rfc9684.original   rfc9684.txt 
RATS Working Group H. Birkholz Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft M. Eckel Request for Comments: 9684 M. Eckel
Intended status: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT Category: Standards Track Fraunhofer SIT
Expires: 30 January 2025 S. Bhandari ISSN: 2070-1721 S. Bhandari
ThoughtSpot ThoughtSpot
E. Voit E. Voit
B. Sulzen B. Sulzen
Cisco Cisco
L. Xia L. Xia
Huawei Huawei
T. Laffey T. Laffey
HPE HPE
G. Fedorkow G. C. Fedorkow
Juniper Juniper
29 July 2024 November 2024
A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote Attestation A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based Remote Attestation
Procedures using TPMs (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra-23
Abstract Abstract
This document defines YANG Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) and a few This document defines the YANG Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) and
configuration nodes required to retrieve attestation evidence about configuration nodes that are required to retrieve attestation
integrity measurements from a device, following the operational evidence about integrity measurements from a device, following the
context defined in TPM-based Network Device Remote Integrity operational context defined in RFC 9683 "TPM-based Network Device
Verification. Complementary measurement logs are also provided by Remote Integrity Verification". Complementary measurement logs
the YANG RPCs, originating from one or more roots of trust for originating from one or more Roots of Trust for Measurement (RTMs)
measurement (RTMs). The module defined requires at least one TPM 1.2 are also provided by the YANG RPCs. The defined module requires the
or TPM 2.0 as well as a corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or inclusion of the following in the device components of the composite
equivalent hardware implementations that include the protected device on which the YANG server is running: at least one Trusted
capabilities as provided by TPMs as well as a corresponding software Platform Module (TPM) of either version 1.2 or 2.0 as well as a
stack, included in the device components of the composite device the corresponding TPM Software Stack (TSS), or an equivalent hardware
YANG server is running on. implementation that includes the protected capabilities as provided
by TPMs as well as a corresponding software stack.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 January 2025. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9684.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Requirements Notation
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures . . . 3 2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures
2.1. YANG Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. YANG Modules
2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1. ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.1.2. ietf-tcg-algs
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3. IANA Considerations
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 4. Security Considerations
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5. References
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1. Normative References
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5.2. Informative References
Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) . . . . . . 57 Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs . . . . . . . . 58 Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document is based on the general terminology defined in the This document is based on the general terminology defined in Remote
[RFC9334] and uses the operational context defined in ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture [RFC9334] and uses the
[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest] as well as the operational context defined in [RFC9683] as well as the interaction
interaction model and information elements defined in model and information elements defined in [RATS-Interaction-Models].
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models]. The currently The currently supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the
supported hardware security modules (HSMs) are the Trusted Platform Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] [TPM2.0] as specified by the
Modules (TPMs) [TPM1.2] and [TPM2.0] as specified by the Trusted Trusted Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple TPMs in the case
Computing Group (TCG). One TPM, or multiple TPMs in the case of a of a composite device, is required in order to use the YANG module
Composite Device, are required in order to use the YANG module defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a Root of Trust for
defined in this document. Each TPM is used as a root of trust for Storage (RTS) in order to store system security measurement Evidence.
storage (RTS) in order to store system security measurement Evidence. And each TPM is used as a Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) in order
And each TPM is used as a root of trust for reporting (RTR) in order
to retrieve attestation Evidence. This is done by using a YANG RPC to retrieve attestation Evidence. This is done by using a YANG RPC
to request a quote which exposes a rolling hash of the security to request a quote that exposes a rolling hash of the security
measurements held internally within the TPM. measurements held internally within the TPM.
Specific terms imported from [RFC9334] and used in this document Specific terms imported from [RFC9334] and used in this document
include: Attester, Composite Device, Evidence. include Attester, composite device, and Evidence.
Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document Specific terms imported from [TPM2.0-Key] and used in this document
include: Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK), include Endorsement Key (EK), Initial Attestation Key (IAK),
Attestation Identity Key (AIK), Local Attestation Key (LAK). Attestation Identity Key (AIK), and Local Attestation Key (LAK).
1.1. Requirements notation 1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures 2. The YANG Module for Basic Remote Attestation Procedures
One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a Composite Device that provides One or more TPMs MUST be embedded in a composite device that provides
attestation Evidence via the YANG module defined in this document. attestation Evidence via the YANG module defined in this document.
The ietf-tpm-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite The ietf-tpm-remote-attestation YANG module enables a composite
device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the device to take on the role of an Attester, in accordance with the
Remote Attestation Procedures (RATS) architecture [RFC9334], and the RATS architecture [RFC9334] and the corresponding challenge-response
corresponding challenge-response interaction model defined in the interaction model defined in [RATS-Interaction-Models]. A fresh
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] document. A fresh nonce nonce with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be
with an appropriate amount of entropy [NIST-915121] MUST be supplied supplied by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness
by the YANG client in order to enable a proof-of-freshness with with respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester
respect to the attestation Evidence provided by the Attester running running the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent
the YANG datastore. Further, this nonce is used to prevent replay replay attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of
attacks. The method for communicating the relationship of each each individual TPM to the specific measured component within the
individual TPM to specific measured component within the Composite composite device is out of the scope of this document.
Device is out of the scope of this document.
2.1. YANG Modules 2.1. YANG Modules
In this section the several YANG modules are defined. In this section, the two YANG modules are defined.
2.1.1. 'ietf-tpm-remote-attestation' 2.1.1. ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang', This YANG module imports modules from [RFC6991] with prefix 'yang',
[RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] with prefix [RFC8348] with prefix 'hw', [RFC9642] with prefix 'ks', and ietf-tcg-
'ks', and 'ietf-tcg-algs.yang' Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'. algs.yang Section 2.1.2.3 with prefix 'taa'. Additionally,
Additionally, references are made to [RFC8032], [RFC8017], [RFC6933], references are made to [RFC6933], [TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch],
[TPM1.2-Commands], [TPM2.0-Arch], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key], [TPM2.0-Structures], [TPM2.0-Key], [TPM1.2-Structures], [BIOS-Log],
[TPM1.2-Structures], [bios-log], [BIOS-Log-Event-Type], as well as and [CEL], as well as Appendix B.
Appendix A and Appendix B.
2.1.1.1. Features 2.1.1.1. Features
This module supports the following features: This module supports the following features:
* 'mtpm': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support 'mtpm': Indicates that multiple TPMs on the device can support
remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in remote attestation. For example, this feature could be used in
cases where multiple line cards are present, each with its own cases where multiple line cards are present, each with its own
TPM. TPM.
* 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS/ 'bios': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of BIOS and
UEFI event logs. [bios-log] Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) event logs
[BIOS-Log].
* 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event 'ima': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of event
logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA, see logs from the Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA, see
Appendix A). Appendix A).
* 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval 'netequip_boot': Indicates that the device supports the retrieval of
of netequip boot event logs. See Appendix A and Appendix B. netequip boot event logs. See Appendixes A and B.
2.1.1.2. Identities 2.1.1.2. Identities
This module supports the following types of attestation event logs: This module supports the following types of attestation event logs:
'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'. 'bios', 'ima', and 'netequip_boot'.
2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs) 2.1.1.3. Remote Procedure Calls (RPCs)
In the following, RPCs for both TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 attestation In the following sections, RPCs for attestation procedures for both
procedures are defined. TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 are defined.
2.1.1.3.1. 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation' 2.1.1.3.1. tpm12-challenge-response-attestation
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_ This RPC allows a Verifier to request via the _TPM Quote_ operation,
operation) from a TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the signed TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) from a
feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not cryptoprocessor compliant with TPM 1.2. Where the feature 'mtpm' is
provided, all TPM 1.2 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not provided, all
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows: cryptoprocessors compliant with TPM 1.2 will respond. The YANG tree
diagram of this RPC is as follows:
+---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}? +---x tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm12}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm12-attestation-challenge
| +---w pcr-index* pcr | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
| {tpm:mtpm}? | {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro tpm12-attestation-response* [] +--ro tpm12-attestation-response* []
+--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref +--ro certificate-name certificate-name-ref
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary +--ro TPM_QUOTE2? binary
2.1.1.3.2. 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation' 2.1.1.3.2. tpm20-challenge-response-attestation
This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_ This RPC allows a Verifier to request signed TPM PCRs (_TPM Quote_
operation) from a TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessor. Where the operation) from a cryptoprocessor compliant with TPM 2.0. Where the
feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not feature 'mtpm' is active, and one or more 'certificate-name' is not
provided, all TPM 2.0 compliant cryptoprocessors will respond. A provided, all cryptoprocessors compliant with TPM 2.0 will respond.
YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows: The YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as follows:
+---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}? +---x tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {taa:tpm20}?
+---w input +---w input
| +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge | +---w tpm20-attestation-challenge
| +---w nonce-value binary | +---w nonce-value binary
| +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* [] | +---w tpm20-pcr-selection* []
| | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref | | +---w tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
| | +---w pcr-index* pcr | | +---w pcr-index* pcr
| +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref | +---w certificate-name* certificate-name-ref
| {tpm:mtpm}? | {tpm:mtpm}?
skipping to change at page 6, line 5 skipping to change at line 228
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro unsigned-pcr-values* [] +--ro unsigned-pcr-values* []
+--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref +--ro tpm20-hash-algo? identityref
+--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index] +--ro pcr-values* [pcr-index]
+--ro pcr-index pcr +--ro pcr-index pcr
+--ro pcr-value? binary +--ro pcr-value? binary
An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256 An example of an RPC challenge requesting PCRs 0-7 from a SHA-256
bank could look like the following: bank could look like the following:
<rpc message-id="101" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> <rpc message-id="101"
<tpm20-attestation-challenge xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<tpm20-attestation-challenge
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<certificate-name> <certificate-name>
(identifier of a TPM signature key with which the Attester is (identifier of a TPM signature key with which the Attester is
supposed to sign the attestation data) supposed to sign the attestation data)
</certificate-name> </certificate-name>
<nonce> <nonce>
0xe041307208d9f78f5b1bbecd19e2d152ad49de2fc5a7d8dbf769f6b8ffdeab9 0xe041307208d9f78f5b1bbecd19e2d152ad49de2fc5a7d8dbf769f6b8ffdeab9
</nonce> </nonce>
<tpm20-pcr-selection> <tpm20-pcr-selection>
<tpm20-hash-algo <tpm20-hash-algo
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs">
TPM_ALG_SHA256 TPM_ALG_SHA256
</tpm20-hash-algo> </tpm20-hash-algo>
<pcr-index>0</pcr-index> <pcr-index>0</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>1</pcr-index> <pcr-index>1</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>2</pcr-index> <pcr-index>2</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>3</pcr-index> <pcr-index>3</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>4</pcr-index> <pcr-index>4</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>5</pcr-index> <pcr-index>5</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>6</pcr-index> <pcr-index>6</pcr-index>
<pcr-index>7</pcr-index> <pcr-index>7</pcr-index>
</tpm20-pcr-selection> </tpm20-pcr-selection>
</tpm20-attestation-challenge> </tpm20-attestation-challenge>
</rpc> </rpc>
A successful response could be formatted as follows: A successful response could be formatted as follows:
<rpc-reply message-id="101" <rpc-reply message-id="101"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<tpm20-attestation-response <tpm20-attestation-response
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation">
<certificate-name <certificate-name
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-keystore">
(instance of Certificate name in the Keystore) (instance of certificate name in the keystore)
</certificate-name> </certificate-name>
<attestation-data> <attestation-data>
(raw attestation data, i.e., the TPM quote; this includes, (raw attestation data, i.e., the TPM quote; this includes,
among other information, a composite digest of requested PCRs, among other information, a composite digest of requested PCRs,
the nonce, and TPM 2.0 clock information.) the nonce, and TPM 2.0 clock information.)
</attestation-data> </attestation-data>
<quote-signature> <quote-signature>
(signature over attestation-data using the TPM key (signature over attestation-data using the TPM key
identified by sig-key-id) identified by sig-key-id)
</quote-signature> </quote-signature>
</tpm20-attestation-response> </tpm20-attestation-response>
</rpc-reply> </rpc-reply>
2.1.1.4. 'log-retrieval' 2.1.1.4. log-retrieval
This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the Evidence which was extended This RPC allows a Verifier to acquire the Evidence that was extended
into specific TPM PCRs. A YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as into specific TPM PCRs. The YANG tree diagram of this RPC is as
follows: follows:
+---x log-retrieval +---x log-retrieval
+---w input +---w input
| +---w log-type identityref | +---w log-type identityref
| +---w log-selector* [] | +---w log-selector* []
| +---w name* string | +---w name* string
| +---w (index-type)? | +---w (index-type)?
| | +--:(last-entry) | | +--:(last-entry)
| | | +---w last-entry-value? binary | | | +---w last-entry-value? binary
| | +--:(index) | | +--:(index)
| | | +---w last-index-number? uint64 | | | +---w last-index-number? uint64
| | +--:(timestamp) | | +--:(timestamp)
| | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time | | +---w timestamp? yang:date-and-time
| +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16 | +---w log-entry-quantity? uint16
+--ro output +--ro output
+--ro system-event-logs +--ro system-event-logs
+--ro node-data* [] +--ro node-data* []
+--ro name? string +--ro name? string
+--ro up-time? uint32 +--ro up-time? uint32
+--ro log-result +--ro log-result
+--ro (attested_event_log_type) +--ro (attested_event_log_type)
+--:(bios) {bios}? +--:(bios) {bios}?
| +--ro bios-event-logs | +--ro bios-event-logs
| +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number] | +--ro bios-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint32 | +--ro event-number uint32
| +--ro event-type? uint32 | +--ro event-type? uint32
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr | +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro digest-list* [] | +--ro digest-list* []
| | +--ro hash-algo? identityref | | +--ro hash-algo? identityref
| | +--ro digest* binary | | +--ro digest* binary
| +--ro event-size? uint32 | +--ro event-size? uint32
| +--ro event-data* binary | +--ro event-data* binary
+--:(ima) {ima}? +--:(ima) {ima}?
| +--ro ima-event-logs | +--ro ima-event-logs
| +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number] | +--ro ima-event-entry* [event-number]
| +--ro event-number uint64 | +--ro event-number uint64
| +--ro ima-template? string | +--ro ima-template? string
| +--ro filename-hint? string | +--ro filename-hint? string
| +--ro filedata-hash? binary | +--ro filedata-hash? binary
| +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string | +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
| +--ro template-hash? binary | +--ro template-hash? binary
| +--ro pcr-index? pcr | +--ro pcr-index? pcr
| +--ro signature? binary | +--ro signature? binary
+--:(netequip_boot) {netequip_boot}? +--:(netequip_boot) {netequip_boot}?
+--ro boot-event-logs +--ro boot-event-logs
+--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number] +--ro boot-event-entry* [event-number]
+--ro event-number uint64 +--ro event-number uint64
+--ro ima-template? string +--ro ima-template? string
+--ro filename-hint? string +--ro filename-hint? string
+--ro filedata-hash? binary +--ro filedata-hash? binary
+--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string +--ro filedata-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash-algorithm? string +--ro template-hash-algorithm? string
+--ro template-hash? binary +--ro template-hash? binary
+--ro pcr-index? pcr +--ro pcr-index? pcr
+--ro signature? binary +--ro signature? binary
2.1.1.5. Data Nodes 2.1.1.5. Data Nodes
This section provides a high level description of the data nodes This section provides a high-level description of the data nodes that
containing the configuration and operational objects with the YANG contain the configuration and operational objects within the YANG
model. For more details, please see the YANG model itself in data model. For more details, please see the YANG module itself in
Figure 1. Figure 1.
Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of Container 'rats-support-structures': This houses the set of
information relating to remote attestation for a device. This information relating to remote attestation for a device. This
includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (such as line includes specific device TPM(s), the compute nodes (such as line
cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported cards) on which the TPM(s) reside, and the algorithms supported
across the platform. across the platform.
Container 'tpms': Provides configuration and operational details for Container 'tpms': This provides configuration and operational
each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-version, PCRs which details for each supported TPM, including the tpm-firmware-
may be quoted, certificates which are associated with that TPM, version, PCRs that may be quoted, certificates that are associated
and the current operational status. Of note are the certificates with that TPM, and the current operational status. Of note are
which are associated with that TPM. As a certificate is the certificates that are associated with that TPM. As a
associated with a particular TPM attestation key, knowledge of the certificate is associated with a particular TPM Attestation Key,
certificate allows a specific TPM to be identified. knowledge of the certificate allows a specific TPM to be
identified.
+--rw tpms +--rw tpms
+--rw tpm* [name] +--rw tpm* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--ro hardware-based boolean +--ro hardware-based boolean
+--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro path? string +--ro path? string
+--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}? +--ro compute-node compute-node-ref {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro manufacturer? string +--ro manufacturer? string
+--rw firmware-version identityref +--rw firmware-version identityref
skipping to change at page 9, line 26 skipping to change at line 383
+--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo] {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-pcr-bank* [tpm20-hash-algo] {taa:tpm20}?
| +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref | +--rw tpm20-hash-algo identityref
| +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr | +--rw pcr-index* tpm:pcr
+--ro status enumeration +--ro status enumeration
+--rw certificates +--rw certificates
+--rw certificate* [name] +--rw certificate* [name]
+--rw name string +--rw name string
+--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}? +--rw keystore-ref? leafref {ks:asymmetric-keys}?
+--rw type? enumeration +--rw type? enumeration
container 'attester-supported-algos' - Identifies which TCG hash Container 'attester-supported-algos': This identifies which TCG hash
algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. An algorithms are available for use on the Attesting platform. An
operator will use this information to limit algorithms available for operator will use this information to limit algorithms available
use by RPCs to just a desired set from the universe of all allowed for use by RPCs to just a desired set from the universe of all
hash algorithms by the TCG. hash algorithms allowed by the TCG.
+--rw attester-supported-algos +--rw attester-supported-algos
+--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm12}? +--rw tpm12-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm12}?
+--rw tpm12-hash* identityref {taa:tpm12}? +--rw tpm12-hash* identityref {taa:tpm12}?
+--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-asymmetric-signing* identityref {taa:tpm20}?
+--rw tpm20-hash* identityref {taa:tpm20}? +--rw tpm20-hash* identityref {taa:tpm20}?
container 'compute-nodes' - When there is more than one TPM Container 'compute-nodes': When there is more than one TPM
supported, this container maintains the set of information related to supported, this container maintains the set of information related
the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows each to the compute node associated with a specific TPM. This allows
specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs. each specific TPM to identify to which 'compute-node' it belongs.
+--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}? +--rw compute-nodes {tpm:mtpm}?
+--ro compute-node* [node-id] +--ro compute-node* [node-id]
+--ro node-id string +--ro node-id string
+--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}? +--ro node-physical-index? int32 {hw:entity-mib}?
+--ro node-name? string +--ro node-name? string
+--ro node-location? string +--ro node-location? string
2.1.1.6. YANG Module 2.1.1.6. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang@24-07-29.yang"
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tpm-remote-attestation@2024-10-22.yang"
module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation { module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang"
+ ":ietf-tpm-remote-attestation";
prefix tpm; prefix tpm;
import ietf-yang-types { import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang; prefix yang;
} }
import ietf-hardware { import ietf-hardware {
prefix hw; prefix hw;
} }
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
skipping to change at page 10, line 29 skipping to change at line 435
import ietf-tcg-algs { import ietf-tcg-algs {
prefix taa; prefix taa;
} }
organization organization
"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group"; "IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web : <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/> "WG Web : <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
WG List : <mailto:rats@ietf.org> WG List : <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
Author : Eric Voit <evoit@cisco.com> Author : Eric Voit <evoit@cisco.com>
Author : Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de> Author : Henk Birkholz <henk.birkholz@ietf.contact>
Author : Michael Eckel <michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de> Author : Michael Eckel <michael.eckel@sit.fraunhofer.de>
Author : Shwetha Bhandari <shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com> Author : Shwetha Bhandari <shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com>
Author : Bill Sulzen <bsulzen@cisco.com> Author : Bill Sulzen <bsulzen@cisco.com>
Author : Liang Xia (Frank) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com> Author : Liang Xia (Frank) <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
Author : Tom Laffey <tom.laffey@hpe.com> Author : Tom Laffey <tom.laffey@hpe.com>
Author : Guy Fedorkow <gfedorkow@juniper.net>"; Author : Guy C. Fedorkow <gfedorkow@juniper.net>";
description description
"A YANG module to enable a TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 based "A YANG module to enable remote attestation procedures based
remote attestation procedure using a challenge-response on TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 using a challenge-response
interaction model and the TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0 Quote interaction model and the Quote primitive operations defined
primitive operations. by TPM 1.2 and TPM 2.0.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info). (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9684; see the
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC RFC itself for full legal notices.";
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2022-05-17 { revision 2024-10-22 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs)";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
feature mtpm { feature mtpm {
description description
"The device supports the remote attestation of multiple "The device supports the remote attestation of multiple
TPM based cryptoprocessors."; TPM-based cryptoprocessors.";
} }
feature bios { feature bios {
description description
"The device supports the bios logs."; "The device supports the BIOS logs.";
reference reference
"bios-log: "BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf TCG-PC-Client-Platform-Firmware-Profile-Version-1.06-
Section 9.4.5.2"; Revision-52_pub-2.pdf, Section 10.4.5.2";
} }
feature ima { feature ima {
description description
"The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs. "The device supports Integrity Measurement Architecture logs.
Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each encodes Many variants of IMA logs exist in the deployment. Each
the log entry contents as the specific measurements which get encodes the log entry contents as the specific measurements
hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference below for that get hashed into a PCRs as Evidence. See the reference
one example of such an encoding."; below for one example of such an encoding.";
reference reference
"ima-log: "CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 5.1.6"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 5.1.6";
} }
feature netequip_boot { feature netequip_boot {
description description
"The device supports the netequip_boot logs."; "The device supports the netequip_boot logs.";
reference reference
"netequip-boot-log: "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
RFC XXXX Appendix B"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs), Appendix B";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Typedefs */ /* Typedefs */
/*****************/ /*****************/
typedef pcr { typedef pcr {
type uint8 { type uint8 {
range "0..31"; range "0..31";
} }
description description
"Valid index number for a PCR. A {{TPM2.0}} compliant PCR index "Valid index number for a PCR. A PCR index compliant with
extends from 0-31. At this time a typical TPM would have no TPM 2.0 extends from 0-31. At this time, a typical TPM would
more than 32 PCRS."; have no more than 32 PCRs.";
} }
typedef compute-node-ref { typedef compute-node-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:compute-nodes"
+ "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-id"; + "/tpm:compute-node/tpm:node-id";
} }
description description
"This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an "This type is used to reference a hardware node. Note that an
implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a implementer might include an alternative leafref pointing to a
different YANG module node specifying hardware structures."; different YANG module node specifying hardware structures.";
} }
typedef certificate-name-ref { typedef certificate-name-ref {
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm" path "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm"
+ "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name"; + "/tpm:certificates/tpm:certificate/tpm:name";
} }
description description
"A type which allows identification of a TPM based certificate."; "A type that allows identification of a TPM-based
certificate.";
} }
/******************/ /******************/
/* Identities */ /* Identities */
/******************/ /******************/
identity attested_event_log_type { identity attested_event_log_type {
description description
"Base identity allowing categorization of the reasons why an "Base identity allowing categorization of the reasons why an
attested measurement has been taken on an Attester."; attested measurement has been taken on an Attester.";
} }
identity ima { identity ima {
base attested_event_log_type; base attested_event_log_type;
description description
"An event type recorded in IMA."; "An event type recorded in IMA.";
skipping to change at page 13, line 34 skipping to change at line 589
description description
"An event type associated with Network Equipment Boot."; "An event type associated with Network Equipment Boot.";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Groupings */ /* Groupings */
/*****************/ /*****************/
grouping tpm20-hash-algo { grouping tpm20-hash-algo {
description description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM2 PCRs. This "The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the PCRs compliant
must be from the list of platform supported options."; with TPM 2.0. This must be from the list of platform-
supported options.";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures' must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM2.0 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a PCR compliant with
must be one of those supported by a platform. TPM 2.0. This must be one of those supported by a platform.
Where this object does not appear, the default value of Where this object does not appear, the default value of
'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256' will apply."; 'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA256' will apply.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-hash-algo { grouping tpm12-hash-algo {
description description
"The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the TPM1.2 PCRs."; "The cryptographic algorithm used to hash the PCRs compliant
with TPM 1.2.";
leaf tpm12-hash-algo { leaf tpm12-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures' must '. = /tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm12-hash' { + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos/tpm:tpm12-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm12-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm12-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to hash a TPM1.2 PCR. This "The hash scheme that is used to hash a PCR compliant with
MUST be one of those supported by a platform. TPM 1.2. This MUST be one of those supported by a platform.
Where this object does not appear, the default value of Where this object does not appear, the default value of
'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1' will apply."; 'taa:TPM_ALG_SHA1' will apply.";
} }
} }
grouping nonce { grouping nonce {
description description
"A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use "A random number intended to guarantee freshness and for use
as part of a replay-detection mechanism."; as part of a replay-detection mechanism.";
leaf nonce-value { leaf nonce-value {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A cryptographically generated random number which should "A cryptographically generated random number that should
not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random not be predictable prior to its issuance from a random
number generation function. The random number MUST be number generation function. The random number MUST be
derived from an entropy source external to the Attester. derived from an entropy source external to the Attester.
Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or 256 Note that a nonce sent into a TPM will typically be 160 or
binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if fewer 256 binary digits long. (This is 20 or 32 bytes.) So if
binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be padded fewer binary digits are sent, this nonce object will be
with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the TPM. padded with leading zeros within Quotes returned from the
Additionally if more bytes are sent, the nonce will be trimmed TPM. Additionally, if more bytes are sent, the nonce will
to the most significant binary digits."; be trimmed to the most significant binary digits.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-pcr-selection { grouping tpm12-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its "A Verifier can request one or more PCR values using its
individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC). individually created Attestation Key Certificate (AC).
The corresponding selection filter is represented in this The corresponding selection filter is represented in this
grouping."; grouping.";
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection "The numbers/indexes of the PCRs. In addition, any selection
of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs requested are a
subset the set of PCRs exposed by in the leaf-list subset of the set of PCRs exposed in the leaf-list
/tpm:rats-support-structures /tpm:rats-support-structures
/tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs"; /tpm:tpms/tpm:tpm[name=current()]/tpm:tpm12-pcrs";
} }
} }
grouping tpm20-pcr-selection { grouping tpm20-pcr-selection {
description description
"A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are hashed "A Verifier can acquire one or more PCR values, which are
together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2. The selection hashed together in a TPM2B_DIGEST coming from the TPM2.
list of desired PCRs and the Hash Algorithm is represented in The selection list of desired PCRs and the hash algorithm
this grouping."; is represented in this grouping.";
list tpm20-pcr-selection { list tpm20-pcr-selection {
unique "tpm20-hash-algo"; unique "tpm20-hash-algo";
description description
"Specifies the list of PCRs and Hash Algorithms that can be "Specifies the list of PCRs and hash algorithms that can be
returned within a TPM2B_DIGEST."; returned within a TPM2B_DIGEST.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 10.9.7";
uses tpm20-hash-algo; uses tpm20-hash-algo;
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The numbers of the PCRs that which are being tracked "The numbers of the PCRs that are being tracked
with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition, with a hash based on the tpm20-hash-algo. In addition,
any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs any selection of PCRs MUST verify that the set of PCRs
requested are a subset the set of PCR indexes selected requested are a subset of the set of selected PCR indexes
are available for that specific TPM."; available for that specific TPM.";
} }
} }
} }
grouping certificate-name-ref { grouping certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore."; "Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
leaf certificate-name { leaf certificate-name {
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
skipping to change at page 16, line 4 skipping to change at line 709
grouping certificate-name-ref { grouping certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore."; "Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
leaf certificate-name { leaf certificate-name {
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Identifies a certificate in a keystore."; "Identifies a certificate in a keystore.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm-name { grouping tpm-name {
description description
"A unique TPM on a device."; "A unique TPM on a device.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"Unique system generated name for a TPM on a device."; "Unique system-generated name for a TPM on a device.";
} }
} }
grouping node-uptime { grouping node-uptime {
description description
"Uptime in seconds of the node."; "Uptime in seconds of the node.";
leaf up-time { leaf up-time {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data"; "Uptime in seconds of this node reporting its data.";
} }
} }
grouping tpm12-attestation { grouping tpm12-attestation {
description description
"Contains an instance of TPM1.2 style signed cryptoprocessor "Contains an instance of cryptoprocessor measurements signed
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester according to TPM 1.2. It is supplemented by unsigned
information."; Attester information.";
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
leaf pcr-data { leaf pcr-data {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The value created and signed for the quote (type TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT), "The value created and signed for the quote
i.e., the 'pcrData' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; (type TPM_PCR_INFO_SHORT), i.e., the 'pcrData' part of
a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
leaf version-info { leaf version-info {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The version info (type TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO), "The version info (type TPM_CAP_VERSION_INFO),
i.e., the 'versionInfo' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; i.e., the 'versionInfo' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2
operation result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
leaf sig { leaf sig {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The signed data blob, i.e., the signature "The signature generated across the signed data,
i.e., the 'sig' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation result."; i.e., the 'sig' part of a TPM1.2 Quote2 operation
result.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Commands: "TPM1.2-Commands:
TPM1.2 commands rev116 July 2007, Section 16.5 TPM Main Part 3 Commands, Rev116,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads
/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; /TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf,
Section 16.5";
} }
} }
grouping tpm20-attestation { grouping tpm20-attestation {
description description
"Contains an instance of TPM2 style signed cryptoprocessor "Contains an instance of cryptoprocessor measurements signed
measurements. It is supplemented by unsigned Attester according to TPM 2.0. It is supplemented by unsigned
information."; Attester information.";
leaf quote-data { leaf quote-data {
type binary; type binary;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"A hash of the latest PCR values (and the hash algorithm used) "A hash of the latest PCR values (and the hash algorithm
which have been returned from an Attester for the selected PCRs used) that have been returned from an Attester for the
and Hash Algorithms."; selected PCRs and hash algorithms.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.12.1"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 10.12.1";
} }
leaf quote-signature { leaf quote-signature {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Quote signature returned by TPM Quote. The signature was "Quote signature returned by TPM Quote. The signature was
generated using the key associated with the generated using the key associated with the
certificate 'name'."; certificate 'name'.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 11.2.1"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 11.2.1";
} }
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
list unsigned-pcr-values { list unsigned-pcr-values {
description description
"PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant with "PCR values in each PCR bank. This might appear redundant
the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across multiple with the TPM2B_DIGEST, but that digest is calculated across
PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does not multiple PCRs. Having to verify across multiple PCRs does
necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just the not necessarily make it easy for a Verifier to appraise just
minimum set of PCR information which has changed since the last the minimum set of PCR information that has changed since
received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should a Verifier the last received TPM2B_DIGEST. Put another way, why should
reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes when only a a Verifier reconstruct the proper value of all PCR Quotes
single PCR has changed? when only a single PCR has changed?
To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR To help this happen, if the Attester does know specific PCR
values, the Attester can provide these individual values via values, the Attester can provide these individual values via
'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to 'unsigned-pcr-values'. By comparing this information to
what has previously been validated, it is possible for a what has previously been validated, it is possible for a
Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while eliminating Verifier to confirm the Attester's signature while
eliminating significant processing. Note that there should
significant processing. Note that there should never be a never be a result where an unsigned PCR value differs from
result where an unsigned PCR value differs from what may be what may be reconstructed from within the PCR quote and
reconstructed from the within the PCR quote and the event logs. the event logs.
If there is a difference, a signed result which has been If there is a difference, a signed result that has been
verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive."; verified from retrieved logs is considered definitive.";
uses tpm20-hash-algo; uses tpm20-hash-algo;
list pcr-values { list pcr-values {
key "pcr-index"; key "pcr-index";
description description
"List of one PCR bank."; "List of one PCR bank.";
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"PCR index number."; "PCR index number.";
} }
leaf pcr-value { leaf pcr-value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"PCR value."; "PCR value.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 10.9.7";
} }
} }
} }
} }
grouping log-identifier { grouping log-identifier {
description description
"Identifier for type of log to be retrieved."; "Identifier for type of log to be retrieved.";
leaf log-type { leaf log-type {
type identityref { type identityref {
base attested_event_log_type; base attested_event_log_type;
} }
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"The corresponding measurement log type identity."; "The corresponding identity of the measurement log type.";
} }
} }
grouping boot-event-log { grouping boot-event-log {
description description
"Defines a specific instance of an event log entry "Defines a specific instance of an event log entry
and corresponding to the information used to and corresponding to the information used to
extend the PCR"; extend the PCR.";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Unique event number of this event which monotonically "Unique event number of this event, which monotonically
increases within a given event log. The maximum event increases within a given event log. The maximum event
number should not be reached, nor is wrapping back to number should not be reached, nor is wrapping back to
an earlier number supported."; an earlier number supported.";
} }
leaf event-type { leaf event-type {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"BIOS Log Event Type: "BIOS log event type.";
reference
"BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf Section 10.4.1"; TCG-PC-Client-Platform-Firmware-Profile-Version-1.06-
Revision-52_pub-2.pdf, Section 10.4.1";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended.";
} }
list digest-list { list digest-list {
description description
"Hash of event data"; "Hash of event data.";
leaf hash-algo { leaf hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"The hash scheme that is used to compress the event data in "The hash scheme that is used to compress the event data in
each of the leaf-list digest items."; each of the leaf-list digest items.";
} }
leaf-list digest { leaf-list digest {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the "The hash of the event data using the algorithm of the
'hash-algo' against 'event data'."; 'hash-algo' against 'event data'.";
} }
} }
leaf event-size { leaf event-size {
type uint32; type uint32;
description description
"Size of the event data"; "Size of the event data.";
} }
leaf-list event-data { leaf-list event-data {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"The event data. This is a binary structure "The event data. This is a binary structure
of size 'event-size'. For more on what of size 'event-size'. For more on what
might be recorded within this object might be recorded within this object
see [bios-log] Section 9 which details see BIOS-Log, Section 10, which details
viable events which might be recorded."; viable events that might be recorded.";
reference
"BIOS-Log:
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG-PC-Client-Platform-Firmware-Profile-Version-1.06-
Revision-52_pub-2.pdf, Section 10";
} }
} }
grouping bios-event-log { grouping bios-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI."; "Measurement log created by the BIOS/UEFI.";
list bios-event-entry { list bios-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of TCG described event log "Ordered list of the TCG-described event log
that extended the PCRs in the order they that extended the PCRs in the order they
were logged"; were logged.";
uses boot-event-log; uses boot-event-log;
} }
} }
grouping ima-event { grouping ima-event {
description description
"Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements"; "Defines a hash log extend event for IMA measurements.";
reference reference
"ima-log: "CEL:
Canonical Event Log Format,
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf Section 4.3"; TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf, Section 4.3";
leaf event-number { leaf event-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"Unique event number of this event which monotonically "Unique event number of this event, which monotonically
increases. The maximum event number should not be increases. The maximum event number should not be
reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number reached, nor is wrapping back to an earlier number
supported."; supported.";
} }
leaf ima-template { leaf ima-template {
type string; type string;
description description
"Name of the template used for event logs "Name of the template used for event logs,
for e.g. ima, ima-ng, ima-sig"; e.g., ima, ima-ng, ima-sig.";
} }
leaf filename-hint { leaf filename-hint {
type string; type string;
description description
"File name (including the path) that was measured."; "File name (including the path) that was measured.";
} }
leaf filedata-hash { leaf filedata-hash {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Hash of filedata as updated based upon the "Hash of filedata as updated based upon the
filedata-hash-algorithm"; filedata-hash-algorithm.";
} }
leaf filedata-hash-algorithm { leaf filedata-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for filedata-hash"; "Algorithm used for filedata-hash.";
} }
leaf template-hash-algorithm { leaf template-hash-algorithm {
type string; type string;
description description
"Algorithm used for template-hash"; "Algorithm used for template-hash.";
} }
leaf template-hash { leaf template-hash {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)"; "hash(filedata-hash, filename-hint)";
} }
leaf pcr-index { leaf pcr-index {
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"Defines the PCR index that this event extended"; "Defines the PCR index that this event extended.";
} }
leaf signature { leaf signature {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Digital file signature which provides a "Digital file signature that provides a
fingerprint for the file being measured."; fingerprint for the file being measured.";
} }
} }
grouping ima-event-log { grouping ima-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by IMA."; "Measurement log created by IMA.";
list ima-event-entry { list ima-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of ima event logs by event-number"; "Ordered list of IMA event logs by event-number.";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log { grouping network-equipment-boot-event-log {
description description
"Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The Network "Measurement log created by Network Equipment Boot. The
Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA format. In Network Equipment Boot format is identical to the IMA
contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment Boot log format. In contrast to the IMA log, the Network Equipment
includes every measurable event from an Attester, including Boot log includes every measurable event from an Attester,
the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In essence, the scope including the boot stages of BIOS, Bootloader, etc. In
of events represented in this format combines the scope of BIOS essence, the scope of events represented in this format
events and IMA events."; combines the scope of BIOS events and IMA events.";
list boot-event-entry { list boot-event-entry {
key "event-number"; key "event-number";
description description
"Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs "Ordered list of Network Equipment Boot event logs
by event-number, using the IMA event format."; by event-number, using the IMA event format.";
uses ima-event; uses ima-event;
} }
} }
grouping event-logs { grouping event-logs {
description description
"A selector for the log and its type."; "A selector for the log and its type.";
choice attested_event_log_type { choice attested_event_log_type {
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Event log type determines the event logs content."; "Event log type determines the event log's content.";
case bios { case bios {
if-feature "bios"; if-feature "bios";
description description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs"; "BIOS/UEFI event logs.";
container bios-event-logs { container bios-event-logs {
description description
"BIOS/UEFI event logs"; "BIOS/UEFI event logs.";
uses bios-event-log; uses bios-event-log;
} }
} }
case ima { case ima {
if-feature "ima"; if-feature "ima";
description description
"IMA event logs."; "IMA event logs.";
container ima-event-logs { container ima-event-logs {
description description
"IMA event logs."; "IMA event logs.";
uses ima-event-log; uses ima-event-log;
} }
} }
case netequip_boot { case netequip_boot {
if-feature "netequip_boot"; if-feature "netequip_boot";
description description
"Network Equipment Boot event logs"; "Network Equipment Boot event logs.";
container boot-event-logs { container boot-event-logs {
description description
"Network equipment boot event logs."; "Network Equipment Boot event logs.";
uses network-equipment-boot-event-log; uses network-equipment-boot-event-log;
} }
} }
} }
} }
/**********************/ /**********************/
/* RPC operations */ /* RPC operations */
/**********************/ /**********************/
rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation { rpc tpm12-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
description description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands made to the "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 1.2 commands made to
attesting device."; the attesting device.";
input { input {
container tpm12-attestation-challenge { container tpm12-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 1.2 structure definitions"; TPM 1.2 structure definitions";
uses tpm12-pcr-selection; uses tpm12-pcr-selection;
uses nonce; uses nonce;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
skipping to change at page 24, line 5 skipping to change at line 1118
description description
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with these certificate(s)."; TPMs associated with these certificate(s).";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
list tpm12-attestation-response { list tpm12-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name"; unique "certificate-name";
description description
"The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2, including "The binary output of TPM 1.2 TPM_Quote/TPM_Quote2,
the PCR selection and other associated attestation evidence including the PCR selection and other associated
metadata"; attestation evidence metadata.";
uses certificate-name-ref { uses certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Certificate associated with this tpm12-attestation."; "Certificate associated with this tpm12-attestation.";
} }
uses tpm12-attestation; uses tpm12-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation { rpc tpm20-challenge-response-attestation {
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
description description
"This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the "This RPC accepts the input for TSS TPM 2.0 commands of the
managed device. ComponentIndex from the hardware manager YANG managed device. Composite devices may contain several TPMs;
module is used to refer to dedicated TPM in composite devices, /hardware/component/physical-index from the hardware management
e.g. smart NICs, is not covered."; YANG module is used to refer to dedicated TPMs in composite
devices; however, devices without TPMs are not covered.";
input { input {
container tpm20-attestation-challenge { container tpm20-attestation-challenge {
description description
"This container includes every information element defined "This container includes every information element defined
in the reference challenge-response interaction model for in the reference challenge-response interaction model for
remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on remote attestation. Corresponding values are based on
TPM 2.0 structure definitions"; TPM 2.0 structure definitions.";
uses nonce; uses nonce;
uses tpm20-pcr-selection; uses tpm20-pcr-selection;
leaf-list certificate-name { leaf-list certificate-name {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type certificate-name-ref; type certificate-name-ref;
must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms" must "/tpm:rats-support-structures/tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']" + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"
+ "/tpm:certificates/" + "/tpm:certificates/"
+ "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" { + "/tpm:certificate[name=current()]" {
error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate."; error-message "Not an available TPM2.0 AIK certificate.";
skipping to change at page 25, line 5 skipping to change at line 1167
"When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the "When populated, the RPC will only get a Quote for the
TPMs associated with the certificates."; TPMs associated with the certificates.";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
list tpm20-attestation-response { list tpm20-attestation-response {
unique "certificate-name"; unique "certificate-name";
description description
"The binary output of TPM2_Quote from one TPM of the "The binary output of TPM2_Quote from one TPM of the
node which identified by node-id. An TPMS_ATTEST structure node which is identified by node-id: an attestation
including a length, encapsulated in a signature"; structure (TPMS_ATTEST), including a length, and a
signature (TPMT_SIGNATURE) over that structure.";
reference
"TPM2.0-Structures:
Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 10.12.12";
uses certificate-name-ref { uses certificate-name-ref {
description description
"Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation."; "Certificate associated with this tpm20-attestation.";
} }
uses tpm20-attestation; uses tpm20-attestation;
} }
} }
} }
rpc log-retrieval { rpc log-retrieval {
description description
"Logs Entries are either identified via indices or via providing "Log entries are identified either via indices or by providing
the last line received. The number of lines returned can be the last line received. The number of lines returned can be
limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented."; limited. The type of log is a choice that can be augmented.";
input { input {
uses log-identifier; uses log-identifier;
list log-selector { list log-selector {
description description
"Only log entries which meet all the selection criteria "Only log entries that meet all of the provided selection
provided are to be returned by the RPC output."; criteria are to be returned by the RPC output.";
leaf-list name { leaf-list name {
type string; type string;
description description
"Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this "Name of one or more unique TPMs on a device. If this
object exists, a selection should pull only the objects object exists, a selection should pull only the objects
related to these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all related to these TPM(s). If it does not exist, all
qualifying TPMs that are 'hardware-based' equals true qualifying TPMs that are 'hardware-based' equals true
on the device are selected. When this selection on the device are selected. When this selection
criteria is provided, it will be considered as a logical criteria is provided, it will be considered as a logical
AND with any other selection criteria provided."; AND with any other selection criteria provided.";
} }
choice index-type { choice index-type {
description description
"Last log entry received, log index number, or timestamp."; "Last log entry received, log index number, or
timestamp.";
case last-entry { case last-entry {
description description
"The last entry of the log already retrieved."; "The last entry of the log already retrieved.";
leaf last-entry-value { leaf last-entry-value {
type binary; type binary;
description description
"Content of a log event which matches 1:1 with a "Content of a log event that matches 1:1 with a
unique event record contained within the log. Log unique event record contained within the log. Log
entries after this will be passed to the entries after this will be passed to the
requester. Note: if log entry values are not unique, requester. Note: if log entry values are not
this MUST return an error."; unique, this MUST return an error.";
} }
} }
case index { case index {
description description
"Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or "Numeric index of the last log entry retrieved, or
zero."; zero.";
leaf last-index-number { leaf last-index-number {
type uint64; type uint64;
description description
"The last numeric index number of a log entry. "The last numeric index number of a log entry.
skipping to change at page 26, line 43 skipping to change at line 1260
type uint16; type uint16;
description description
"The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it "The number of log entries to be returned. If omitted, it
means all of them."; means all of them.";
} }
} }
} }
output { output {
container system-event-logs { container system-event-logs {
description description
"The requested data of the measurement event logs"; "The requested data of the measurement event logs.";
list node-data { list node-data {
unique "name"; unique "name";
description description
"Event logs of a node in a distributed system "Event logs of a node in a distributed system
identified by the node name"; identified by the node name.";
uses tpm-name; uses tpm-name;
uses node-uptime; uses node-uptime;
container log-result { container log-result {
description description
"The requested entries of the corresponding log."; "The requested entries of the corresponding log.";
uses event-logs; uses event-logs;
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
/**************************************/ /****************************************/
/* Config & Oper accessible nodes */ /* Config and Oper accessible nodes */
/**************************************/ /****************************************/
container rats-support-structures { container rats-support-structures {
description description
"The datastore definition enabling verifiers or relying "The datastore definition enabling Verifiers or Relying
parties to discover the information necessary to use the Parties to discover the information necessary to use the
remote attestation RPCs appropriately."; remote attestation RPCs appropriately.";
container compute-nodes { container compute-nodes {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
description description
"Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this "Holds the set of device subsystems/components in this
composite device that support TPM operations."; composite device that support TPM operations.";
list compute-node { list compute-node {
key "node-id"; key "node-id";
unique "node-name"; unique "node-name";
config false; config false;
min-elements 2; min-elements 2;
description description
"A component within this composite device which "A component within this composite device that
supports TPM operations."; supports TPM operations.";
leaf node-id { leaf node-id {
type string; type string;
description description
"ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number."; "ID of the compute node, such as Board Serial Number.";
} }
leaf node-physical-index { leaf node-physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib"; if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 { type int32 {
range "1..2147483647"; range "1..2147483647";
skipping to change at page 28, line 29 skipping to change at line 1343
unique "path"; unique "path";
description description
"A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS "A list of TPMs in this composite device that RATS
can be conducted with."; can be conducted with.";
uses tpm-name; uses tpm-name;
leaf hardware-based { leaf hardware-based {
type boolean; type boolean;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"System generated indication of whether this is a "System-generated indication of whether this is a
hardware based TPM."; hardware-based TPM.";
} }
leaf physical-index { leaf physical-index {
if-feature "hw:entity-mib"; if-feature "hw:entity-mib";
type int32 { type int32 {
range "1..2147483647"; range "1..2147483647";
} }
config false; config false;
description description
"The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM."; "The entPhysicalIndex for the TPM.";
reference reference
"RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex"; "RFC 6933: Entity MIB (Version 4) - entPhysicalIndex";
} }
leaf path { leaf path {
type string; type string;
config false; config false;
description description
"Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can change "Device path to a unique TPM on a device. This can
across reboots."; change across reboots.";
} }
leaf compute-node { leaf compute-node {
if-feature "tpm:mtpm"; if-feature "tpm:mtpm";
type compute-node-ref; type compute-node-ref;
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM."; "Indicates the compute node measured by this TPM.";
} }
leaf manufacturer { leaf manufacturer {
skipping to change at page 29, line 31 skipping to change at line 1393
description description
"Identifies the cryptoprocessor API set supported. This "Identifies the cryptoprocessor API set supported. This
is automatically configured by the device and should not is automatically configured by the device and should not
be changed."; be changed.";
} }
uses tpm12-hash-algo { uses tpm12-hash-algo {
when "derived-from-or-self(firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')"; when "derived-from-or-self(firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
refine "tpm12-hash-algo" { refine "tpm12-hash-algo" {
description description
"The hash algorithm overwrites the default used for PCRs "The hash algorithm overwrites the default used for
on this TPM1.2 compliant cryptoprocessor."; PCRs on this TPM1.2-compliant cryptoprocessor.";
} }
} }
leaf-list tpm12-pcrs { leaf-list tpm12-pcrs {
when when "derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, "
"derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, 'taa:tpm12')"; + "'taa:tpm12')";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type pcr; type pcr;
description description
"The PCRs which may be extracted from this TPM1.2 "The PCRs that may be extracted from this TPM1.2-
compliant cryptoprocessor."; compliant cryptoprocessor.";
} }
list tpm20-pcr-bank { list tpm20-pcr-bank {
when when "derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, "
"derived-from-or-self(../firmware-version, 'taa:tpm20')"; + "'taa:tpm20')";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
key "tpm20-hash-algo"; key "tpm20-hash-algo";
description description
"Specifies the list of PCRs that may be extracted for "Specifies the list of PCRs that may be extracted for
a specific Hash Algorithm on this TPM2 compliant a specific hash algorithm on this TPM2-compliant
cryptoprocessor. A bank is a set of PCRs which are cryptoprocessor. A bank is a set of PCRs that are
extended using a particular hash algorithm."; extended using a particular hash algorithm.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf Section 10.9.7"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf,
Section 10.9.7";
leaf tpm20-hash-algo { leaf tpm20-hash-algo {
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
must '/tpm:rats-support-structures' must '/tpm:rats-support-structures'
+ '/tpm:attester-supported-algos' + '/tpm:attester-supported-algos'
+ '/tpm:tpm20-hash' { + '/tpm:tpm20-hash' {
error-message "This platform does not support tpm20-hash-algo"; error-message "This platform does not support "
+ "tpm20-hash-algo";
} }
description description
"The hash scheme actively being used to hash a "The hash scheme actively being used to hash
one or more TPM2.0 PCRs."; one or more TPM2.0 PCRs.";
} }
leaf-list pcr-index { leaf-list pcr-index {
type tpm:pcr; type tpm:pcr;
description description
"Defines what TPM2 PCRs are available to be extracted."; "Defines which TPM2.0 PCRs are available to be
extracted.";
} }
} }
leaf status { leaf status {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum operational { enum operational {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"The TPM currently is running normally and "The TPM currently is running normally and
is ready to accept and process TPM quotes."; is ready to accept and process TPM quotes.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Arch: "TPM2.0-Arch: Trusted Platform Module Library
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Part 1: Architecture,
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-1-Architecture.pdf,
Section 12"; Section 12";
} }
enum non-operational { enum non-operational {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown which "TPM is in a state such as startup or shutdown, which
precludes the processing of TPM quotes."; precludes the processing of TPM quotes.";
} }
} }
config false; config false;
mandatory true; mandatory true;
description description
"TPM chip self-test status."; "TPM chip self-test status.";
} }
container certificates { container certificates {
description description
"The TPM's certificates, including EK certificates "The TPM's certificates, including EK Certificates
and Attestation Key certificates."; and Attestation Key Certificates.";
list certificate { list certificate {
key "name"; key "name";
description description
"Three types of certificates can be accessed via "Three types of certificates can be accessed via
this statement, including Initial Attestation this statement, including Initial Attestation
Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate or Key Certificate, Local Attestation Key Certificate, or
Endorsement Key Certificate."; Endorsement Key Certificate.";
leaf name { leaf name {
type string; type string;
description description
"An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate "An arbitrary name uniquely identifying a certificate
associated within key within a TPM."; associated with a key within a TPM.";
} }
leaf keystore-ref { leaf keystore-ref {
if-feature "ks:central-keystore-supported"; if-feature "ks:central-keystore-supported";
if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys"; if-feature "ks:asymmetric-keys";
type leafref { type leafref {
path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys/ks:asymmetric-key" path "/ks:keystore/ks:asymmetric-keys"
+ "/ks:name"; + "/ks:asymmetric-key/ks:name";
} }
description description
"A reference to a specific certificate of an "A reference to a specific certificate of an
asymmetric key in the Keystore."; asymmetric key in the keystore.";
} }
leaf type { leaf type {
type enumeration { type enumeration {
enum endorsement-certificate { enum endorsement-certificate {
value 0; value 0;
description description
"Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type."; "Endorsement Key (EK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.11"; Section 3.11";
} }
enum initial-attestation-certificate { enum initial-attestation-certificate {
value 1; value 1;
description description
"Initial Attestation key (IAK) Certificate type."; "Initial Attestation Key (IAK) Certificate
type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
enum local-attestation-certificate { enum local-attestation-certificate {
value 2; value 2;
description description
"Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type."; "Local Attestation Key (LAK) Certificate type.";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Key: "TPM2.0-Key:
TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity- uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-
and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf and-Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf,
Section 3.2"; Section 3.2";
} }
} }
description description
"Function supported by this certificate from within the "Function supported by this certificate from within
TPM."; the TPM.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
container attester-supported-algos { container attester-supported-algos {
description description
"Identifies which TPM algorithms are available for use on an "Identifies which TPM algorithms are available for use on an
attesting platform."; attesting platform.";
leaf-list tpm12-asymmetric-signing { leaf-list tpm12-asymmetric-signing {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric; base taa:asymmetric;
} }
description description
"Platform Supported TPM12 asymmetric algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM1.2 asymmetric algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm12-hash { leaf-list tpm12-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm12']";
if-feature "taa:tpm12"; if-feature "taa:tpm12";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"Platform supported TPM12 hash algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM1.2 hash algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm20-asymmetric-signing { leaf-list tpm20-asymmetric-signing {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:asymmetric; base taa:asymmetric;
} }
description description
"Platform Supported TPM20 asymmetric algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM2.0 asymmetric algorithms.";
} }
leaf-list tpm20-hash { leaf-list tpm20-hash {
when "../../tpm:tpms" when "../../tpm:tpms"
+ "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']"; + "/tpm:tpm[tpm:firmware-version='taa:tpm20']";
if-feature "taa:tpm20"; if-feature "taa:tpm20";
type identityref { type identityref {
base taa:hash; base taa:hash;
} }
description description
"Platform supported TPM20 hash algorithms."; "Platform-supported TPM2.0 hash algorithms.";
} }
} }
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
Figure 1 Figure 1
2.1.2. 'ietf-tcg-algs' 2.1.2. ietf-tcg-algs
This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of This document has encoded the TCG Algorithm definitions of Table 3 of
[TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a [TCG-Algos], revision 1.32. By including this full table as a
separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other separate YANG file within this document, it is possible for other
YANG models to leverage the contents of this model. Specific YANG modules to leverage the contents of this module. Specific
references to [RFC2104], [RFC8017], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], references to [TPM1.2-Structures], [TPM2.0], [RFC2104], [RFC8017],
[ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116], [ISO-IEC-10118-3], [RFC8032], [ISO-IEC-9797-1], [ISO-IEC-9797-2], [ISO-IEC-10116],
[ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1], [ISO-IEC-18033-3], [ISO-IEC-10118-3], [ISO-IEC-14888-3], [ISO-IEC-15946-1],
[IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004], [NIST-PUB-FIPS-202], [ISO-IEC-18033-3], [IEEE-Std-1363-2000], [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004],
[NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D], [NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-FIPS-202], [NIST-SP800-38C], [NIST-SP800-38D],
[NIST-SP800-56A], [NIST-SP800-108], [bios-log], as well as Appendix A [NIST-SP800-38F], [NIST-SP800-56A], and [NIST-SP800-108] exist within
and Appendix B exist within the YANG Model. the YANG module.
2.1.2.1. Features 2.1.2.1. Features
There are two types of features supported: 'TPM12' and 'TPM20'. There are two types of features supported: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'.
Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor Support for either of these features indicates that a cryptoprocessor
supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an supporting the corresponding type of TCG TPM API is present on an
Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be Attester. Most commonly, only one type of cryptoprocessor will be
available on an Attester. available on an Attester.
2.1.2.2. Identities 2.1.2.2. Identities
There are three types of identities in this model: There are three types of identities in this model:
1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these 1. Cryptographic functions supported by a TPM algorithm; these
include: 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing', include 'asymmetric', 'symmetric', 'hash', 'signing',
'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and 'anonymous_signing', 'encryption_mode', 'method', and
'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2 'object_type'. The definitions of each of these are in Table 2
of [TCG-Algos]. of [TCG-Algos].
2. API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20' 2. API specifications for TPM types: 'tpm12' and 'tpm20'
3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines what 3. Specific algorithm types: Each algorithm type defines which
cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of cryptographic functions may be supported, and on which type of
API specification. It is not required that an implementation of API specification. It is not required that an implementation of
a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of a specific TPM will support all algorithm types. The contents of
each specific algorithm mirrors what is in Table 3 of each specific algorithm mirrors the contents of Table 3 of
[TCG-Algos]. [TCG-Algos].
2.1.2.3. YANG Module 2.1.2.3. YANG Module
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2022-03-23.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tcg-algs@2024-10-22.yang"
module ietf-tcg-algs { module ietf-tcg-algs {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs";
prefix taa; prefix taa;
organization organization
"IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group"; "IETF RATS (Remote ATtestation procedureS) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/> "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/rats/>
WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:rats@ietf.org>
Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>"; Author: Eric Voit <mailto:evoit@cisco.com>";
description description
"This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms. "This module defines identities for asymmetric algorithms.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
authors of the code. All rights reserved. NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
subject to the license terms contained in, the Revised they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself authors of the code. All rights reserved.
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License set
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all Relating to IETF Documents
capitals, as shown here."; (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
revision 2022-03-23 { This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 9684; see the
RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision 2024-10-22 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC XXXX: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-based Remote "RFC 9684: A YANG Data Model for Challenge-Response-Based
Attestation Procedures using TPMs"; Remote Attestation (CHARRA) Procedures Using Trusted Platform
Modules (TPMs)";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Features */ /* Features */
/*****************/ /*****************/
feature tpm12 { feature tpm12 {
description description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API "This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 1.2 API
as per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures: per Section 4.8 of TPM1.2-Structures.";
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures reference
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- "TPM1.2-Structures: TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures,
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf"; https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
} }
feature tpm20 { feature tpm20 {
description description
"This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API "This feature indicates algorithm support for the TPM 2.0 API
as per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library per Section 11.4 of Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Part 1: Architecture. See TPM2.0-Arch: Architecture.";
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ reference
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf"; "TPM2.0-Arch: Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1:
Architecture, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/
uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-1-Architecture.pdf, Section 11.4";
} }
/*****************/ /*****************/
/* Identities */ /* Identities */
/*****************/ /*****************/
identity asymmetric { identity asymmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and "A TCG-recognized asymmetric algorithm with a public and
private key."; private key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub"; tcg-algorithm-registry/TCG-_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub";
} }
identity symmetric { identity symmetric {
description description
"A TCG recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private key."; "A TCG-recognized symmetric algorithm with only a private
key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity hash { identity hash {
description description
"A TCG recognized hash algorithm that compresses input data to "A TCG-recognized hash algorithm that compresses input data to
a digest value or indicates a method that uses a hash."; a digest value or indicates a method that uses a hash.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity signing { identity signing {
description description
"A TCG recognized signing algorithm"; "A TCG-recognized signing algorithm";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity anonymous_signing { identity anonymous_signing {
description description
"A TCG recognized anonymous signing algorithm."; "A TCG-recognized anonymous signing algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity encryption_mode { identity encryption_mode {
description description
"A TCG recognized encryption mode."; "A TCG-recognized encryption mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity method { identity method {
description description
"A TCG recognized method such as a mask generation function."; "A TCG-recognized method such as a mask generation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity object_type { identity object_type {
description description
"A TCG recognized object type."; "A TCG-recognized object type.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 2"; "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 2";
} }
identity cryptoprocessor { identity cryptoprocessor {
description description
"Base identity identifying a crytoprocessor."; "Base identity identifying a crytoprocessor.";
} }
identity tpm12 { identity tpm12 {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM1.2."; "Supportable by a TPM 1.2.";
reference reference
"TPM1.2-Structures: "TPM1.2-Structures:
TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures,
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8"; TPM_ALGORITHM_ID values, Section 4.8";
} }
identity tpm20 { identity tpm20 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base cryptoprocessor; base cryptoprocessor;
description description
"Supportable by a TPM2."; "Supportable by a TPM 2.0";
reference reference
"TPM2.0-Structures: "TPM2.0-Structures:
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ Trusted Platform Module Library Part 2: Structures,
TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf"; Revision 01.83, https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/
wp-content/uploads/TPM-2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSA {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"RSA algorithm"; "RSA algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0001";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_TDES { identity TPM_ALG_TDES {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"Block cipher with various key sizes (Triple Data Encryption "Block cipher with various key sizes (Triple Data Encryption
Algorithm, commonly called Triple Data Encryption Standard) Algorithm, commonly called Triple Data Encryption Standard)
Note: was banned in TPM1.2 v94"; Note: Was banned in TPM 1.2, v94";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0003";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA1 {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base hash; base hash;
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic "SHA1 algorithm - Deprecated due to insufficient cryptographic
protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms protection. However, it is still useful for hash algorithms
where protection is not required."; where protection is not required.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x0004";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_HMAC { identity TPM_ALG_HMAC {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm"; "Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 9797-2 and RFC2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005"; ISO/IEC 9797-2, and
RFC 2104. ALG_ID: 0x0005";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_AES { identity TPM_ALG_AES {
if-feature "tpm12"; if-feature "tpm12";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The AES algorithm with various key sizes"; "The AES algorithm with various key sizes.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0006";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_MGF1 { identity TPM_ALG_MGF1 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"hash-based mask-generation function"; "Hash-based mask-generation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
IEEE Std 1363-2000 and IEEE Std 1363a-2004. IEEE Std 1363-2000, and
IEEE Std 1363a-2004.
ALG_ID: 0x0007"; ALG_ID: 0x0007";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH { identity TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These "An encryption or signing algorithm using a keyed hash. These
may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may may use XOR for encryption or an HMAC for signing and may
also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor also refer to a data object that is neither signing nor
encrypting."; encrypting.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3, "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0008"; ALG_ID: 0x0008";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_XOR { identity TPM_ALG_XOR {
if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20"; if-feature "tpm12 or tpm20";
base tpm12; base tpm12;
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The XOR encryption algorithm."; "The XOR encryption algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x000A"; ALG_ID: 0x000A";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA256 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 256 algorithm"; "The SHA-256 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA384 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 384 algorithm"; "The SHA-384 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA512 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 512 algorithm"; "The SHA-512 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D"; ISO/IEC 10118-3. ALG_ID: 0x000D";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_NULL { identity TPM_ALG_NULL {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
description description
"NULL algorithm"; "Null algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0010"; ALG_ID: 0x0010";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM3_256 { identity TPM_ALG_SM3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SM3 hash algorithm."; "The ShangMi 3 (SM3) hash algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018. ALG_ID: 0x0012"; ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018. ALG_ID: 0x0012";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM4 { identity TPM_ALG_SM4 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"SM4 symmetric block cipher"; "ShangMi 4 (SM4) symmetric block cipher.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x0013"; ALG_ID: 0x0013";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA { identity TPM_ALG_RSASSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 8.2 "Signature algorithm defined in Section 8.2
(RSASSAPKCS1-v1_5)"; (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5) of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0014";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAES { identity TPM_ALG_RSAES {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"RFC 8017 Signature algorithm defined in section 7.2 "Signature algorithm defined in Section 7.2
(RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5)"; (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5) of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0015";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS { identity TPM_ALG_RSAPSS {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 8.1 (RSASSA PSS)"; "Padding algorithm defined in Section 8.1 (RSASSA-PSS)
of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0016"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0016";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_OAEP { identity TPM_ALG_OAEP {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Padding algorithm defined in section 7.1 (RSASSA OAEP)"; "Padding algorithm defined in Section 7.1 (RSAES-OAEP)
of RFC 8017.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0017"; RFC 8017. ALG_ID: 0x0017";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDSA { identity TPM_ALG_ECDSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Signature algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)"; "Signature algorithm using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 14888-3. ALG_ID: 0x0018"; ISO/IEC 14888-3. ALG_ID: 0x0018";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDH { identity TPM_ALG_ECDH {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Secret sharing using ECC"; "Secret sharing using ECC.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019"; NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x0019";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA { identity TPM_ALG_ECDAA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base anonymous_signing; base anonymous_signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based anonymous signing scheme"; "Elliptic-curve-based, anonymous signing scheme.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x001A"; TCG TPM 2.0 Library. ALG_ID: 0x001A";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SM2 { identity TPM_ALG_SM2 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
base method; base method;
description description
"SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based, "SM2 - depending on context, either an elliptic-curve based,
signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange signature algorithm, an encryption scheme, or a key exchange
protocol"; protocol.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001B"; ALG_ID: 0x001B";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR { identity TPM_ALG_ECSCHNORR {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Elliptic-curve based Schnorr signature"; "Elliptic-curve-based Schnorr signature.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3. "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3.
ALG_ID: 0x001C"; ALG_ID: 0x001C";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV { identity TPM_ALG_ECMQV {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base method; base method;
description description
"Two-phase elliptic-curve key"; "Two-phase elliptic-curve key.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x001D"; NIST SP800-56A. ALG_ID: 0x001D";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A { identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_56A {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Concatenation key derivation function"; "Concatenation key derivation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) section 5.8.1. NIST SP800-56A (approved alternative1) Section 5.8.1.
ALG_ID: 0x0020"; ALG_ID: 0x0020";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 { identity TPM_ALG_KDF2 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
base method; base method;
description description
"Key derivation function"; "Key derivation function.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
IEEE 1363a-2004 KDF2 section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021"; IEEE 1363a-2004, KDF2, Section 13.2. ALG_ID: 0x0021";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 { identity TPM_ALG_KDF1_SP800_108 {
base TPM_ALG_KDF2; base TPM_ALG_KDF2;
description description
"A key derivation method"; "A key derivation method.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3 and
NIST SP800-108 - Section 5.1 KDF. ALG_ID: 0x0022"; NIST SP800-108, Section 4.1, KDF. ALG_ID: 0x0022";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECC { identity TPM_ALG_ECC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"Prime field ECC"; "Prime field ECC.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023"; ISO/IEC 15946-1. ALG_ID: 0x0023";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER { identity TPM_ALG_SYMCIPHER {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base object_type; base object_type;
description description
"Object type for a symmetric block cipher"; "Object type for a symmetric block cipher.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
TCG TPM 2.0 library specification. ALG_ID: 0x0025"; TCG TPM 2.0 Library. ALG_ID: 0x0025";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA { identity TPM_ALG_CAMELLIA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
description description
"The Camellia algorithm"; "The Camellia algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026"; ISO/IEC 18033-3. ALG_ID: 0x0026";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_256 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA 256 algorithm"; "ISO/IEC 10118-3 - the SHA-256 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0027";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_384 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 384 algorithm"; "The SHA-384 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0028"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0028";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 { identity TPM_ALG_SHA3_512 {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base hash; base hash;
description description
"The SHA 512 algorithm"; "The SHA-512 algorithm.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST PUB FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0029"; NIST FIPS 202. ALG_ID: 0x0029";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CMAC { identity TPM_ALG_CMAC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"block Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC)"; "Block Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 Algorithm 5. ALG_ID: 0x003F"; ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Algorithm 5. ALG_ID: 0x003F";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CTR { identity TPM_ALG_CTR {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Counter mode"; "Counter mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0040"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0040";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_OFB { identity TPM_ALG_OFB {
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Output Feedback mode"; "Output Feedback mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0041"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0041";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CBC { identity TPM_ALG_CBC {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Cipher Block Chaining mode"; "Cipher Block Chaining mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0042"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0042";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CFB { identity TPM_ALG_CFB {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Cipher Feedback mode"; "Cipher Feedback mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0043";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_ECB { identity TPM_ALG_ECB {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Electronic Codebook mode"; "Electronic Codebook mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044"; ISO/IEC 10116. ALG_ID: 0x0044";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_CCM { identity TPM_ALG_CCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication "Counter with Cipher Block Chaining--Message Authentication
Code (CCM)"; Code (CCM).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050"; NIST SP800-38C. ALG_ID: 0x0050";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_GCM { identity TPM_ALG_GCM {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)"; "Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38D. ALG_ID: 0x0051"; NIST SP800-38D. ALG_ID: 0x0051";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KW { identity TPM_ALG_KW {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"AES Key Wrap (KW)"; "AES Key Wrap (KW).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0052"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0052";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_KWP { identity TPM_ALG_KWP {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP)"; "AES Key Wrap with Padding (KWP).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0053";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_EAX { identity TPM_ALG_EAX {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base symmetric; base symmetric;
base signing; base signing;
base encryption_mode; base encryption_mode;
description description
"Authenticated-Encryption Mode"; "Authenticated-Encryption Mode.";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054"; NIST SP800-38F. ALG_ID: 0x0054";
} }
identity TPM_ALG_EDDSA { identity TPM_ALG_EDDSA {
if-feature "tpm20"; if-feature "tpm20";
base tpm20; base tpm20;
base asymmetric; base asymmetric;
base signing; base signing;
description description
"Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA)"; "Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (PureEdDSA).";
reference reference
"TCG-Algos:TCG Algorithm Registry Rev1.32 Table 3 and "TCG-Algos: TCG Algorithm Registry, Rev1.34, Table 3, and
RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060"; RFC 8032. ALG_ID: 0x0060";
} }
} }
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by Note that not all cryptographic functions are required for use by
ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However, the full definition of ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang. However, the full definition of
Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG Table 3 of [TCG-Algos] will allow use by additional YANG
specifications. specifications.
3. IANA Considerations 3. IANA Considerations
This document registers the following namespace URIs in the This document registers the following namespace URIs in the
[xml-registry] as per [RFC3688]: [XML-Registry] per [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
Registrant Contact: The IESG. Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tcg-algs
Registrant Contact: The IESG. Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document registers the following YANG modules in the registry This document registers the following YANG modules in the registry
[yang-parameters] as per Section 14 of [RFC6020]: [YANG-Parameters] per Section 14 of [RFC6020]:
Name: ietf-tpm-remote-attestation Name: ietf-tpm-remote-attestation
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote- Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tpm-remote-
attestation attestation
Prefix: tpm Prefix: tpm
Reference: draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form) Reference: draft-ietf-rats-yang-tpm-charra (RFC form)
skipping to change at page 50, line 23 skipping to change at line 2409
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
The YANG module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang specified in this The YANG module ietf-tpm-remote-attestation.yang specified in this
document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed document defines a schema for data that is designed to be accessed
via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or via network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] or
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport RESTCONF [RFC8040]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport
layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure
Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTPS, and the
mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446]. mandatory-to-implement secure transport is TLS [RFC8446].
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
Of special consideration are the following nodes:
* In the 'tpms' container, the 'certificates' will expose
certificates used for attestation, potentially allowing selection
of a certificate that might be compromised. The 'type' could also
be misconfigured to represent a different type of key, which might
alter how a Verifier might evaluate the results.
* Within the 'attester-supported-algos' container, each leaf-list
will expose and potentially allow changing of the encryption
algorithms supported by a device.
There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are There are a number of data nodes defined in this YANG module that are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., _config true_, which is the writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., _config true_, which is the
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_) in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., _edit-config_)
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability: as well as their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1 Container '/rats-support-structures/attester-supported-algos': 'tpm1
2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing', 2-asymmetric-signing', 'tpm12-hash', 'tpm20-asymmetric-signing',
and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are and 'tpm20-hash'. All could be populated with algorithms that are
not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the not supported by the underlying physical TPM installed by the
equipment vendor. A vendor should restrict the ability to equipment vendor. A vendor should restrict the ability to
configure unsupported algorithms. configure unsupported algorithms.
Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown Container: '/rats-support-structures/tpms': 'name': Although shown
as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be as 'rw', it is system generated. Therefore, it should not be
possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the possible for an operator to add or remove a TPM from the
configuration. configuration.
'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs for extraction 'tpm20-pcr-bank': It is possible to configure PCRs that are not
which are not being extended by system software. This could being extended by system software for extraction. This could
unnecessarily use TPM resources. unnecessarily use TPM resources.
'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate which 'certificates': It is possible to provision a certificate that
does not correspond to an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) within does not correspond to an AIK within the TPM 1.2, or to an
the TPM 1.2, or an Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0 Attestation Key (AK) within the TPM 2.0, respectively. In such a
respectively. In such a case, calls to an RPC requesting this case, calls to an RPC requesting this specific certificate could
specific certificate could result in either no response or a result in either no response or a response from an unexpected TPM.
response for an unexpected TPM.
RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC RPC 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
response must verify that the certificate is for an active AIK, response must verify that the certificate is for an active AIK,
i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party as being i.e., the certificate has been confirmed by a third party as being
able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2. able to support Attestation on the targeted TPM 1.2.
RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC RPC 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation': The receiver of the RPC
response must verify that the certificate is for an active AK, response must verify that the certificate is for an active AK,
i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature within i.e., the private key confirmation of the quote signature within
the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to the RPC response has been confirmed by a third party to belong to
an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted an entity legitimately able to perform Attestation on the targeted
TPM 2.0. TPM 2.0.
RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the RPC 'log-retrieval': Requesting a large volume of logs from the
Attester could require significant system resources and create a Attester could require significant system resources and create a
denial of service. denial of service.
Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal that Information collected through the RPCs above could reveal specific
specific versions of software and configurations of endpoints that versions of software and configurations of endpoints that could
could identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore, RPCs identify vulnerabilities on those systems. Therefore, RPCs should be
should be protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny- protected by NACM [RFC8341] with a default setting of deny-all to
all to limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized limit the extraction of attestation data by only authorized
Verifiers. Verifiers.
For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when For the YANG module ietf-tcg-algs.yang, please use care when
selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of selecting specific algorithms. The introductory section of
[TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered [TCG-Algos] highlights that some algorithms should be considered
legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate legacy, and recommends implementers and adopters diligently evaluate
available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic available information such as governmental, industrial, and academic
research before selecting an algorithm for use. research before selecting an algorithm for use.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
Event logs (bios-log, ima-log, netequip-boot-log) typically contain
hash values (digests) of running boot and OS software. Passive
attackers can use these hash values to identify software versions and
thus launch targeted attacks on known vulnerabilities. Hence, bios-
log, ima-log, and netequip-boot-log are considerd sensitive.
Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
The 'log-retrieval' RPC operation is considered sensitive since it
enables retrieval of logs (bios-log, ima-log, netequip-boot-log) that
typically contain hash values (digests) of running boot and OS
software. This allows specifics of loaded software including BIOS
and operating system software to be understood externally.
The other two RPC operations, 'tpm20-challenge-response-attestation'
and 'tpm12-challenge-response-attestation', will expose values
indicating the internal operational state of the device. These
values could also be correlated to specifics of running software as
well.
5. References 5. References
5.1. Normative References 5.1. Normative References
[bios-log] "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification, [BIOS-Log] Trusted Computing Group, "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware
Section 9.4.5.2", n.d., Profile Specification", Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision
1.03 Version 51, 1 May 2017,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-C
lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf lientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v51.pdf
>. >.
[BIOS-Log-Event-Type] [CEL] Trusted Computing Group, "Canonical Event Log Format",
"TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Version 1.0 Revision 0.41, 25 February 2022,
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf>.
[cel] "Canonical Event Log Format, Section 4.3", n.d.,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf>. TCG_IWG_CEL_v1_r0p41_pub.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore and Keystore
Operations", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-keystore-35, 16 March 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
keystore-35>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-tpm-based-network-device-attest]
Fedorkow, G., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay, "TPM-
based Network Device Remote Integrity Verification", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-tpm-based-
network-device-attest-14, 22 March 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
tpm-based-network-device-attest-14>.
[IEEE-Std-1363-2000] [IEEE-Std-1363-2000]
"IEEE 1363-2000 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public- IEEE, "IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key
Key Cryptography", n.d., Cryptography", IEEE Std 1363-2000,
<https://standards.ieee.org/standard/1363-2000.html>. DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2000.92292, August 2000,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/891000>.
[IEEE-Std-1363a-2004] [IEEE-Std-1363a-2004]
"1363a-2004 - IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key IEEE, "IEEE Standard Specifications for Public-Key
Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques", n.d., Cryptography - Amendment 1: Additional Techniques", IEEE
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1335427>. Std 1363a-2004, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2004.94612, September
2004, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1335427>.
[ISO-IEC-10116] [ISO-IEC-10116]
"ISO/IEC 10116:2017 - Information technology", n.d., ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Security techniques -
Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher", Edition 4,
ISO/IEC 10116:2017, July 2017,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/64575.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/64575.html>.
[ISO-IEC-10118-3] [ISO-IEC-10118-3]
"Dedicated hash-functions - ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018", n.d., ISO/IEC, "IT Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part
3: Dedicated hash-functions", Edition 4, ISO/
IEC 10118-3:2018, October 2018,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/67116.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/67116.html>.
[ISO-IEC-14888-3] [ISO-IEC-14888-3]
"ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 - Digital signatures with appendix", ISO/IEC, "Security techniques - Digital signatures with
n.d., <https://www.iso.org/standard/76382.html>. appendix - Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms",
Edition 4, ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018, November 2018,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/76382.html>.
[ISO-IEC-15946-1] [ISO-IEC-15946-1]
"ISO/IEC 15946-1:2016 - Information technology", n.d., ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Security techniques -
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - Part
1: General", Edition 3, ISO/IEC 15946-1:2016, July 2016,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/65480.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/65480.html>.
[ISO-IEC-18033-3] [ISO-IEC-18033-3]
"ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 - Encryption algorithms", n.d., ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Security techniques -
Encryption algorithms - Part 3: Block ciphers", Edition 2,
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010, December 2010,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/54531.html>. <https://www.iso.org/standard/54531.html>.
[ISO-IEC-9797-1] [ISO-IEC-9797-1]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC ISO/IEC, "Information technology - Security techniques -
9797-1:2011", n.d., Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - Part 1: Mechanisms
<https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>. using a block cipher", Edition 2, ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011,
November 2011, <https://www.iso.org/standard/50375.html>.
[ISO-IEC-9797-2] [ISO-IEC-9797-2]
"Message Authentication Codes (MACs) - ISO/IEC ISO/IEC, "Information security - Message authentication
9797-2:2011", n.d., codes (MACs) - Part 2: Mechanisms using a dedicated hash-
<https://www.iso.org/standard/51618.html>. function", Edition 3, ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021, June 2021,
<https://www.iso.org/standard/75296.html>.
[NIST-PUB-FIPS-202] [NIST-FIPS-202]
"SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable- NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Output Functions", n.d., Extendable-Output Functions", NIST FIPS 202,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202, August 2015,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-108] [NIST-SP800-108]
"Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key Derivation Using
Functions", n.d., Pseudorandom Functions",
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/ DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1, NIST
nistspecialpublication800-108.pdf>. SP 800-108r1-upd1, February 2024,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/108/r1/upd1/final>.
[NIST-SP800-38C] [NIST-SP800-38C]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality", n.d., Operation: the CCM Mode for Authentication and
Confidentiality", NIST SP 800-38C,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38C, July 2007,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38c/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38c/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-38D] [NIST-SP800-38D]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", n.d., Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST
SP 800-38D, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38D, November 2007,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38d/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-38F] [NIST-SP800-38F]
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Methods for Key Wrapping", n.d., Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping", NIST SP 800-38F,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38F, December 2012,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/ <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38f/
final>. final>.
[NIST-SP800-56A] [NIST-SP800-56A]
"Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", n.d., Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56a/rev- Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST
3/final>. SP 800-56A Rev. 3, DOI 10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3, April
2018, <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-
56a/rev-3/final>.
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC2104>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC3688>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for [RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6020>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., [RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6241>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure [RFC6242] Wasserman, M., "Using the NETCONF Protocol over Secure
Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011, Shell (SSH)", RFC 6242, DOI 10.17487/RFC6242, June 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6242>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6242>.
[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M. [RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933, Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6933, May 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6933>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6933>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types", [RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013, RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC6991>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6991>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, [RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8017>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8032>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF [RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8040>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration [RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341, Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8341>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8341>.
[RFC8348] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Dong, J., and D. Romascanu, "A [RFC8348] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., Dong, J., and D. Romascanu, "A
YANG Data Model for Hardware Management", RFC 8348, YANG Data Model for Hardware Management", RFC 8348,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8348, March 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8348, March 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8348>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8348>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC9334>. 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
[RFC9642] Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", RFC 9642,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9642, October 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9642>.
[RFC9683] Fedorkow, G. C., Voit, E., and J. Fitzgerald-McKay,
"Remote Integrity Verification of Network Devices
Containing Trusted Platform Modules", RFC 9683,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9683, November 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9683>.
[TCG-Algos] [TCG-Algos]
"TCG Algorithm Registry", n.d., Trusted Computing Group, "TCG Algorithm Registry", Family
"2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.34, 24 August 2023,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG-
_Algorithm_Registry_r1p32_pub.pdf>. Algorithm-Registry-Revision-1.34_pub-1.pdf>.
[TPM1.2] TCG, "TPM 1.2 Main Specification", 2 October 2003, [TPM1.2] Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 1.2 Main Specification", TPM
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main- Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1
specification/>. March 2011, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
tpm-main-specification/>.
[TPM1.2-Commands] [TPM1.2-Commands]
"TPM Main Part 3 Commands", n.d., Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Main Part 3 Commands", TPM
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116, 1
Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>. March 2011, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-
3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>.
[TPM1.2-Structures] [TPM1.2-Structures]
"TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures", n.d., Trusted Computing Group, "TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures",
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- TPM Main Specification Level 2 Version 1.2, Revision 116,
Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>. 1 March 2011, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-
Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf>.
[TPM2.0] TCG, "TPM 2.0 Library Specification", 15 March 2013, [TPM2.0] Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 2.0 Library", Trusted
Platform Module Library Specification, Family "2.0", Level
00, Revision 01.83, March 2024,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library- <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-
specification/>. specification/>.
[TPM2.0-Arch] [TPM2.0-Arch]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture", Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp- Part 1: Architecture", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
content/uploads/ 01.83, 25 January 2024,
TCG_TPM2_r1p59_Part1_Architecture_pub.pdf>. <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
2.0-1.83-Part-1-Architecture.pdf>.
[TPM2.0-Key] [TPM2.0-Key]
TCG, "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation, Trusted Computing Group, "TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity
Rev12", 8 October 2021, and Attestation", Version 1.00, Revision 12, 8 October
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM- 2021, <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and- content/uploads/TPM-2p0-Keys-for-Device-Identity-and-
Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf>. Attestation_v1_r12_pub10082021.pdf>.
[TPM2.0-Structures] [TPM2.0-Structures]
"Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 2: Structures", Trusted Computing Group, "Trusted Platform Module Library
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp- Part 2: Structures", Family "2.0", Level 00, Revision
content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf>. 01.83, 25 January 2024,
<https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-
2.0-1.83-Part-2-Structures.pdf>.
[UEFI-Secure-Boot] [UEFI-Secure-Boot]
Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Forum, Inc.,
"Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) "Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)
Specification Version 2.9 (March 2021), Section 32.1 Specification", Section 32.1: Secure Boot, Version 2.10,
(Secure Boot)", n.d., 29 August 2022,
<https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/
UEFI_Spec_2_9_2021_03_18.pdf>. UEFI_Spec_2_10_Aug29.pdf>.
5.2. Informative References 5.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-rats-reference-interaction-models] [IMA-Template-Management]
The kernel development community, "IMA Template Management
Mechanism", Linux Kernel 6.11, 15 September 2024,
<https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.11/security/IMA-
templates.html>.
[NIST-915121]
NIST, "True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why
entropy is important for information security",
<https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/
get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>.
[RATS-Interaction-Models]
Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference Birkholz, H., Eckel, M., Pan, W., and E. Voit, "Reference
Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures", Interaction Models for Remote Attestation Procedures",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats- Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-
reference-interaction-models-11, 22 July 2024, reference-interaction-models-11, 22 July 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-rats-
reference-interaction-models-11>. reference-interaction-models-11>.
[IMA-Kernel-Source] [XML-Registry]
"Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA): Kernel IANA, "IETF XML Registry",
Sourcecode", n.d., <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob <https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/>.
/df0cc57e057f18e44dac8e6c18aba47ab53202f9/security/
integrity/ima/>.
[NIST-915121]
"True Randomness Can't be Left to Chance: Why entropy is
important for information security", n.d.,
<https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/
get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=915121>.
[xml-registry]
"IETF XML Registry", n.d.,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/xml-registry/xml-
registry.xhtml>.
[yang-parameters] [YANG-Parameters]
"YANG Parameters", n.d., IANA, "YANG Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/yang- <https://www.iana.org/assignments/yang-parameters/>.
parameters.xhtml>.
Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) Appendix A. Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA)
IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot [TPM2.0-Arch] and Secure IMA extends the principles of Measured Boot [TPM2.0-Arch] and Secure
Boot [UEFI-Secure-Boot] to the Linux operating system, applying it to Boot [UEFI-Secure-Boot] to the Linux operating system, applying it to
operating system applications and files. IMA has been part of the operating system applications and files. IMA has been part of the
Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 2009 (kernel Linux integrity subsystem of the Linux kernel since 2009 (kernel
version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in version 2.6.30). The IMA mechanism represented by the YANG module in
this specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16 this specification is rooted in the kernel version 5.16
[IMA-Kernel-Source]. IMA enables the protection of system integrity [IMA-Template-Management]. IMA enables the protection of system
by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and storing integrity by collecting (commonly referred to as measuring) and
measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of files storing measurements (called Claims in the context of IETF RATS) of
before execution so that these measurements can be used later, at files before execution so that these measurements can be used later,
system runtime, in remote attestation procedures. IMA acts in at system runtime, in remote attestation procedures. IMA acts in
support of the appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement support of the Appraisal of Evidence (which includes measurement
Claims) by leveraging Reference Values stored in extended file Claims) by leveraging Reference Values stored in extended file
attributes. attributes.
In support of the appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered In support of the Appraisal of Evidence, IMA maintains an ordered
list (with no duplicates) of measurements in kernel-space, the Stored list (with no duplicates) of measurements in kernel space, the Stored
Measurement Log (SML), for all files that have been measured before Measurement Log (SML), for all files that have been measured before
execution since the operating system was started. Although IMA can execution since the operating system was started. Although IMA can
be used without a TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with a TPM be used without a TPM, it is typically used in conjunction with a TPM
to anchor the integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure to anchor the integrity of the SML in a hardware-protected secure
storage location, i.e., Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) storage location, i.e., PCRs provided by TPMs. IMA provides the SML
provided by TPMs. IMA provides the SML in both binary and ASCII in both binary and ASCII representations in the Linux security file
representations in the Linux security file system _securityfs_ system _securityfs_ (/sys/kernel/security/ima/).
(/sys/kernel/security/ima/).
IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are IMA templates define the format of the SML, i.e., which fields are
included in a log record. Examples are file path, file hash, user included in a log record. Examples are file path, file hash, user
ID, group ID, file signature, and extended file attributes. IMA ID, group ID, file signature, and extended file attributes. IMA
comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a comes with a set of predefined template formats and also allows a
custom format, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported custom format, i.e., a format consisting of template fields supported
by IMA. Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments by IMA. Template usage is typically determined by boot arguments
passed to the kernel. Alternatively, the format can also be hard- passed to the kernel. Alternatively, the format can also be hard-
coded into custom kernels. IMA templates and fields are extensible coded into custom kernels. IMA templates and fields are extensible
in the kernel source code. As a result, more template fields can be in the kernel source code. As a result, more template fields can be
added in the future. added in the future.
IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy IMA policies define which files are measured using the IMA policy
language. Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the language. Built-in policies can be passed as boot arguments to the
kernel. Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be kernel. Custom IMA policies can be defined once during runtime or be
hard-coded into a custom kernel. If no policy is defined, no hard-coded into a custom kernel. If no policy is defined, no
measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabled. measurements are taken and IMA is effectively disabled.
A comprehensive description of the content fields in native Linux IMA A comprehensive description of the content fields of the Linux IMA
TLV format can be found in Table 16 of the Canonical Event Log (CEL) TLV format can be found in Table 16 of the Canonical Event Log (CEL)
specification [cel]. The CEL specification also illustrates the use specification [CEL]. The CEL specification also illustrates the use
of templates to enable extended or customized IMA TLV formats in of templates to enable extended or customized IMA TLV formats in
Section 5.1.6. Section 5.1.6.
Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs Appendix B. IMA for Network Equipment Boot Logs
Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected Network equipment can generally implement similar IMA-protected
functions to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of functions to generate measurements (Claims) about the boot process of
a device and enable corresponding remote attestation. Network a device and enable corresponding remote attestation. Network
Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot Equipment Boot Logs combine the measurement and logging of boot
components and operating system components (executables and files) components and operating system components (executables and files)
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Verifier initiates a remote attestation process (e.g., challenge- Verifier initiates a remote attestation process (e.g., challenge-
response remote attestation as defined in this document), the network response remote attestation as defined in this document), the network
equipment takes on the role of an Attester and can convey to the equipment takes on the role of an Attester and can convey to the
Verifier Claims that comprise the measurement log as well as the Verifier Claims that comprise the measurement log as well as the
corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM. corresponding PCR values (Evidence) of a TPM.
The Verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the The Verifier can appraise the integrity (compliance with the
Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured Reference Values) of each executed file by comparing its measured
value with the Reference Value. Based on the execution order, the value with the Reference Value. Based on the execution order, the
Verifier can compute a PCR Reference Value (by replaying the log) and Verifier can compute a PCR Reference Value (by replaying the log) and
compare it to the Measurement Log Claims obtained in conjunction with compare it to the measurement log Claims obtained in conjunction with
the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to an the PCR Evidence to assess their trustworthiness with respect to an
intended operational state. intended operational state.
Network equipment usually executes multiple components in parallel. Network equipment usually executes multiple components in parallel.
This holds not only during the operating system loading phase, but This holds not only during the operating system loading phase, but
also even during the BIOS boot phase. With this measurement log also even during the BIOS boot phase. With this measurement log
mechanism, network equipment can take on the role of an Attester, mechanism, network equipment can assume the role of an Attester,
proving to the Verifier the trustworthiness of its boot process. proving to the Verifier the trustworthiness of its boot process.
Using the measurement log, Verifiers can precisely identify Using the measurement log, Verifiers can precisely identify
mismatching log entries to infer potentially tampered components. mismatching log entries to infer potentially tampered components.
This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the This mechanism also supports scenarios that modify files on the
Attester that are subsequently executed during the boot phase (e.g., Attester that are subsequently executed during the boot phase (e.g.,
updating/patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference updating/patching) by simply updating the appropriate Reference
Values in Reference Integrity Manifests that inform Verifiers about Values in Reference Integrity Manifests that inform Verifiers about
how an Attester is composed. how an Attester is composed.
skipping to change at page 60, line 4 skipping to change at line 2923
ThoughtSpot ThoughtSpot
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Eric Voit Eric Voit
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: evoit@cisco.com Email: evoit@cisco.com
Bill Sulzen Bill Sulzen
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
Email: bsulzen@cisco.com Email: bsulzen@cisco.com
Liang Xia (Frank) Liang Xia (Frank)
Huawei Technologies Huawei Technologies
101 Software Avenue, Yuhuatai District Yuhuatai District
101 Software Avenue
Nanjing Nanjing
Jiangsu, 210012 Jiangsu, 210012
China China
Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com Email: Frank.Xialiang@huawei.com
Tom Laffey Tom Laffey
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com Email: tom.laffey@hpe.com
Guy C. Fedorkow Guy C. Fedorkow
Juniper Networks Juniper Networks
10 Technology Park Drive 10 Technology Park Drive
Westford Westford, Massachusetts 01886
United States of America
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
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