Internet Engineering Task Force D. Atkins
Internet-Draft SecureRF Corporation
Intended status: Informational November 20, 2019
Expires: May 23, 2020
Use of the Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm with CBOR Object Signing
and Encryption (COSE)
draft-atkins-suit-cose-walnutdsa-01
Abstract
This document specifies the conventions for using the Walnut Digital
Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) for digital signatures with the CBOR
Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) syntax. WalnutDSA is a
lightweight, quantum-resistant signature scheme based on Group
Theoretic Cryptography (see [WALNUTDSA] and [WALNUTSPEC]) with
implementation and computational efficiency of signature verification
in constrained environments, even on 8- and 16-bit platforms.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. WalnutDSA Algorithm Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. WalnutDSA Algorithm Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Implementation Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Method Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.1. COSE Algorithms Registry Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.2. COSE Key Types Registry Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.3. COSE Key Type Parameter Registry Entries . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.1. WalnutDSA Parameter: N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.2. WalnutDSA Parameter: q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.3. WalnutDSA Parameter: t-values . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3.4. WalnutDSA Parameter: matrix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3.5. WalnutDSA Parameter: permutation 1 . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3.6. WalnutDSA Parameter: matrix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the Walnut Digital
Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) [WALNUTDSA] for digital signatures
with the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] syntax.
WalnutDSA is a Group-Theoretic [GTC] signature scheme where signature
validation is both computationally- and space-efficient, even on very
small processors. Unlike many hash-based signatures, there is no
state required and no limit on the number of signatures that can be
made. WalnutDSA private and public keys are relatively small;
however, the signatures are larger than RSA and ECC, but still
smaller than most all other quantum-resistant schemes (including all
hash-based schemes).
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1.1. Motivation
There have been recent advances in cryptanalysis and advances in the
development of quantum computers. Each of these advances pose a
threat to widely deployed digital signature algorithms.
At Black Hat USA 2013, some researchers gave a presentation on the
current state of public key cryptography. They said: "Current
cryptosystems depend on discrete logarithm and factoring which has
seen some major new developments in the past 6 months" [BH2013]. Due
to advances in cryptanalysis, they encouraged preparation for a day
when RSA and DSA cannot be depended upon.
Peter Shor showed that a large-scale quantum computer could be used
to factor a number in polynomial time [S1997], effectively breaking
RSA. If large-scale quantum computers are ever built, these
computers will be able to break many of the public-key cryptosystems
currently in use. A post-quantum cryptosystem [PQC] is a system that
is secure against quantum computers that have more than a trivial
number of quantum bits (qu-bits). It is open to conjecture when it
will be feasible to build such a machine; however, RSA, DSA, ECDSA,
and EdDSA are all vulnerable if large-scale uantum computers come to
pass.
WalnutDSA does not depend on the difficulty of discrete logarithm or
factoring. As a result this algorithm is considered to be post-
quantum secure.
Today, RSA and ECDSA are often used to digitally sign software
updates. Unfortunately, implementations of RSA and ECDSA can be
relatively large, and verification can take a significant amount of
time on some very small processors. Therefore, we desire a digital
signature scheme that verifies faster with less code. Moreover, in
preparation for a day when RSA, DSA, and ECDSA cannot be depended
upon, a digital signature algorithm is needed that will remain secure
even if there are significant cryptoanalytic advances or a large-
scale quantum computer is invented. WalnutDSA, specified in
[WALNUTSPEC], is one such algorithm.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 RFC 2119 [RFC2119] RFC 8174 [RFC8174] when, and only when, they
appear in all capitals, as shown here.
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3. WalnutDSA Algorithm Overview
This specification makes use of WalnutDSA signatures as described in
[WALNUTDSA] and more concretely specified in [WALNUTSPEC]. WalnutDSA
is a Group-Theoretic cryptographic signature scheme that leverages
infinite group theory as the basis of its security and maps that to a
one-way evaluation of a series of matrices over small finite fields
with permuted multiplicants based on the group input. WalnutDSA
leverages the SHA2-256 and SHA2-512 one-way hash algorithms [SHA2] in
a hash-then-sign process.
WalnutDSA is based on a one-way function, E-Multiplication, which is
an action on the infinite group. A single E-Multiplication step
takes as input a matrix and permutation, a generator in the group,
and a set of T-values (entries in the finite field) and outputs a new
matrix and permutation. To process a long string of generators (like
a WalnutDSA signature), E-Multiplication is iterated over each
generator. Due to its structure, E-Multiplication is extremely easy
to implement.
In addition to being quantum-resistant, the two main benefits of
using WalnutDSA are that the verification implementation is very
small and WalnutDSA signature verification is extremely fast, even on
very small processors (including 16- and even 8-bit MCUs). This
lends it well to use in constrained and/or time-sensitive
environments.
WalnutDSA has several parameters required to process a signature.
The main parameters are N and q. The parameter N defines the size of
the group and implies working in an NxN matrix. The parameter q
defines the size of the finite field (in q elements). Signature
verification also requires a set of T-values, which is an ordered
list of N entries in the finite field F_q.
A WalnutDSA signature is just a string of generators in the infinite
group.
4. WalnutDSA Algorithm Identifiers
The CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC8152] supports two
signature algorithm schemes. This specification makes use of the
signature with appendix scheme for WalnutDSA signatures.
The signature value is a large byte string. The byte string is
designed for easy parsing, and it includes a length (number of
generators) and type codes that indirectly provide all of the
information that is needed to parse the byte string during signature
validation.
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When using a COSE key for this algorithm, the following checks are
made:
o The 'kty' field MUST be present, and it MUST be 'WalnutDSA'.
o If the 'alg' field is present, and it MUST be 'WalnutDSA'.
o If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'sign' when
creating a WalnutDSA signature.
o If the 'key_ops' field is present, it MUST include 'verify' when
verifying a WalnutDSA signature.
o If the 'kid' field is present, it MAY be used to identify the
WalnutDSA Key.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Implementation Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the private keys. Use of a hardware
security module (HSM) is one way to protect the private keys.
Compromise of the private keys may result in the ability to forge
signatures. As a result, when a private key is stored on non-
volatile media or stored in a virtual machine environment, care must
be taken to preserve confidentiality and integrity.
The generation of private keys relies on random numbers. The use of
inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate these
values can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it
much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys,
searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute
force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality
random numbers is difficult. [RFC4086] offers important guidance in
this area.
The generation of WalnutDSA signatures also depends on random
numbers. While the consequences of an inadequate pseudo-random
number generator (PRNGs) to generate these values is much less severe
than the generation of private keys, the guidance in [RFC4086]
remains important.
5.2. Method Security Considerations
The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm has undergone significant
cryptanalysis since it was first introduced, and several weaknesses
were found in early versions of the method, resulting in the
description of several exponential attacks. A full writeup of all
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the analysis can be found in [WalnutDSAAnalysis]. In summary, the
original suggested parameters were too small, leading to many of
these exponential attacks being practical. However, current
parameters render these attacks impractical. The following
paragraphs summarize the analysis and how the current parameters
defeat all the previous attacks.
First, the team of Hart et al found a universal forgery attack based
on a group factoring problem that runs in O(q^((N-1)/2)) with a
memory complexity of log_2(q) N^2 q^((N-1)/2). With parameters N=10
and q=M31 (2^31 - 1), the runtime is 2^139 and memory complexity is
2^151. W. Beullens found a modification of this attack but its
runtime is even longer.
Next, Beullens and Blackburn found several issues with the original
method and parameters. First they used a Pollard-Rho attack and
discovered the original public key space was too small. Specifically
they require that q^(N(N-1)-1) > 2^(2*Security Level). One can
clearly see that N=10, q=M31 provides 128-bit security and N=10,
q=M61 provides 256-bit security.
Beullens and Blackburn also found two issues with the original
message encoder of WalnutDSA. First, the original encoder was non-
injective, which reduced the available signature space. This was
repaired in an update. Second, they pointed out that the dimension
of the vector space generated by the encoder was too small.
Specifically, they require that q^dimension > 2^(2*Security Level).
With N=10, the current encoder produces a dimension of 66 which
clearly provides sufficient security.
The final issue discovered by Beullens and Blackburn was a process to
theoretically "reverse" E-Multiplication. First, their process
requires knowing the initial matrix and permutation (which is known
for WalnutDSA). But more importantly, their process runs at
O(q^((N-1)/2)) which, for N=10, q=M31 is greater than 2^128.
A team at Steven's Institute leveraged a length-shortening attack
that enabled them to remove the cloaking elements and then solve a
conjugacy search problem to derive the private keys. Their attack
requires both knowledge of the permutation being cloaked and also
that the cloaking elements themselves are conjugates. By adding
additional concealed cloaking elements the attack requires an N!
search for each cloaking element. By inserting k concealed cloaking
elements, this requires the attacker to perform (N!)^k work. This
allows k to be set to meet the desired security level.
Finally, Merz and Petit discovered that using a Garside Normal Form
of a WalnutDSA signature enabled them to find commonalities with the
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Garside Normal Form of the encoded message. Using those
commonalities they were able to splice into a signature and create
forgeries. Increasing the number of cloaking elements, specifically
within the encoded message, sufficiently obscures the commonalities
and blocks this attack.
In summary, most of these attacks are exponential in run time and can
be shown that current parameters put the runtime beyond the desired
security level. The final two attacks are also sufficiently blocked
to the desired security level.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add entries for WalnutDSA signatures in the
"COSE Algorithms" registry and WalnutDSA public keys in the "COSE Key
Types" and "COSE Key Type Parameters" registries.
6.1. COSE Algorithms Registry Entry
The new entry in the "COSE Algorithms" registry has the following
columns:
Name: WalnutDSA
Value: TBD1 (Value to be assigned by IANA)
Description: WalnutDSA signature
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
Recommended: Yes
6.2. COSE Key Types Registry Entry
The new entry in the "COSE Key Types" registry has the following
columns:
Name: WalnutDSA
Value: TBD2 (Value to be assigned by IANA)
Description: WalnutDSA public key
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
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6.3. COSE Key Type Parameter Registry Entries
The following sections detail the additions to the "COSE Key Type
Parameters" registry.
6.3.1. WalnutDSA Parameter: N
The new entry N in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry has the
following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
Name: N
Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: uint
Description: Group and Matrix (NxN) size
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
6.3.2. WalnutDSA Parameter: q
The new entry q in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry has the
following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
Name: q
Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: uint
Description: Finite field F_q
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
6.3.3. WalnutDSA Parameter: t-values
The new entry t-values in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry has
the following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
Name: t-values
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Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: array (of uint)
Description: List of T-values, enties in F_q
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
6.3.4. WalnutDSA Parameter: matrix 1
The new entry matrix 1 in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry has
the following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
Name: matrix 1
Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: array (of array of uint)
Description: NxN Matrix of enties in F_q
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
6.3.5. WalnutDSA Parameter: permutation 1
The new entry permutation 1 in the "COSE Key Type Parameters"
registry has the following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
Name: permutation 1
Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: array (of uint)
Description: Permutation associated with matrix 1
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
6.3.6. WalnutDSA Parameter: matrix 2
The new entry matrix 2 in the "COSE Key Type Parameters" registry has
the following columns:
Key Type: TBD2 (Value assigned by IANA above)
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Name: matrix 2
Label: TBD (Value to be assigned by IANA)
CBOR Type: array (of array of uint)
Description: NxN Matrix of enties in F_q
Reference: This document (Number to be assigned by RFC Editor)
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, .
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, .
[SHA2] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"FIPS Publication 180-3: Secure Hash Standard", October
2008.
[WALNUTSPEC]
Anshel, I., Atkins, D., Goldfeld, D., and P. Gunnells,
"The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm Specification",
November 2018.
7.2. Informative References
[BH2013] Ptacek, T., Ritter, J., Samuel, J., and A. Stamos, "The
Factoring Dead: Preparing for the Cryptopocalypse", August
2013, .
[GTC] Vasco, M. and R. Steinwandt, "Group Theoretic
Cryptography", April 2015, .
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[PQC] Bernstein, D., "Introduction to post-quantum
cryptography", 2009,
.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005, .
[S1997] Shor, P., "Polynomial-time algorithms for prime
factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum
computer", SIAM Journal on Computing 26(5), 1484-26, 1997,
.
[WALNUTDSA]
Anshel, I., Atkins, D., Goldfeld, D., and P. Gunnells,
"WalnutDSA(TM): A Quantum-Resistant Digital Signature
Algorithm", January 2017,
.
[WalnutDSAAnalysis]
Anshel, I., Atkins, D., Goldfeld, D., and P. Gunnells,
"Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-
Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)",
May 2019, .
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
A big thank you to Russ Housley for his input on the concepts and
text of this document.
Author's Address
Derek Atkins
SecureRF Corporation
100 Beard Sawmill Rd, Suite 350
Shelton, CT 06484
US
Phone: +1 617 623 3745
Email: datkins@securerf.com
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