'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='E' surname='Voit' fullname='Eric Voit'>
<organization />
</author>
<author initials='J' surname='Fitzgerald-McKay' fullname='Jessica Fitzgerald
-McKay'>
<organization />
</author>
<date year='2024' month='October' />
</front>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9683"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9683"/>
</reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. FYI, the date of [TPM1.2] was updated to "01
March 2011" from "2 October 2003" to match the information provided at the targe
t URL (https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/). Plea
se let us know if any changes are necessary.
Original:
[TPM1.2] TCG, "TPM 1.2 Main Specification", 2 October 2003,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-
specification/>.
Current:
[TPM1.2] Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 1.2 Main Specification", TPM
Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1
March 2011, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
tpm-main-specification/>.
-->
</t>
</abstract>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="TPM1.2" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/res ource/tpm-main-specification/"> <reference anchor="TPM1.2" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/res ource/tpm-main-specification/">
<front> <front>
<title>TPM 1.2 Main Specification</title> <title>TPM 1.2 Main Specification</title>
<author initials="" surname="TCG" fullname="Trusted Computing Group" <author>
> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
<organization/>
</author> </author>
<date year="2003" month="October" day="02"/> <date year="2011" month="March" day="01"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116</ refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="TPM1.2-Structures" target="https://trustedcomputinggr oup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.p df"> <reference anchor="TPM1.2-Structures" target="https://trustedcomputinggr oup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.p df">
<front> <front>
<title>TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures</title> <title>TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date year="2011" month="March" day="01"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116</ refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="TPM1.2-Commands" target="https://trustedcomputinggrou p.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"> <reference anchor="TPM1.2-Commands" target="https://trustedcomputinggrou p.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>TPM Main Part 3 Commands</title> <title>TPM Main Part 3 Commands</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date year="2011" month="March" day="01"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116</ refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. FYI, the date of [TPM2.0] was updated to "Ma
rch 2024" from "15 March 2013" to match the information provided at the target U
RL <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/>. Plea
se let us know if any changes are necessary.
Original:
[TPM2.0] TCG, "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-
specification/>.
Current:
[TPM2.0] Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 2.0 Library", Trusted
Platform Module Library Specification, Family "2.0", Level
00, Revision 01.83, March 2024,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-
specification/>.
-->
<reference anchor="TPM2.0" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/res ource/tpm-library-specification/"> <reference anchor="TPM2.0" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/res ource/tpm-library-specification/">
<front> <front>
<title>TPM 2.0 Library Specification</title> <title>TPM 2.0 Library</title>
<author initials="" surname="TCG" fullname="Trusted Computing Group" <author>
> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
<organization/>
</author> </author>
<date year="2013" month="March" day="15"/> <date year="2024" month="March"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Trusted Platform Module Library Specification, Family "2.0 ", Level 00, Revision 01.83</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. There is an updated version of [TPM2.0-Arch]
released on 25 January 2024 (available here:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-1-Archite
cture.pdf). May we update [TPM2.0-Arch] to the most recent version?
Original:
[TPM2.0-Arch]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
01.59, 8 November 2019,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf>.
Perhaps:
[TPM2.0-Arch]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 1: Architecture", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
01.83, 25 January 2024,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-1-Architecture.pdf>.
-->
<!-- XML for newest version of [TPM2.0-Arch]
<reference anchor="TPM2.0-Arch"
target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-
1.83-Part-1-Architecture.pdf">
<front>
<title>Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture</title>
<author>
<organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author>
<date year="2024" month="January" day="25"/>
</front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision 01.83</refcontent>
</reference>
-->
<reference anchor="TPM2.0-Arch" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.or g/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf"> <reference anchor="TPM2.0-Arch" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.or g/wp-content/uploads/TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture</title > <title>Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1: Architecture</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date year="2019" month="November" day="8"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision 01.59</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. An updated version of [TPM2.0-Structures] wa
s released on 25 January 2024 (available here:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structu
res.pdf). May we update [TPM2.0-Structures] to the most recent version?
Original:
[TPM2.0-Structures]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 2: Structures", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
01.38, 29 December 2016,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>.
Perhaps:
[TPM2.0-Structures]
Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
Part 2: Structures", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
01.83, 25 January 2024,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf>.
-->
<!-- XML for newest version of [TPM2.0-Structures]
<reference anchor="TPM2.0-Structures"
target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-
1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf">
<front>
<title>Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures</title>
<author>
<organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author>
<date year="2024" month="January" day="25"/>
</front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision 01.83</refcontent>
</reference>
-->
<reference anchor="TPM2.0-Structures" target="https://trustedcomputinggr oup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf"> <reference anchor="TPM2.0-Structures" target="https://trustedcomputinggr oup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures</title> <title>Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date day="29" month="December" year="2016"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision 01.38</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="TPM2.0-Key" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org /wp-content/uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub1 0082021.pdf"> <reference anchor="TPM2.0-Key" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org /wp-content/uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub1 0082021.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation, Rev12</titl <title>TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation</title>
e> <author>
<author initials="" surname="TCG" fullname="Trusted Computing Group" <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
>
<organization/>
</author> </author>
<date year="2021" month="October" day="08"/> <date year="2021" month="October" day="08"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Version 1.00, Revision 12</refcontent>
</reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. An updated version of [TCG-Algos] was releas
ed on 24 August 2023 (available here:
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-Algorithm-Registry-Rev
ision-1.34_pub-1.pdf>). May we update [TCG-Algos] to the most recent version?
Original:
[TCG-Algos]
Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Algorithm Registry", Family
"2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.32, 25 June 2020,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-
_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub.pdf>.
Perhaps:
[TCG-Algos]
Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Algorithm Registry", Family
"2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.34, 24 August 2023,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-
_Algorithm_Registry-Revision-1.34_pub-1.pdf>.
-->
<!-- XML for updated version of [TCG-Algos]
<reference anchor="TCG-Algos" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TCG-Algorithm-Registry-Revision-1.34_pub-1.pdf">
<front>
<title>TCG Algorithm Registry</title>
<author>
<organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author>
<date year="2023" month="August" day="24"/>
</front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.34</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
-->
<reference anchor="TCG-Algos" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/ wp-content/uploads/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub.pdf"> <reference anchor="TCG-Algos" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/ wp-content/uploads/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>TCG Algorithm Registry</title> <title>TCG Algorithm Registry</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date year="2020" month="June" day="25"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.32</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. [BIOS-Log-Event-Type] and [BIOS-Log] referenc
e different versions of the same TCG specification (see <https://trustedcomputin
ggroup.org/resource/pc-client-specific-platform-firmware-profile-specification/>
). Is this intentional? If not, may we consolidate these two references into one
reference?
The most current version of "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specificati
on" was published on 4 December 2023 (see: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TCG-PC-Client-Platform-Firmware-Profile-Version-1.06-Revision-52
_pub-2.pdf). May we update these references to the most current version?
Original:
* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/
UEFI event logs. [bios-log]
...
leaf-list event-data {
type binary;
description
"The event data. This is a binary structure
of size 'event-size'. For more on what
might be recorded within this object
see [bios-log] Section 9 which details
viable events which might be recorded.";
[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
>.
leaf event-type {
type uint32;
description
"BIOS Log Event Type:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1";
[BIOS-Log-Event-Type]
"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>.
-->
<reference anchor="BIOS-Log-Event-Type" target="https://trustedcomputing group.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf"> <reference anchor="BIOS-Log-Event-Type" target="https://trustedcomputing group.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification</title> <title>TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date day="7" month="May" year="2017"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0" Level 00 Version 1.05 Revision 23</refcontent >
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-9797-1" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/ 50375.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-9797-1" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/ 50375.html">
<front> <front>
<title>Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011</ti tle> <title>Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authen tication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="November" year="2011"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="9797-1:2011"/>
<refcontent>Edition 2</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 <https://www.iso.org/sta
ndard/51618.html> has been withdrawn by ISO and updated by ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 <
https://www.iso.org/standard/75296.html>. May we replace ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011 wit
h ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021? -->
<!-- Updated XML for [ISO-IEC-9797-2]
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-9797-2" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/
75296.html">
<front>
<title>Information security - Message authentication codes (MACs) -
Part 2:
Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function</title>
<author>
<organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author>
<date month="June" year="2021"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="9797-2:2021"/>
<refcontent>Edition 3</refcontent>
</reference>
-->
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-9797-2" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/ 51618.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-9797-2" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/ 51618.html">
<front> <front>
<title>Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011</ti <title>Information technology - Security techniques - Message authen
tle> tication codes (MACs) - Part 2:
Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-function</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="November" year="2011"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="9797-2:2011"/>
<refcontent>Edition 2</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-10116" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/6 4575.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-10116" target="https://www.iso.org/standard/6 4575.html">
<front> <front>
<title>ISO/IEC 10116:2017 - Information technology</title> <title>Information technology - Security techniques - Modes of opera tion for an n-bit block cipher</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="July" year="2017"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="10116:2017"/>
<refcontent>Edition 4</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-10118-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /67116.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-10118-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /67116.html">
<front> <front>
<title>Dedicated hash-functions - ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018</title> <title>IT Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 3: Dedicated h ash-functions</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="October" year="2018"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="10118-3:2018"/>
<refcontent>Edition 4</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-14888-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /76382.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-14888-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /76382.html">
<front> <front>
<title>ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 - Digital signatures with appendix</titl e> <title>Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="November" year="2018"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="14888-3:2018"/>
<refcontent>Edition 4</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-15946-1" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /65480.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-15946-1" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /65480.html">
<front> <front>
<title>ISO/IEC 15946-1:2016 - Information technology</title> <title>Information technology - Security techniques - Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - Part 1: General</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="July" year="2016"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="15946-1:2016"/>
<refcontent>Edition 3</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="ISO-IEC-18033-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /54531.html"> <reference anchor="ISO-IEC-18033-3" target="https://www.iso.org/standard /54531.html">
<front> <front>
<title>ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 - Encryption algorithms</title> <title>Information technology - Security techniques - Encryption alg orithms - Part 3: Block ciphers</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>ISO/IEC</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="December" year="2010"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="18033-3:2010"/>
<refcontent>Edition 2</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="IEEE-Std-1363-2000" target="https://standards.ieee.or
g/standard/1363-2000.html"> <!-- [rfced] Normative References. FYI, we updated the target URL for [IEEE-Std
-1363-2000] to https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/891000. This matches the DOI
URL for this document. Please let us know if any changes are necessary. -->
<reference anchor="IEEE-Std-1363-2000" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee.o
rg/document/891000">
<front> <front>
<title>IEEE 1363-2000 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography</title> <title>IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography</tit le>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>IEEE</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="August" year="2000"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="IEEE Std" value="1363-2000"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2000.92292"/>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. FYI, we updated the target URL for [IEEE-Std
-1363a-2004] to https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1335427. This matches the D
OI URL for this document. Please let us know if any changes are necessary. -->
<reference anchor="IEEE-Std-1363a-2004" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee. org/document/1335427"> <reference anchor="IEEE-Std-1363a-2004" target="https://ieeexplore.ieee. org/document/1335427">
<front> <front>
<title>1363a-2004 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryp tography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques</title> <title>IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography - Am endment 1: Additional Techniques</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>IEEE</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="September" year="2004"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="IEEE Std" value="1363a-2004"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.1109/IEEESTD.2004.94612"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-PUB-FIPS-202" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publ
ications/detail/fips/202/final"> <reference anchor="NIST-FIPS-202" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publicat
ions/detail/fips/202/final">
<front> <front>
<title>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions</title> <title>SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>NIST</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="August" year="2015"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST FIPS" value="202"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38C" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38c/final"> <reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38C" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38c/final">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM M ode for Authentication and Confidentiality</title> <title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM M ode for Authentication and Confidentiality</title>
<author> <author fullname="Morris Dworkin">
<organization/> <organization>NIST</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="July" year="2007"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-38C"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38C"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38D" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38d/final"> <reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38D" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38d/final">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Co unter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</title> <title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Co unter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</title>
<author> <author fullname="Morris Dworkin">
<organization/> <organization>NIST</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="November" year="2007"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-38D"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38F" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38f/final"> <reference anchor="NIST-SP800-38F" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-38f/final">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods f or Key Wrapping</title> <title>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods f or Key Wrapping</title>
<author> <author fullname="Morris Dworkin">
<organization/> <organization>NIST</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="December" year="2012"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-38F"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38F"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-56A" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-3/final"> <reference anchor="NIST-SP800-56A" target="https://csrc.nist.gov/publica tions/detail/sp/800-56a/rev-3/final">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</title> <title>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</title>
<author> <author fullname="Elaine Barker"/>
<organization/> <author fullname="Lily Chen"/>
</author> <author fullname="Allen Roginsky"/>
<date>n.d.</date> <author fullname="Apostol Vassilev"/>
<author fullname="Richard Davis"/>
<date month="April" year="2018"/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-56A Rev. 3"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3"/>
</reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. NIST SP800-108 (https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist
pubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf) has been withdrawn by NIST and
updated by NIST SP800-108r1 (https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/108/r1/upd1/fina
l). May we replace NIST SP800-108 with NIST SP800-108r1? -->
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-108" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist
pubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf">
<front>
<title>Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Function
s (Revised)</title>
<author fullname="Lily Chen"/>
<date day="1" month="October" year="2009"/>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-108"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108"/>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- Note to PE: Updated XML for [NIST-SP800-108]
<reference anchor="NIST-SP800-108" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist pubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf"> <reference anchor="NIST-SP800-108" target="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nist pubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Function s</title> <title>Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Function s</title>
<author> <author fullname="Lily Chen"/>
<organization/> <date month="February" year="2024"/>
</author>
<date>n.d.</date>
</front> </front>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1"/>
<seriesInfo name="NIST SP" value="800-108r1-upd1"/>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="bios-log" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/w
p-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf -->
">
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. FYI, to avoid reader confusion, we have remov
ed the section information from [BIOS-Log] and [CEL] because other sections of [
BIOS-Log] and [CEL] are also referenced in the document. Please let us know if a
ny changes are necessary.
Original
[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
Section 9.4.5.2", n.d.,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
>.
[cel] "Canonical Event Log Format, Section 4.3", n.d.,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf>.
Current:
[BIOS-Log] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware
Profile Specification", Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision
1.03 Version 51, 1 May 2017,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
>.
[CEL] Trusted Computing Group, "Canonical Event Log Format",
Version 1.0 Revision 0.41, 25 February 2022,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf>.
-->
<reference anchor="BIOS-Log" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/w
p-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
">
<front> <front>
<title>TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification, Sectio n 9.4.5.2</title> <title>TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date day="1" month="May" year="2017"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 1.03 Version 51</refcontent >
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="cel" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf"> <reference anchor="CEL" target="https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Canonical Event Log Format, Section 4.3</title> <title>Canonical Event Log Format</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Trusted Computing Group</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date day="25" month="February" year="2022"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Version 1.0 Revision 0.41</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<!-- [rfced] Normative References. A new version of [UEFI-Secure-Boot] was publi
shed on 29 August 2022 (available here: <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/re
sources/UEFI_Spec_2_10_Aug29.pdf>). May we update this reference to the newest v
ersion? -->
<reference anchor="UEFI-Secure-Boot" target="https://uefi.org/sites/defa ult/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf"> <reference anchor="UEFI-Secure-Boot" target="https://uefi.org/sites/defa ult/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Specification Ve rsion 2.9 (March 2021), Section 32.1 (Secure Boot)</title> <title>Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Specification</t itle>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Forum, Inc.</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date month="March" year="2021"/>
</front>
</reference>
<reference anchor="RFC2119">
<front>
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</tit
le>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
<author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
<date month="March" year="1997"/>
<abstract>
<t>In many standards track documents several words are used to sig
nify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. T
his document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents
. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Co
mmunity, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
</abstract>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Section 32.1: Secure Boot</refcontent>
<refcontent>Version 2.9</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="RFC8174">
<!-- [rfced] Note to PE: XML for most current version of [UEFI-Secure-Boot
<reference anchor="UEFI-Secure-Boot" target="https://uefi.org/sites/defa
ult/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf">
<front> <front>
<title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</ti <title>Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Specification</t
tle> itle>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> <author>
<seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/> <organization>Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Forum,
<seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/> Inc.</organization>
<author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/> </author>
<date month="May" year="2017"/> <date day="29" month="August" year="2022"/>
<abstract>
<t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protoco
l specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that
only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
</abstract>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>Section 32.1: Secure Boot</refcontent>
<refcontent>Version 2.10</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
-->
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"
/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"
/>
</references> </references>
<references> <references>
<name>Informative References</name> <name>Informative References</name>
<reference anchor="I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models">
<front>
<title>Reference Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedure
s</title>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-rats-reference-i
nteraction-models-11"/>
<author fullname="Henk Birkholz" initials="H." surname="Birkholz">
<organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Michael Eckel" initials="M." surname="Eckel">
<organization>Fraunhofer SIT</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Wei Pan" initials="W." surname="Pan">
<organization>Huawei Technologies</organization>
</author>
<author fullname="Eric Voit" initials="E." surname="Voit">
<organization>Cisco Systems</organization>
</author>
<date day="22" month="July" year="2024"/>
<abstract>
<t> This document describes interaction models for remote attest
ation
procedures (RATS). Three conveying mechanisms -- Challenge/Response,
Uni-Directional, and Streaming Remote Attestation -- are illustrated
and defined. Analogously, a general overview about the information
elements typically used by corresponding conveyance protocols are
highlighted.
</t> <!-- [I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] Active I-D -->
</abstract>
</front> <xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml3/reference.I-D.ietf-rat
</reference> s-reference-interaction-models.xml"/>
<!-- [rfced] Informative References. Given the size and scope of the Linux GitH
ub Repository, it may be difficult for readers to find the specific files [IMA-K
ernel-Source] in the future as the repository expands. We found the following r
epository for the Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) maintained by Mimi Zo
har at the following URL: <https://github.com/linux-integrity/ima-evm-utils>. Wo
uld this be a better reference for IMA?
Original:
[IMA-Kernel-Source]
"Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel
Sourcecode", n.d., <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob
/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/
integrity/ima/>.
Current (updated according to RFC Style Guide guidance <https://www.rfc-editor.o
rg/styleguide/part2/#ref_repo>):
[IMA-Kernel-Source]
"Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel
Sourcecode", commit df0cc57, 9 October 2021, <https://git
hub.com/torvalds/linux>.
-->
<reference anchor="IMA-Kernel-Source" target="https://github.com/torvald s/linux/blob/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/integrity/ima/"> <reference anchor="IMA-Kernel-Source" target="https://github.com/torvald s/linux/blob/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/integrity/ima/">
<front> <front>
<title>Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel Source code</title> <title>Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel Source code</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization/>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date> <date day="9" month="October" year="2021"/>
</front> </front>
<refcontent>commit df0cc57</refcontent>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="NIST-915121" target="https://tsapps.nist.gov/publicat ion/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121"> <reference anchor="NIST-915121" target="https://tsapps.nist.gov/publicat ion/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121">
<front> <front>
<title>True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is impor tant for information security</title> <title>True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is impor tant for information security</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>NIST</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date>
</front> </front>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="yang-parameters" target="https://www.iana.org/assignm
ents/yang-parameters/yang-parameters.xhtml"> <reference anchor="YANG-Parameters" target="https://www.iana.org/assignm
ents/yang-parameters/">
<front> <front>
<title>YANG Parameters</title> <title>YANG Parameters</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>IANA</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date>
</front> </front>
</reference> </reference>
<reference anchor="xml-registry" target="https://www.iana.org/assignment
s/xml-registry/xml-registry.xhtml"> <reference anchor="XML-Registry" target="https://www.iana.org/assignment
s/xml-registry/">
<front> <front>
<title>IETF XML Registry</title> <title>IETF XML Registry</title>
<author> <author>
<organization/> <organization>IANA</organization>
</author> </author>
<date>n.d.</date>
</front> </front>
</reference> </reference>
</references> </references>
</references> </references>
<?line 2469?> <section anchor="ima">
<section anchor="ima">
<name>Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)</name> <name>Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)</name>
<t>IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot <xref target="TPM2.0-Arch"/ > and Secure Boot <xref target="UEFI-Secure-Boot"/> to the Linux operating syste m, applying it to operating system applications and files. <t>IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot <xref target="TPM2.0-Arch"/ > and Secure Boot <xref target="UEFI-Secure-Boot"/> to the Linux operating syste m, applying it to operating system applications and files.
IMA has been part of the Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 200 9 (kernel version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in t his specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16 <xref target="IMA-Kernel- Source"/>. IMA has been part of the Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 200 9 (kernel version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in t his specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16 <xref target="IMA-Kernel- Source"/>.
IMA enables the protection of system integrity by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and storing measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of files before execution so that these measurements can be used later, at system runtime, in remote attestation procedures. IMA enables the protection of system integrity by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and storing measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of files before execution so that these measurements can be used later, at system runtime, in remote attestation procedures.
IMA acts in support of the appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement Cla IMA acts in support of the Appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement Cla
ims) by leveraging Reference Values stored in extended file attributes.</t> ims) by leveraging Reference Values stored in extended file attributes.</t>
<t>In support of the appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered list <t>In support of the Appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered list
(with no duplicates) of measurements in kernel-space, the Stored Measurement Log (with no duplicates) of measurements in kernel space, the Stored Measurement Log
(SML), for all files that have been measured before execution since the operati (SML), for all files that have been measured before execution since the operati
ng system was started. ng system was started.
Although IMA can be used without a TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with Although IMA can be used without a TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with
a TPM to anchor the integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure storage a TPM to anchor the integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure storage
location, i.e., Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) provided by TPMs. location, i.e., PCRs provided by TPMs.
IMA provides the SML in both binary and ASCII representations in the Linux secur ity file system <em>securityfs</em> (<tt>/sys/kernel/security/ima/</tt>).</t> IMA provides the SML in both binary and ASCII representations in the Linux secur ity file system <em>securityfs</em> (<tt>/sys/kernel/security/ima/</tt>).</t>
<t>IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are incl uded in a log record. <t>IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are incl uded in a log record.
Examples are file path, file hash, user ID, group ID, file signature, and extend ed file attributes. Examples are file path, file hash, user ID, group ID, file signature, and extend ed file attributes.
IMA comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a custom for mat, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported by IMA. IMA comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a custom for mat, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported by IMA.
Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments passed to the kernel. Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments passed to the kernel.
Alternatively, the format can also be hard-coded into custom kernels. Alternatively, the format can also be hard-coded into custom kernels.
IMA templates and fields are extensible in the kernel source code. IMA templates and fields are extensible in the kernel source code. As a result,
As a result, more template fields can be added in the future.</t> more template fields can be added in the future.</t>
<t>IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy langu age. <t>IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy langu age.
Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the kernel. Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the kernel.
Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be hard-coded into a c ustom kernel. Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be hard-coded into a c ustom kernel.
If no policy is defined, no measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabl ed.</t> If no policy is defined, no measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabl ed.</t>
<t>A comprehensive description of the content fields in native Linux IMA T LV format can be found in Table 16 of the Canonical Event Log (CEL) specificatio n <xref target="cel"/>. The CEL specification also illustrates the use of templa tes to enable extended or customized IMA TLV formats in Section 5.1.6.</t> <t>A comprehensive description of the content fields in native Linux IMA T LV format can be found in Table 16 of the Canonical Event Log (CEL) specificatio n <xref target="CEL"/>. The CEL specification also illustrates the use of templa tes to enable extended or customized IMA TLV formats in Section 5.1.6.</t>
</section> </section>
<section anchor="netequip-boot-log"> <section anchor="netequip-boot-log">
<name>IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs</name> <name>IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs</name>
<t>Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected functio ns to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of a device and enab le corresponding remote attestation. <t>Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected functio ns to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of a device and enab le corresponding remote attestation.
Network Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot componen ts and operating system components (executables and files) into a single log fil e in a format identical to the IMA format. Network Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot componen ts and operating system components (executables and files) into a single log fil e in a format identical to the IMA format.
Note that the format used for logging measurement of boot components in this sch eme differs from the boot logging strategy described elsewhere in this document. </t> Note that the format used for logging measurement of boot components in this sch eme differs from the boot logging strategy described elsewhere in this document. </t>
<t>During the boot process of the network device, i.e., from BIOS to the e nd of the operating system and user-space, all files executed can be measured an d logged in the order of their execution. <t>During the boot process of the network device, i.e., from BIOS to the e nd of the operating system and user-space, all files executed can be measured an d logged in the order of their execution.
When the Verifier initiates a remote attestation process (e.g., challenge-respon se remote attestation as defined in this document), the network equipment takes on the role of an Attester and can convey to the Verifier Claims that comprise t he measurement log as well as the corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM.< /t> When the Verifier initiates a remote attestation process (e.g., challenge-respon se remote attestation as defined in this document), the network equipment takes on the role of an Attester and can convey to the Verifier Claims that comprise t he measurement log as well as the corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM.< /t>
<t>The Verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured value with the Reference Value. <t>The Verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured value with the Reference Value.
Based on the execution order, the Verifier can compute a PCR Reference Value (by Based on the execution order, the Verifier can compute a PCR Reference Value (by
replaying the log) and compare it to the Measurement Log Claims obtained in con replaying the log) and compare it to the measurement log Claims obtained in con
junction with the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to a junction with the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to a
n intended operational state.</t> n intended operational state.</t>
<t>Network equipment usually executes multiple components in parallel. Thi <t>Network equipment usually executes multiple components in parallel. Th
s holds not only during the operating system loading phase, but also even during is holds not only during the operating system loading phase, but also even durin
the BIOS boot phase. g the BIOS boot phase.
With this measurement log mechanism, network equipment can take on the role of a With this measurement log mechanism, network equipment can assume the role of an
n Attester, proving to the Verifier the trustworthiness of its boot process. Attester, proving to the Verifier the trustworthiness of its boot process.
Using the measurement log, Verifiers can precisely identify mismatching log entr ies to infer potentially tampered components.</t> Using the measurement log, Verifiers can precisely identify mismatching log entr ies to infer potentially tampered components.</t>
<t>This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the Atteste r that are subsequently executed during the boot phase (e.g., updating/patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference Values in Reference Integrity Mani fests that inform Verifiers about how an Attester is composed.</t> <t>This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the Atteste r that are subsequently executed during the boot phase (e.g., updating/patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference Values in Reference Integrity Mani fests that inform Verifiers about how an Attester is composed.</t>
</section> </section>
</back> </back>
<!-- ##markdown-source: <!-- [rfced] FYI, we have added expansions for abbreviations upon first use per
H4sIAGRzp2YAA+2923LbSLYg+s6I+YccV8RIqkNQJHWxrHJXFU3RtnZJtlqU Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review each expansion in the
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