drip Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Wiethuechter, Ed.
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 9886 AX Enterprize, LLC
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track J. Reid
Expires: 20 February 2026
ISSN: 2070-1721 RTFM llp
19 August
December 2025
DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) in the Domain Name System
draft-ietf-drip-registries-33
Abstract
This document defines the Domain Name System (DNS) functionality of a
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Identity Management
Entity (DIME). It is built around DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) to
standardize a hierarchical registry structure and associated
processes to facilitate trustable and scalable registration and
lookup of information related to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS).
The registry system supports issuance, discovery, and verification of
DETs, enabling secure identification and association of UAS and their
operators. It also defines the interactions between different
classes of registries (root, organizational, and individual) and
their respective roles in maintaining the integrity of the
registration data. This architecture enables decentralized,
federated operation while supporting privacy, traceability, and
regulatory compliance requirements in the context of UAS Remote ID
Identification and other services.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 February 2026.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9886.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. General Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Required Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. DET Hierarchy in DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Use of Existing DNS Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. DNS Model Considerations for DIMEs . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Resource Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. HHIT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Text Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Field Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.1. Text Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2. Field Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. DET Prefix Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2. IANA DRIP Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2.1. DRIP RAA Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.2.2. HHIT Entity Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. DNS Operational & and Registration Considerations . . . . . . 18
7.2. DET & and Public Key Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1.
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2.
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Example Zone Files & and RRType Contents . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. Example RAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1.1. Authentication HHIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1.2. Delegation of HDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.2. Example HDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.2.1. Authentication & and Issue HHITs . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A.2.2. Registratant HHIT & and BRID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Acknowledgements
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction
Registries are fundamental to Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote
Identification (RID). Only very limited operational information can
be sent via Broadcast RID, but extended information is sometimes
needed. The most essential element of information from RID is the
UAS ID, the unique key for lookup of extended information in relevant
registries (see Figure 1; 1, which is the same as Figure 4 of
[RFC9434]).
*************** ***************
* UAS1 * * UAS2 *
* * * *
* +--------+ * DAA/V2V * +--------+ *
* | UA o--*----------------------------------------*--o UA | *
* +--o--o--+ * * +--o--o--+ *
* | | * +------+ Lookups +------+ * | | *
* | | * | GPOD o------. .------o PSOD | * | | *
* | | * +------+ | | +------+ * | | *
* | | * | | * | | *
* C2 | | * V2I ************ V2I * | | C2 *
* | '-----*--------------* *--------------*-----' | *
* | * * * * | *
* | o====Net-RID===* *====Net-RID===o | *
* +--o--+ * * Internet * * +--o--+ *
* | GCS o-----*--------------* *--------------*-----o GCS | *
* +-----+ * Registration * * Registration * +-----+ *
* * (and UTM) * * (and UTM) * *
*************** ************ ***************
| | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| Public o---' | '---o Private |
| Registry | | | Registry |
+----------+ | +----------+
+--o--+
| DNS |
+-----+
DAA: Detect And Avoid
GPOD: General Public Observer Device
PSOD: Public Safety Observer Device
V2I: Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
V2V: Vehicle-to-Vehicle
Figure 1: Global UAS RID Usage Scenario (Figure 4 of RFC9434) RFC 9434)
When a DRIP Entity Tag (DET) [RFC9374] is used as the UAS ID in RID,
extended information can be retrieved from a DRIP Identity Management
Entity (DIME), which manages registration of and associated lookups
from DETs. In this document it is assumed the DIME is a function of
UAS Service Suppliers (USS) (Appendix A.2 of [RFC9434]) [RFC9434]), but a DIME
can be independent or handled by another entity as well.
1.1. General Concept
DRIP Entity Tags (DETs) embed a hierarchy scheme which that is mapped onto
the Domain Name System (DNS) [STD13]. DIMEs enforce registration and
information access of data associated with a DET while also providing
the trust inherited from being a member of the hierarchy. Other
identifiers and their methods are out of scope for this document.
Authoritative Name Servers of the DNS provide the public information
such as the cryptographic keys, endorsements and certificates of DETs
DETs, and pointers to private information resources. Cryptographic
(public) keys are used to authenticate anything signed by a DET, such
as in the Authentication defined in [RFC9575] for Broadcast RID.
Endorsements and certificates are used to endorse the claim of being
part of the hierarchy.
This document does not specify AAA mechanisms used by Private
Information Registries to store and protect Personally Identifiable
Information (PII).
1.2. Scope
The scope of this document is the DNS registration of DETs with the
DNS delegation of the reverse domain of the IPv6 Prefix, prefix, assigned by
IANA for DETs 2001:30::/28 and RRsets used to handle DETs.
2. Terminology
2.1. Required Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Additional Definitions
This document makes use of the terms and abbreviations from previous
DRIP documents. Below are subsets, grouped by original document, of
terms used this document. Please see those documents for additional
context, definitions definitions, and any further referenced material.
From Section 2.2 of [RFC9153] [RFC9153], this document uses: AAA, CAA, GCS,
ICAO, PII, Observer, Operator, UA, UAS, USS, and UTM.
From Section 2 of [RFC9434] [RFC9434], this document uses: Certificate, DIME,
and Endorsement.
From Section 2 of [RFC9374] [RFC9374], this document uses: HDA, HID, and RAA.
3. DET Hierarchy in DNS
[RFC9374] defines the HHIT Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHIT) and
further specifies an instance of them used for UAS RID called DETs.
The HHIT/DET is a 128-bit value that is as an IPv6 address intended
primarily as an identifier rather than locator. Its The format is shown
in Figure 2, shown here for reference, 2 and further information is in [RFC9374].
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
| IPv6 Prefix | Hierarchy ID | HHIT Suite ID | ORCHID Hash |
| (28 bits) | (28 bits) | (8 bits) | (64 bits) |
+-------------+--------------+---------------+-------------+
/ \
/ \
/ \-----------------------------\
/ \
/ \
+--------------------------------+-----------------------+
| Registered Assigning Authority | HHIT Domain Authority |
| (14 bits) | (14 bits) |
+--------------------------------+-----------------------+
Figure 2: DRIP Entity Tag Breakdown
[RFC9374] assigns the IPv6 prefix 2001:30::/28 for DETs. Its
corresponding domain name for reverse lookups is
3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.. The IAB has administrative control of this
domain name.
Due to the nature of the hierarchy split and its relationship to
nibble reversing of the IPv6 address (Section 2.5 of RFC 3596
[STD88]), the upper level of the hierarchy (i.e., Registered
Assigning Authority (RAA)) "borrows" the upper two bits of their
respective HHIT Domain Authority (HDA) space for DNS delegation. As such
such, the IPv6 prefix of RAAs are is 2001:3x:xxx0::/44 and HDAs are is
2001:3x:xxxy:yy00::/56 with respective nibble reverse domains of
x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. and
y.y.y.x.x.x.x.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa..
This document preallocates a subset of RAAs based on the ISO 3166-1
Numeric Nation Code [ISO3166-1]. This is to support the initial use
case of DETs in UAS RID on an international level. See Section 6.2.1
for the RAA allocations.
The HDA values of 0, 4096, 8192 8192, and 12288 are reserved for
operational use of an RAA (a by-product of the above mentioned
borrowing of bits), specifically in particular to specify when to register with
the apex and endorse delegations of HDAs in their namespace.
The administration, management management, and policy for the operation of a
DIME at any level in the hierarchy (Apex, RAA or HDA) is out of scope
for this document. For RAAs or DETs allocated on a per-country
basis, these considerations should be be determined by the appropriate
national authorities, presumably the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
3.1. Use of Existing DNS Models
DRIP relies on the DNS and as such roughly follows the registrant-
registrar-registry model. In the UAS ecosystem, the registrant would
be the end user who owns/controls the Unmanned Aircraft. They are
ultimately responsible for the DET and any other information that
gets published in the DNS. Registrants use agents known as
registrars to manage their interactions with the registry.
Registrars typically provide optional additional services such as DNS
hosting.
The registry maintains a database of the registered domain names and
their related metadata such as the contact details for domain name
holder and the relevant registrar. The registry provides DNS service
for the zone apex apex, which contains delegation information for domain
names. Registries generally provide services such RDAP as the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) [STD95] or equivalent to
publish metadata about the registered domain names and their
registrants and registrars.
Registrants have contracts with registrars who in turn have contracts
with registries. Payments follow this model too: the registrant buys
services from a registrar who pays for services provided by the
registry.
By definition, there can only be one registry for a domain name. A
registry can have an arbitrary number of registrars who compete with
each other on price, service service, and customer support.
3.1.1. DNS Model Considerations for DIMEs
Apex
Registry/Registrar
(IANA)
+=========================+
| 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. |
+============o============+
|
--------------------------------------|-------------------------
National |
Registries/Registrars |
(RAA) |
|
+--------------+--------------o-+---------------+
| | | |
+=====o====+ +====o=====+ +=====o====+ +=====o====+
| 0.0.0.0. | | 1.0.0.0. | | 2.0.0.0. | | 3.0.0.0. |
+====o=====+ +====o=====+ +====o=====+ +====o=====+
|
---------------------------------------|------------------------
Local |
Registries/Registrars |
(HDA) |
|
+--------------+---------------o--------...-----+
| | | |
+=====o====+ +====o=====+ +====o=====+ +=====o====+
| 1.0.0. | | 2.0.0. | | 3.0.0. | | f.f.f. |
+====o=====+ +=====o====+ +====o=====+ +====o=====+
|
---------------------------------------|------------------------
Local |
Registrants |
+=====================o================+
| x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.x.5.0. |
+======================================+
Figure 3: Example DRIP DNS Model
While the registrant-registrar-registry model is mature and well
understood, it may not be appropriate for DRIP registrations in some
circumstances. It could add costs and complexity; developing complexity to develop policies
and contracts as outlined above. On the other hand, registries and
registrars offer customer service/support service and support and can provide the
supporting infrastructure for reliable DNS and RDAP service.
Another approach could be to handle DRIP registrations in a
comparable way to how IP address space gets provisioned. Here,
blocks of addresses get delegated to a "trusted" third party,
typically an ISP, who then issues IP addresses to its customers. For
DRIP, blocks of IP addresses could be delegated from the
3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. domain (reverse domain of prefix allocated by
[RFC9374]) to an entity chosen by the appropriate Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA). This third party would be responsible for the
corresponding DNS and RDAP infrastructure for these IP address
blocks. They would also provision the Hierarchical Host Identity Tag
(HHIT, [RFC9374]) HHIT records [RFC9374] for
these IP addresses. In principle principle, a manufacturer or vendor of UAS
devices could provide that role. This is shown as an example in
Figure 3.
Dynamic DRIP registration is another possible solution, for example
when the operator of a UAS device registers its corresponding HHIT
record and other resources before a flight and deletes them
afterwards. This may be feasible in controlled environments with
well-behaved actors. However, this approach may not scale since each
device is likely to need credentials for updating the IT
infrastructure which that provisions the DNS.
Registration policies (pricing, renewals, registrar registrar, and registrant
agreements, etc.) will need to be developed. These considerations
should be determined by the CAA, perhaps in consultation with local
stakeholders to assess the cost-benefits of these approaches (and
others). All of these are out of scope for this document. The
specifics for the UAS RID use case are detailed in the rest of
document.
4. Public Information Registry
Per [RFC9434] [RFC9434], all information classified as public is stored in the
DNS, specifically Authoritative Name Servers, to satisfy REG-1 from
[RFC9153].
Authoritative Name Servers use domain names as identifiers and data
is stored in Resource Records (RR) (RRs) with associated RRTypes. This
document defines two new RRTypes, one for HHIT metadata (HHIT,
Section 5.1) and another for UAS Broadcast RID information (BRID,
Section 5.2). The former RRType is particularly important as it
contains a URI (as part of the certificate) that points to Private
Information resources.
DETs, being IPv6 addresses, are to be under ip6.arpa. (nibble
reversed per Section 2.5 of RFC 3596 [STD88]) and MUST resolve to an
HHIT RRType. Depending on local circumstances or additional use cases
cases, other RRTypes MAY be present (for example the inclusion of the
DS RRTypes or equivalent when using DNSSEC). For UAS RID RID, the BRID
RRType MUST be present to provide the Broadcast Endorsements (BEs)
defined in Section 3.1.2.1 of [RFC9575].
DNSSEC MUST be used for apex entities (those which use a self-signed
Canonical Registration Certificate) and is RECOMMENDED for other
entities. When a DIME decides to use DNSSEC DNSSEC, they SHOULD define a
framework for cryptographic algorithms and key management [RFC6841].
This may be influenced by the frequency of updates, size of the zone,
and policies.
UAS-specific information, such as physical characteristics, may also
be stored in DNS but is out of scope for this document.
A DET IPv6 address gets mapped into domain names using the scheme
defined in Section 2.5 of RFC 3596 [STD88]. However However, DNS lookups of
these names query for HHIT and/or BRID resource records rather than
the PTR resource records conventionally used in reverse lookups of IP
addresses. For example, the HHIT resource record for the DET
2001:30::1 would be returned from a DNS lookup for the HHIT QTYPE for
1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.a
rpa..
The HHIT RRType provides the public key for signature verification
and URIs via the certificate. The BRID RRType provides static
Broadcast RID information such as the Broadcast Endorsements sent
following as
described in [RFC9575].
5. Resource Records
5.1. HHIT Resource Record
The HHIT Resource Record (HHIT, RRType 67) is a metadata record for
various bits of HHIT-specific information that isn't available in the
pre-existing HIP RRType. The HHIT RRType does not replace the HIP
RRType. The primary advantage of the HHIT RRType over the existing
RRType is the mandatory inclusion of the Canonical Registration
Certificate containing an entity's public key signed by the
registrar, or other trust anchor, to confirm registration.
The data MUST be encoded in CBOR the Concise Binary Object Representation
(CBOR) [RFC8949] bytes. The CDDL Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL)
[RFC8610] of the data is provided in Figure 4.
5.1.1. Text Representation
The data are represented in base64 [RFC4648] and may be divided into
any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64
digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These
substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that
the data has internal subfields but these do not appear in the master
file representation; only a single logical base64 string will appear.
5.1.1.1. Presentation Representation
The data MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the
Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of [RFC8610].
5.1.2. Field Descriptions
hhit-rr = [
hhit-entity-type: uint,
hid-abbreviation: tstr .size(15),
canonical-registration-cert: bstr
]
Figure 4: HHIT Wire Format CDDL
All fields of the HHIT RRType MUST be included to be properly formed.
HHIT Entity Type: The HHIT Entity Type field is a number with values
defined in Section 6.2.2. It is envisioned that there may be many
types of HHITs in use. In some cases, it may be helpful to
understand the HHITs role of the HHITs in the ecosystem ecosystem, like that
described in [drip-dki]. This field provides such context. This
field MAY provide a signal of additional information and/or
different handling of the data beyond what is defined in this
document.
HID Abbreviation: The HID Abbreviation field is a string that
provides an abbreviation to the HID (Hierarchy ID) structure of a
DET for display devices. The convention for such abbreviations is
a matter of local policy. Absent of such a policy, this field
MUST be filled with the four character hexadecimal representations
of the RAA and HDA (in that order) with a separator character character,
such as a space. space, in between. For example, a DET with an RAA value
of 10 and HDA value of 20 would be abbreviated as: 000A 0014.
Canonical Registration Certificate: The Canonical Registration
Certificate field is for a certificate endorsing certificate-endorsing registration of
the DET. It MUST be encoded as X.509 DER [RFC5280]. This
certificate MAY be self-signed when the entity is acting as a root
of trust (i.e., an apex). Such self-signed behavior is defined by
policy, such as in [drip-dki], and is out of scope for this
document. This certificate is part of a chain of certificates
that can be used to validate inclusion in the heirarchy. hierarchy.
5.2. UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record
The UAS Broadcast RID Resource Record (BRID, RRType 68) is a format
to hold public information typically sent over UAS Broadcast RID that
is static. It can act as a data source if information is not
received over Broadcast RID or for cross validation. The primary
function for DRIP is the inclusion to include of one or more Broadcast Endorsements
as defined in [RFC9575] in the auth field. These Endorsements are
generated by the registrar upon successful registration and broadcast
by the entity.
The data MUST be encoded in CBOR [RFC8949] bytes. The CDDL [RFC8610]
of the data is provided in Figure 5.
5.2.1. Text Representation
The data are represented in base64 [RFC4648] and may be divided into
any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to single base64
digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full object. These
substrings can span lines using the standard parenthesis. Note that
the data has internal subfields but these do not appear in the master
file representation; only a single logical base64 string will appear.
5.2.1.1. Presentation Representation
The data MAY, for display purposes only, be represented using the
Extended Diagnostic Notation as defined in Appendix G of [RFC8610].
All byte strings longer than a length of 20 SHOULD be displayed as
base64 when possible.
5.2.2. Field Descriptions
bcast-rr = {
uas_type => nibble-field,
uas_ids => [+ uas-id-grp],
? auth => [+ auth-grp],
? self_id => self-grp,
? area => area-grp,
? classification => classification-grp,
? operator_id => operator-grp
}
uas-id-grp = [
id_type: &uas-id-types,
uas_id: bstr .size(20)
]
auth-grp = [
a_type: &auth-types,
a_data: bstr .size(1..362)
]
area-grp = [
area_count: 1..255,
area_radius: float, # in decameters
area_floor: float, # wgs84-hae in meters
area_ceiling: float # wgs84-hae in meters
]
classification-grp = [
class_type: 0..8,
class: nibble-field,
category: nibble-field
]
self-grp = [
desc_type: 0..255,
description: tstr .size(23)
]
operator-grp = [
operator_id_type: 0..255,
operator_id: bstr .size(20)
]
uas-id-types = (none: 0, serial: 1, session_id: 4)
auth-types = (none: 0, specific_method: 5)
nibble-field = 0..15
uas_type = 0
uas_ids = 1
auth = 2
self_id = 3
area = 4
classification = 5
operator_id = 6
Figure 5: BRID Wire Format CDDL
The field names and their general typing are borrowed taken from the ASTM
[F3411] data
dictionary (Table (Tables 1 and Table 2). 2) [F3411]. See that document for
additional context and background information on aviation
application-specific interpretation of the field semantics. The
explicitly enumerated values included in the CDDL above are relevant
to DRIP for its operation. Other values may be valid but are outside
the scope of DRIP operation. Application-specific fields, such as
UAS Type Type, are transported and authenticated by DRIP but are regarded
as opaque user data to DRIP.
6. IANA Considerations
6.1. DET Prefix Delegation
The reverse domain for the DET Prefix, i.e., 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.,
is managed by the IANA following the usual IANA rules. IANA. IANA will liaise, as needed, with the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to verify the
authenticity of delegations to CAAs (see Section 6.2.1.4).
6.2. IANA DRIP Registry
6.2.1. DRIP RAA Allocations
This document requests a new
IANA has created the registry for RAA Allocations under the
DRIP "Drone
Remote ID Protocol" registry group (https://www.iana.org/assignments/drip) to be
managed by IANA. <https://www.iana.org/assignments/
drip>.
RAA Allocations: a 14-bit value used to represent RAAs. Future
additions to this registry are to be made based on the following
range/policy
range and policy table:
+===========+======================+================================+
| RAA Range | Allocation | Policy |
+===========+======================+================================+
| 0 - 3 | Reserved | N/A |
+-----------+----------------------+--------------------------------+
| 4 - 3999 | ISO 3166-1 | IESG Approval (Section 4.10 of |
| | Countries | [RFC8126]), Section 6.2.1.4 |
+-----------+----------------------+--------------------------------+
| 4000 - | Reserved | N/A |
| 8191 | | |
+-----------+----------------------+--------------------------------+
| 8192 - | Unassigned | First Come First Served |
| 15359 | | (Section 4.4 of [RFC8126]) |
+-----------+----------------------+--------------------------------+
| 15360 - | Private | Private Use (Section 4.1 of |
| 16383 | Use | [RFC8126]), Section 6.2.1.5 |
+-----------+----------------------+--------------------------------+
Table 1: RAA Ranges
6.2.1.1. RAA Allocation Fields
Value: The RAA value delegated for this entry.
Name: Name of the delegated RAA. For the ISO 3166-1 Countries
(Section 6.2.1.4), this should be the name of the country.
Policy Reference: A publicly accessible link to the requirements for
prospective HDA operators to register under this RAA. This field
is OPTIONAL.
Contact: Contact details of the administrator of this RAA that
prospective HDAs HDA operators can make informational queries to.
6.2.1.2. RAA Registration Form
Value:
Name:
Policy Reference:
Contact:
NS RRType Content (HDA=0):
NS RRType Content (HDA=4096):
NS RRType Content (HDA=8192):
NS RRType Content (HDA=12288):
Figure 6: RAA Delegation Request Form
The NS RRType Content (HDA=X) fields are used by IANA to perform the
DNS delegations under 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.. See Section 6.2.1.3
for technical details.
6.2.1.3. Handling Nibble Split
To support DNS delegation in 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa. 3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa., a single RAA is
given 4 delegations by borrowing the upper two bits of HDA space (see
Figure 7 for an example). This enables a clean nibble boundary in
the DNS to delegate from (i.e., the prefix 2001:3x:xxx0::/44). These
HDAs (0, 4096, 8192 and 12288) are reserved for the RAA.
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0 | x | RAA=16376 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | E | F | F HDA=0,x=00
0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | E | F | F HDA=4096,x=01
0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | E | F | F HDA=8192,x=10
0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | E | F | F HDA=12288,x=11
Figure 7: Example Bit Borrowing of RAA=16376
6.2.1.4. ISO 3166-1 Countries Range
The mapping between ISO 3166-1 Numeric Nation Codes and RAAs is
specified and documented by IANA. Each Nation is assigned four 4 RAAs
that are left to the national authority for their purpose. For RAAs
under this range, a shorter prefix of 2001:3x:xx00::/40 MAY be
delegated to each CAA, which covers all 4 RAAs (and reserved HDAs)
assigned to them.
This range is set to IESG Approval (Section 4.10 of [RFC8126]) and
IANA will liaise with the ICAO to verify the authenticity of
delegation requests (using Figure 6) by CAAs.
The CSV file found for the ISO to RAA mapping is on GitHub
(https://github.com/ietf-wg-drip/draft-ietf-drip-
registries/commit/a8da51bfcafcdf91878f8862c52830aa736782c9). RFC
Editor, please remove this note after IANA initializes the
registry but before publication.
6.2.1.5. Private Range
If nibble-reversed lookup in DNS is desired desired, it can only be provided
by private DNS servers as zone delegations from the global root will
not be performed for this address range. Thus the RAAs (with its
subordinate HDAs) in this range may be used in like manner and IANA
will not delegate any value in this range to any party (as per
Private Use, Section 4.1 of [RFC8126]).
One anticipated acceptable use of the private range is for
experimentation and testing prior to request allocation or assignment
from IANA.
6.2.2. HHIT Entity Type
This document requests a new registry for HHIT Entity Type under the
DRIP
"Drone Remote ID Protocol" registry group (https://www.iana.org/assignments/drip).
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/drip>.
HHIT Entity Type: numeric, Numeric, field of the HHIT RRType to encode the
HHIT Entity Type. All entries in this registry are under a the
First Come First Served policy (Section 4.4 of [RFC8126]) policy. [RFC8126]).
6.2.2.1. HHIT Type Registry Fields
Value: HHIT Type value of the entry.
HHIT Type: Name of the entry and an optional abbreviation.
Reference: Public document allocating the value and any additional
information such as semantics. This can be a URL pointing to an
Internet-Draft, IETF RFC, or web-page web page among others.
6.2.2.2. HHIT Type Registration Form
Value:
HHIT Type:
Reference:
Figure 8: HHIT Type Registration Form
6.2.2.3. Initial Values
The following values are defined by this document:
+=======+===========================================+===========+
| Value | HHIT Type | Reference |
+=======+===========================================+===========+
| 0 | Not Defined | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 1 | DRIP Identity Management Entity (DIME) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 5 | Apex | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 9 | Registered Assigning Authority (RAA) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 13 | HHIT Domain Authority (HDA) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 16 | Unmanned Aircraft (UA) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 17 | Ground Control Station (GCS) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 18 | Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 19 | Remote Identification (RID) Module | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 20 | Pilot | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 21 | Operator | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 22 | Discovery & Synchronization Service (DSS) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 23 | UAS Service Supplier (USS) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 24 | Network RID Service Provider (SP) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 25 | Network RID Display Provider (DP) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 26 | Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 27 | Crowd Sourced RID Finder | This RFC 9886 |
+-------+-------------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 2: HHIT Entity Type Initial Values
7. Security Considerations
7.1. DNS Operational & and Registration Considerations
The Registrar and Registry are commonly used concepts in the DNS.
These components interface the DIME into the DNS hierarchy and thus
operation SHOULD follow best common practices, specifically in
security (such as running DNSSEC) as appropriate except when national
regulations prevent it. [BCP237] provides suitable guidance.
If DNSSEC is used, a DNSSEC Practice Statement SHOULD be developed
and published. It SHOULD explain how DNSSEC has been deployed and
what security measures are in place. [RFC6841] documents a Framework framework
for DNSSEC Policies policies and DNSSEC Practice Statements. A self-signed
entity (i.e. (i.e., an entity that self-signed it its certificate as part of
the HHIT RRType) MUST use DNSSEC.
The interfaces and protocol specifications for registry-registrar
interactions are intentionally not specified in this document. These
will depend on nationally defined policy and prevailing local
circumstances. It is expected that registry-registrar activity will
use the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [STD69] or equivalent.
The registry SHOULD provide a lookup service such as RDAP [STD95] or
equivalent to publish public information about registered domain
names.
Decisions about DNS or registry best practices and other operational
matters that influence security SHOULD be made by the CAA, ideally in
consultation with local stakeholders.
The guidance above is intended to reduce the likelihood of
interoperability problems and minimize security and stability
concerns. For instance, validation and authentication of DNS
responses depends on DNSSEC. If this is not used, entities using
DRIP will be vulnerable to DNS spoofing attacks and could be exposed
to bogus data. DRIP DNS responses that have not been validated by
DNSSEC could contain bogus data which that have the potential to create
serious security problems and operational concerns for DRIP entities.
These threats include denial of service denial-of-service attacks, replay attacks,
impersonation or cloning of UAVs, hijacking of DET registrations,
injection of corrupt metadata metadata, and compromising established trust
architecture/relationships. Some regulatory and legal considerations
are expected to be simplified by providing a lookup service for
access to public information about registered domain names for DETs.
When DNSSEC is not in use, due to the length of the ORCHID hash
selected for DETs (Section 3.5 of [RFC9374]), clients MUST "walk" the
tree of certificates locating each certificate by performing DNS
lookups of HHIT RRTypes for each DET verifying inclusion into the
hierarchy. The collection of these certificates (which provide both
signature protection from the parent entity and the public key of the
entity) is the only way without DNSSEC to prove valid registration.
The contents of the BRID RRType auth key, containing Endorsements as
described in Section 4.2 of [RFC9575], are a shadow of the X.509
certificate found in the HHIT RRType. The validation of these
Endorsements follow the guidelines written in Section 6.4.2 of
[RFC9575] for Broadcast RID Observers and when present MUST also be
validated.
7.2. DET & and Public Key Exposure
DETs are built upon asymmetric keys. As such the public key must be
revealed to enable clients to perform signature verifications.
[RFC9374] security considerations cover various attacks on such keys.
While unlikely, the forging of a corresponding private key is
possible if given enough time (and computational power).
When practical, it is RECOMMENDED that no RRTypes under a DET's
specific domain name be published unless and until it is required for
use by other parties. Such action would cause at least the HHIT
RRType to not be in the DNS, protecting the public key in the
certificate from being exposed before its needed. The combination of
this "just in time" publishing mechanism and DNSSEC is out of scope
for this document.
Optimally this requires that the UAS somehow signal to the DIME that
a flight using a Specific Session ID will soon be underway or
complete. It may also be facilitated under UTM if the USS (which may
or may not be a DIME) signals when a given operation using a Session
ID goes active.
9.
8. References
9.1.
8.1. Normative References
[F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
and Tracking", ASTM F3411-22A, DOI 10.1520/F3411-22A, July
2022, <https://www.astm.org/f3411-22a.html>.
[ISO3166-1]
International Standards Organization (ISO),
ISO, "Codes for the representation of names of countries
and their
subdivisions", subdivisions - Part 1: Country code",
ISO 3166-1:2020, August 2020,
<https://www.iso.org/iso-3166-country-codes.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC9374] Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote
ID (UAS RID)", RFC 9374, DOI 10.17487/RFC9374, March 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9374>.
9.2.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9374>.
8.2. Informative References
[BCP237] Best Current Practice 237,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp237>.
At the time of writing, this BCP comprises the following:
Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9364>.
[drip-dki] Moskowitz, R. and S. W. Card, "The DRIP DET public Key
Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-dki-08, 22 April
ietf-drip-dki-09, 20 October 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-
dki-08>.
dki-09>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6841] Ljunggren, F., Eklund Lowinder, AM., and T. Okubo, "A
Framework for DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC Practice
Statements", RFC 6841, DOI 10.17487/RFC6841, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6841>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6841>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC9153] Card, S., Ed., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A.
Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements and Terminology", RFC 9153,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9153, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9153>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9153>.
[RFC9434] Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., Zhao, S., Ed.,
and A. Gurtov, "Drone Remote Identification Protocol
(DRIP) Architecture", RFC 9434, DOI 10.17487/RFC9434, July
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9434>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9434>.
[RFC9575] Wiethuechter, A., Ed., Card, S., and R. Moskowitz, "DRIP
Entity Tag (DET) Authentication Formats and Protocols for
Broadcast Remote Identification (RID)", RFC 9575,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9575, June 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9575>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9575>.
[STD13] Internet Standard 13,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std13>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
[STD69] Internet Standard 69,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std69>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Host Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5732, DOI 10.17487/RFC5732,
August 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5732>.
Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Contact Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5733, DOI 10.17487/RFC5733,
August 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5733>.
Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5734>.
[STD88] Internet Standard 88,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std88>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
"DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", STD 88,
RFC 3596, DOI 10.17487/RFC3596, October 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3596>.
[STD95] Internet Standard 95,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/std95>.
At the time of writing, this STD comprises the following:
Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
Access Protocol (RDAP) Service", STD 95, RFC 9224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9224, March 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9224>.
Appendix A. Example Zone Files & and RRType Contents
An example zone file ip6.arpa., run by IANA, is not shown. It would
contain NS RRTypes to delegate to a respective RAA. To avoid any
future collisions with production deployments an apex of
ip6.example.com. is used instead of ip6.arpa.. All hexadecimal
strings in the examples are broken into the lengths of a word, for
document formatting purposes.
An RAA with a HID of RAA=16376, HDA=0 and HDA with a the HID
RAA=16376, HDA=10 were used in the examples.
A.1. Example RAA
A.1.1. Authentication HHIT
$ORIGIN 5.0.0.0.0.0.e.f.f.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.example.com.
7.b.0.a.1.9.e.1.7.5.1.a.0.6.e.5. IN HHIT (
gwppM2ZmOCAwMDAwWQFGMIIBQjCB9aAD
AgECAgE1MAUGAytlcDArMSkwJwYDVQQD
DCAyMDAxMDAzZmZlMDAwMDA1NWU2MGEx
NTcxZTkxYTBiNzAeFw0yNTA0MDkyMDU2
MjZaFw0yNTA0MDkyMTU2MjZaMB0xGzAZ
BgNVBAMMEkRSSVAtUkFBLUEtMTYzNzYt
MDAqMAUGAytlcAMhAJmQ1bBLcqGAZtQJ
K1LH1JlPt8Fr1+jB9ED/qNBP8eE/o0ww
SjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MDcGA1Ud
EQEB/wQtMCuHECABAD/+AAAFXmChVx6R
oLeGF2h0dHBzOi8vcmFhLmV4YW1wbGUu
Y29tMAUGAytlcANBALUPjhIB3rwqXQep
r9/VDB+hhtwuWZIw1OUkEuDrF6DCkgc7
5widXnXa5/uDfdKL7dZ83mPHm2Tf32Dv
b8AzEw8=
)
Figure 9: RAA Auth HHIT RRType Example
Figure 10 shows the CBOR decoded RDATA in the HHIT RRType found in
Figure 9.
[
10, # Reserved (RAA Auth from DKI)
"3ff8 0000",
h'308201423081F5A00302010202013530
0506032B6570302B312930270603550403
0C20323030313030336666653030303030
3535653630613135373165393161306237
301E170D3235303430393230353632365A
170D3235303430393231353632365A301D
311B301906035504030C12445249502D52
41412D412D31363337362D30302A300506
032B65700321009990D5B04B72A18066D4
092B52C7D4994FB7C16BD7E8C1F440FFA8
D04FF1E13FA34C304A300F0603551D1301
01FF040530030101FF30370603551D1101
01FF042D302B87102001003FFE0000055E
60A1571E91A0B7861768747470733A2F2F
7261612E6578616D706C652E636F6D3005
06032B6570034100B50F8E1201DEBC2A5D
07A9AFDFD50C1FA186DC2E599230D4E524
12E0EB17A0C292073BE7089D5E75DAE7FB
837DD28BEDD67CDE63C79B64DFDF60EF6F
C033130F'
]
Figure 10: 2001:3f:fe00:5:5e60:a157:1e91:a0b7 Decoded HHIT RRType
CBOR
Figure 11 shows the decoded DER X.509 found in Figure 10.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 53 (0x35)
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe0000055e60a1571e91a0b7
Validity
Not Before: Apr 9 20:56:26 2025 GMT
Not After : Apr 9 21:56:26 2025 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-RAA-A-16376-0
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
99:90:d5:b0:4b:72:a1:80:66:d4:09:2b:52:c7:d4:
99:4f:b7:c1:6b:d7:e8:c1:f4:40:ff:a8:d0:4f:f1:
e1:3f
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:5:5E60:A157:1E91:A0B7,
URI:https://raa.example.com
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
b5:0f:8e:12:01:de:bc:2a:5d:07:a9:af:df:d5:0c:1f:a1:86:
dc:2e:59:92:30:d4:e5:24:12:e0:eb:17:a0:c2:92:07:3b:e7:
08:9d:5e:75:da:e7:fb:83:7d:d2:8b:ed:d6:7c:de:63:c7:9b:
64:df:df:60:ef:6f:c0:33:13:0f
Figure 11: 2001:3f:fe00:5:5e60:a157:1e91:a0b7 Decoded Certificate
A.1.2. Delegation of HDA
$ORIGIN c.d.f.f.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.example.com.
a.0.0. IN NS ns1.hda-10.example.com
Figure 12: HDA Delegation Example
A.2. Example HDA
A.2.1. Authentication & and Issue HHITs
$ORIGIN 5.0.a.0.0.0.e.f.f.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.example.com.
0.a.9.0.7.2.4.d.5.4.e.e.5.1.6.6.5.0. IN HHIT (
gw5pM2ZmOCAwMDBhWQFHMIIBQzCB9qAD
AgECAgFfMAUGAytlcDArMSkwJwYDVQQD
DCAyMDAxMDAzZmZlMDAwMDA1NWU2MGEx
NTcxZTkxYTBiNzAeFw0yNTA0MDkyMTAz
MTlaFw0yNTA0MDkyMjAzMTlaMB4xHDAa
BgNVBAMME0RSSVAtSERBLUEtMTYzNzYt
MTAwKjAFBgMrZXADIQDOaB424RQa61YN
bna8eWt7fLRU5GPMsfEt4wo4AQGAP6NM
MEowDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zA3BgNV
HREBAf8ELTArhxAgAQA//gAKBWYV7kXU
JwmghhdodHRwczovL3JhYS5leGFtcGxl
LmNvbTAFBgMrZXADQQAhMpOSOmgMkJY1
f+B9nTgawUjK4YEERBtczMknHDkOowX0
ynbaLN60TYe9hqN6+CJ3SN8brJke3hpM
gorvhDkJ
)
8.2.e.6.5.2.b.6.7.3.4.d.e.0.6.2.5.0. IN HHIT (
gw9pM2ZmOCAwMDBhWQFHMIIBQzCB9qAD
AgECAgFYMAUGAytlcDArMSkwJwYDVQQD
DCAyMDAxMDAzZmZlMDAwYTA1NjYxNWVl
NDVkNDI3MDlhMDAeFw0yNTA0MDkyMTA1
MTRaFw0yNTA0MDkyMjA1MTRaMB4xHDAa
BgNVBAMME0RSSVAtSERBLUktMTYzNzYt
MTAwKjAFBgMrZXADIQCCM/2utQaLwUhZ
0ROg7fz43AeBTj3Sdl5rW4LgTQcFl6NM
MEowDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zA3BgNV
HREBAf8ELTArhxAgAQA//gAKBSYO1Ddr
JW4ohhdodHRwczovL2hkYS5leGFtcGxl
LmNvbTAFBgMrZXADQQBa8lZyftxHJqDF
Vgv4Rt+cMUmc8aQwet4UZdO3yQOB9uq4
sLVAScaZCWjC0nmeRkgVRhize1esfyi3
RRU44IAE
)
Figure 13: HDA Auth/Issue HHIT RRType Example
Figure 14 shows the CBOR decoded RDATA in the HHIT RRType found in
Figure 13.
[
14, # Reserved (HDA Auth from DKI)
"3ff8 000a",
h'308201433081F6A00302010202015F30
0506032B6570302B312930270603550403
0C20323030313030336666653030303030
3535653630613135373165393161306237
301E170D3235303430393231303331395A
170D3235303430393232303331395A301E
311C301A06035504030C13445249502D48
44412D412D31363337362D3130302A3005
06032B6570032100CE681E36E1141AEB56
0D6E76BC796B7B7CB454E463CCB1F12DE3
0A380101803FA34C304A300F0603551D13
0101FF040530030101FF30370603551D11
0101FF042D302B87102001003FFE000A05
6615EE45D42709A0861768747470733A2F
2F7261612E6578616D706C652E636F6D30
0506032B6570034100213293923A680C90
96357FE07D9D381AC148CAE18104441B5C
CCC9271C390EA305F4CA76DA2CDEB44D87
BD86A37AF8227748DF1BAC991EDE1A4C82
8AEF843909'
]
Figure 14: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:6615:ee45:d427:9a0 Decoded HHIT
RRType CBOR
Figure 15 shows the decoded DER X.509 found in Figure 14.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 95 (0x5f)
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe0000055e60a1571e91a0b7
Validity
Not Before: Apr 9 21:03:19 2025 GMT
Not After : Apr 9 22:03:19 2025 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-HDA-A-16376-10
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
ce:68:1e:36:e1:14:1a:eb:56:0d:6e:76:bc:79:6b:
7b:7c:b4:54:e4:63:cc:b1:f1:2d:e3:0a:38:01:01:
80:3f
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:A05:6615:EE45:D427:9A0,
URI:https://raa.example.com
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
21:32:93:92:3a:68:0c:90:96:35:7f:e0:7d:9d:38:1a:c1:48:
ca:e1:81:04:44:1b:5c:cc:c9:27:1c:39:0e:a3:05:f4:ca:76:
da:2c:de:b4:4d:87:bd:86:a3:7a:f8:22:77:48:df:1b:ac:99:
1e:de:1a:4c:82:8a:ef:84:39:09
Figure 15: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:6615:ee45:d427:9a0 Decoded Certificate
Figure 16 shows the CBOR decoded RDATA in the HHIT RRType found in
Figure 13.
[
15, # Reserved (HDA Issue from DKI)
"3ff8 000a",
h'308201433081F6A00302010202015830
0506032B6570302B312930270603550403
0C20323030313030336666653030306130
3536363135656534356434323730396130
301E170D3235303430393231303531345A
170D3235303430393232303531345A301E
311C301A06035504030C13445249502D48
44412D492D31363337362D3130302A3005
06032B65700321008233FDAEB5068BC148
59D113A0EDFCF8DC07814E3DD2765E6B5B
82E04D070597A34C304A300F0603551D13
0101FF040530030101FF30370603551D11
0101FF042D302B87102001003FFE000A05
260ED4376B256E28861768747470733A2F
2F6864612E6578616D706C652E636F6D30
0506032B65700341005AF256727EDC4726
A0C5560BF846DF9C31499CF1A4307ADE14
65D3B7C90381F6EAB8B0B54049C6990968
C2D2799E4648154618B37B57AC7F28B745
1538E08004'
]
Figure 16: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:260e:d437:6b25:6e28 Decoded HHIT
RRType CBOR
Figure 17 shows the decoded DER X.509 found in Figure 16.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 88 (0x58)
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe000a056615ee45d42709a0
Validity
Not Before: Apr 9 21:05:14 2025 GMT
Not After : Apr 9 22:05:14 2025 GMT
Subject: CN = DRIP-HDA-I-16376-10
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
82:33:fd:ae:b5:06:8b:c1:48:59:d1:13:a0:ed:fc:
f8:dc:07:81:4e:3d:d2:76:5e:6b:5b:82:e0:4d:07:
05:97
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:A05:260E:D437:6B25:6E28,
URI:https://hda.example.com
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
5a:f2:56:72:7e:dc:47:26:a0:c5:56:0b:f8:46:df:9c:31:49:
9c:f1:a4:30:7a:de:14:65:d3:b7:c9:03:81:f6:ea:b8:b0:b5:
40:49:c6:99:09:68:c2:d2:79:9e:46:48:15:46:18:b3:7b:57:
ac:7f:28:b7:45:15:38:e0:80:04
Figure 17: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:260e:d437:6b25:6e28 Decoded Certificate
A.2.2. Registratant HHIT & and BRID
$ORIGIN 5.0.a.0.0.0.e.f.f.3.0.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.example.com.
2.b.6.c.b.4.a.9.9.6.4.2.8.0.3.1. IN HHIT (
gxJpM2ZmOCAwMDBhWQEYMIIBFDCBx6AD
AgECAgFUMAUGAytlcDArMSkwJwYDVQQD
DCAyMDAxMDAzZmZlMDAwYTA1MjYwZWQ0
Mzc2YjI1NmUyODAeFw0yNTA0MDkyMTEz
MDBaFw0yNTA0MDkyMjEzMDBaMAAwKjAF
BgMrZXADIQDJLi+dl+iWD5tfFlT4sJA5
+drcW88GHqxPDOp56Oh3+qM7MDkwNwYD
VR0RAQH/BC0wK4cQIAEAP/4ACgUTCCRp
mkvGsoYXaHR0cHM6Ly9oZGEuZXhhbXBs
ZS5jb20wBQYDK2VwA0EA0DbcdngC7/BB
/aLjZmLieo0ZFCDbd/KIxAy+3X2KtT4J
todVxRMPAkN6o008gacbNfTG8p9npEcD
eYhesl2jBQ==
)
2.b.6.c.b.4.a.9.9.6.4.2.8.0.3.1. IN BRID (
owAAAYIEUQEgAQA//gAKBRMIJGmaS8ay
AogFWIkB+t72Zwrt9mcgAQA//gAABV5g
oVcekaC3mZDVsEtyoYBm1AkrUsfUmU+3
wWvX6MH0QP+o0E/x4T8gAQA//gAABV5g
oVcekaC3vC9m1JguvXt7W2o4wxPumaT1
IP3TQN3fQP28hpInSIlsSwq8UCNjm2ad
7pdTvm2EqfOJQNPKClvRZm4qTO5FDAVY
iQGX4PZnp+72ZyABAD/+AAoFZhXuRdQn
CaDOaB424RQa61YNbna8eWt7fLRU5GPM
sfEt4wo4AQGAPyABAD/+AAAFXmChVx6R
oLfv3q+mLRB3ya5TmjY8+3CzdoDZT9RZ
+XpN5hDiA6JyyxBJvUewxLzPNhTXQp8v
ED71XAE82tMmt3fB4zbzWNQLBViJAQrh
9mca7/ZnIAEAP/4ACgUmDtQ3ayVuKIIz
/a61BovBSFnRE6Dt/PjcB4FOPdJ2Xmtb
guBNBwWXIAEAP/4ACgVmFe5F1CcJoIjy
CriJCxAyAWTOHPmlHL02MKSpsHviiTze
qwBH9K/Rrz41CYix9HazAIOAZO8FcfU5
M+WLLJZoaQWBHnMbTQwFWIkB3OL2Z+zw
9mcgAQA//gAKBRMIJGmaS8ayyS4vnZfo
lg+bXxZU+LCQOfna3FvPBh6sTwzqeejo
d/ogAQA//gAKBSYO1DdrJW4ogOfc8jTi
mYLmTOOyFZoUx2jOOwtB1jnqUJr6bYaw
MoPrR3MlKGBGWsVz1yXNqUURoCqYdwsY
e61vd5i6YJqnAQ==
)
Figure 18: Registrant HHIT/BRID RRType Example
Figure 19 shows the CBOR decoded RDATA in the HHIT RRType found in
Figure 18.
[
18, # Uncrewed Aircraft System (UAS)
"3ff8 000a",
h'308201143081C7A00302010202015430
0506032B6570302B312930270603550403
0C20323030313030336666653030306130
3532363065643433373662323536653238
301E170D3235303430393231313330305A
170D3235303430393232313330305A3000
302A300506032B6570032100C92E2F9D97
E8960F9B5F1654F8B09039F9DADC5BCF06
1EAC4F0CEA79E8E877FAA33B3039303706
03551D110101FF042D302B87102001003F
FE000A05130824699A4BC6B28617687474
70733A2F2F6864612E6578616D706C652E
636F6D300506032B6570034100D036DC76
7802EFF041FDA2E36662E27A8D191420DB
77F288C40CBEDD7D8AB53E09B68755C513
0F02437AA34D3C81A71B35F4C6F29F67A4
470379885EB25DA305'
]
Figure 19: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:1308:2469:9a4b:c6b2 Decoded HHIT
RRType CBOR
Figure 20 shows the decoded DER X.509 found in Figure 19.
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 84 (0x54)
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Issuer: CN = 2001003ffe000a05260ed4376b256e28
Validity
Not Before: Apr 9 21:13:00 2025 GMT
Not After : Apr 9 22:13:00 2025 GMT
Subject:
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: ED25519
ED25519 Public-Key:
pub:
c9:2e:2f:9d:97:e8:96:0f:9b:5f:16:54:f8:b0:90:
39:f9:da:dc:5b:cf:06:1e:ac:4f:0c:ea:79:e8:e8:
77:fa
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: critical
IP Address:2001:3F:FE00:A05:1308:2469:9A4B:C6B2,
URI:https://hda.example.com
Signature Algorithm: ED25519
Signature Value:
d0:36:dc:76:78:02:ef:f0:41:fd:a2:e3:66:62:e2:7a:8d:19:
14:20:db:77:f2:88:c4:0c:be:dd:7d:8a:b5:3e:09:b6:87:55:
c5:13:0f:02:43:7a:a3:4d:3c:81:a7:1b:35:f4:c6:f2:9f:67:
a4:47:03:79:88:5e:b2:5d:a3:05
Figure 20: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:1308:2469:9a4b:c6b2 Decoded Certificate
Figure 21 shows the CBOR decoded RDATA of the BRID RRType in
Figure 18.
{
0: 0,
1: [4, h'012001003FFE000A05130824699A4BC6B2'],
2: [
5,
h'01FADEF6670AEDF6672001003FFE0000
055E60A1571E91A0B79990D5B04B72A180
66D4092B52C7D4994FB7C16BD7E8C1F440
FFA8D04FF1E13F2001003FFE0000055E60
A1571E91A0B7BC2F66D4982EBD7B7B5B6A
38C313EE99A4F520FDD340DDDF40FDBC86
922748896C4B0ABC5023639B669DEE9753
BE6D84A9F38940D3CA0A5BD1666E2A4CEE
450C',
5,
h'0197E0F667A7EEF6672001003FFE000A
056615EE45D42709A0CE681E36E1141AEB
560D6E76BC796B7B7CB454E463CCB1F12D
E30A380101803F2001003FFE0000055E60
A1571E91A0B7EFDEAFA62D1077C9AE539A
363CFB70B37680D94FD459F97A4DE610E2
03A272CB1049BD47B0C4BCCF3614D7429F
2F103EF55C013CDAD326B777C1E336F358
D40B',
5,
h'010AE1F6671AEFF6672001003FFE000A
05260ED4376B256E288233FDAEB5068BC1
4859D113A0EDFCF8DC07814E3DD2765E6B
5B82E04D0705972001003FFE000A056615
EE45D42709A088F20AB8890B10320164CE
1CF9A51CBD3630A4A9B07BE2893CDEAB00
47F4AFD1AF3E350988B1F476B300838064
EF0571F53933E58B2C96686905811E731B
4D0C',
5,
h'01DCE2F667ECF0F6672001003FFE000A
05130824699A4BC6B2C92E2F9D97E8960F
9B5F1654F8B09039F9DADC5BCF061EAC4F
0CEA79E8E877FA2001003FFE000A05260E
D4376B256E2880E7DCF234E29982E64CE3
B2159A14C768CE3B0B41D639EA509AFA6D
86B03283EB4773252860465AC573D725CD
A94511A02A98770B187BAD6F7798BA609A
A701'
]
}
Figure 21: 2001:3f:fe00:a05:1308:2469:9a4b:c6b2 Decoded BRID
RRType CBOR
8.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Stuart Card (AX Enterprize, LLC) and Bob Moskowitz (HTT
Consulting, LLC) for their early work on the DRIP registries concept.
Their early contributions laid the foundations foundation for the content and
processes of this architecture and document.
Authors' Addresses
Adam Wiethuechter (editor)
AX Enterprize, LLC
4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America
Email: adam.wiethuechter@axenterprize.com
Jim Reid
RTFM llp
St Andrews House
382 Hillington Road, Glasgow Scotland
G51 4BL
United Kingdom
Email: jim@rfc1035.com