Network Configuration
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Turner
Internet-Draft
Request for Comments: 9918 sn3rd
Updates: 7589 (if approved) R. Housley
Intended status:
Category: Standards Track Vigil Security
Expires: 21 July 2024 18
ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2024 2026
Updates to Using the NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security
(TLS) with Mutual X.509 Authentication
draft-ietf-netconf-over-tls13-04
Abstract
RFC 7589 defines how to protect NETCONF Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF) messages with TLS 1.2. This document updates RFC 7589 to
update support requirements for TLS 1.2 and add TLS 1.3 support
requirements, including restrictions on the use of TLS 1.3's early
data.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://netconf-
wg.github.io/netconf-over-tls13/draft-ietf-netconf-over-tls13.html.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netconf-over-tls13/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Network Configuration
Working Group mailing list (mailto:netconf@ietf.org), which is
archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/netconf/.
Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/netconf-wg/netconf-over-tls13.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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(IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 July 2024.
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9918.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Early Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
[RFC7589] defines how to protect NETCONF messages [RFC6241] with TLS
1.2 [RFC5246]. This document updates [RFC7589] to update support
requirements for TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and to add TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] [RFC9846] support
requirements, including restrictions on the use of TLS 1.3's early data
data, which is also known as 0-RTT data. It also updates "netconf-
tls", the "netconf-tls" IANA Registered
Port Number entry IANA-registered port number entry, to refer to this
document. All other provisions set forth in [RFC7589] are unchanged,
including connection initiation, message framing, connection closure,
certificate validation, server identity, and client identity.
| NOTE: Implementations that support TLS 1.3
| [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] [RFC9846] should
| refer to TLS 1.3
| [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] in Sections 4 and 5 of [RFC7589].
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Early Data
Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
[RFC9846] that allows a client to send data ("early data") as part of
the first flight of messages to a server. Note that TLS 1.3 can be
used without early data as per Appendix F.5 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]. [RFC9846]. In fact,
early data is permitted by TLS 1.3 only when the client and server
share a Pre-Shared Key (PSK), either obtained externally or via a
previous handshake. The client uses the PSK to authenticate the
server and to encrypt the early data.
As noted in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], [RFC9846], the security properties for
early data are weaker than those for subsequent TLS-
protected TLS-protected data.
In particular, early data is not forward secret, and there is no
protection against the replay of early data between connections.
Appendix E.5 F.5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] [RFC9846] requires applications not use early data
without a profile that defines its use. This document specifies that
NETCONF implementations that support TLS 1.3 MUST NOT use early data.
4. Cipher Suites
Implementations MUST support mutually authenticated TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]
[RFC5246], and they are, as specified in [RFC9325], recommended to
support the cipher suites found in Section 4.2 of [RFC9325].
Implementations MAY implement additional TLS 1.2 cipher suites that
provide mutual authentication [RFC5246] and confidentiality confidentiality, as
required by NETCONF [RFC6241].
Implementations SHOULD support mutually authenticated TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
[RFC9846] and, if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over
earlier versions of TLS.
Implementations that support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] [RFC9846] are REQUIRED to
support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suites listed in
Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]. [RFC9846].
Implementations that support TLS 1.3 MAY implement additional TLS
cipher suites that provide mutual authentication and confidentiality,
which are required for NETCONF [RFC6241].
5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations security considerations of [RFC6241], [RFC7589], and [RFC9325]
apply here as well.
NETCONF implementations SHOULD follow the TLS recommendations given
in [RFC9325].
For implementations that support TLS 1.3, the Security Considerations security considerations
of TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] [RFC9846] apply.
As specified in [RFC7589], NETCONF over TLS requires mutual
authentication.
For implementations that support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]: [RFC9846]:
TLS 1.3 mutual authentication is used to ensure that only
authorized users and systems are able to view the NETCONF server's
configuration and state or to modify the NETCONF server's
configuration. To this end, neither the client nor the server
should establish a NETCONF over TLS 1.3 connection with an
unknown, unexpected, or incorrectly identified peer; see Section 7
of [RFC7589]. If deployments make use of a trusted list of
Certification Authority (CA) certificates [RFC5280], then the
listed CAs should only issue certificates to parties that are
authorized to access the NETCONF servers. Doing otherwise will
allow certificates that were issued for other purposes to be
inappropriately accepted by a NETCONF server.
The Security Considerations security considerations of [RFC9525] apply to all implementations
when the client checks the identity of the server, as is required in
Section 6 of [RFC7589].
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add has added a reference to this document in the "netconf-tls"
entry in the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
Registry". The updated registry entry would appear appears as follows:
Service Name: netconf-tls
Port Number: 6513
Transport Protocol(s): TCP Protocol: tcp
Description: NETCONF over TLS
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IETF Chair <chair@ietf.org>
Description: NETCONF over TLS
Reference: RFC 7589, [THIS RFC]
Port Number: 6513 RFC 9918
7. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-09, 7 July 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-09>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC7589] Badra, M., Luchuk, A., and J. Schoenwaelder, "Using the
NETCONF Protocol over Transport Layer Security (TLS) with
Mutual X.509 Authentication", RFC 7589,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7589, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7589>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7589>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[RFC9525] Saint-Andre, P. and R. Salz, "Service Identity in TLS",
RFC 9525, DOI 10.17487/RFC9525, November 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9525>.
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9525>.
[RFC9846] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 9846, DOI 10.17487/RFC9846, January
2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846>.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Per Andersson, Jürgen Schönwälder, Jeff
Hartley, Rob Wilton, and Qin Wu for their reviews.
Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA, VA 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com