rfc9851v1.txt   rfc9851.txt 
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Salz Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Salz
Request for Comments: 9851 Akamai Technologies Request for Comments: 9851 Akamai Technologies
Category: Standards Track N. Aviram Category: Standards Track N. Aviram
ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2026 ISSN: 2070-1721 January 2026
TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze TLS 1.2 is in Feature Freeze
Abstract Abstract
Use of TLS 1.3, which fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2, is Use of TLS 1.3, which fixes some known deficiencies in TLS 1.2, is
growing. This document specifies that outside of urgent security growing. This document specifies that no changes will be approved
fixes (as determined by TLS Working Group consensus), new TLS for TLS 1.2 outside of urgent security fixes (as determined by TLS
Exporter Labels, and new Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Working Group consensus), new TLS Exporter Labels, and new
(ALPN) Protocol IDs, no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2. This Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) Protocol IDs. This
prescription pertains to TLS only; it does not pertain to DTLS (in applies to TLS only; it does not apply to DTLS (in any DTLS version).
any DTLS version).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document. This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
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TLS 1.3 [TLS13] fixes most known deficiencies with TLS 1.2 [TLS12] TLS 1.3 [TLS13] fixes most known deficiencies with TLS 1.2 [TLS12]
and its use is growing. Some examples of the fixes include and its use is growing. Some examples of the fixes include
encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by encrypting more of the traffic so that it is not readable by
outsiders and removing most cryptographic primitives that are now outsiders and removing most cryptographic primitives that are now
considered weak. Importantly, TLS 1.3 enjoys robust security proofs. considered weak. Importantly, TLS 1.3 enjoys robust security proofs.
Both versions have several extension points. Items like new Both versions have several extension points. Items like new
cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named cryptographic algorithms, new supported groups (formerly "named
curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. This curves"), etc., can be added without defining a new protocol. This
document specifies that outside of urgent security fixes (as document specifies that no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2
determined by TLS Working Group consensus) and the exceptions listed outside of urgent security fixes (as determined by TLS Working Group
in Section 4, no changes will be approved for TLS 1.2. consensus) and the exceptions listed in Section 4.
This prescription pertains to TLS only. As such, it does not pertain This applies to TLS only. As such, it does not apply to DTLS, in any
to DTLS, in any DTLS version. DTLS version.
2. Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) 2. Implications for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)
Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, are Cryptographically relevant quantum computers, once available, are
likely to greatly lessen the time and effort needed to break RSA, likely to greatly lessen the time and effort needed to break RSA,
finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman (FFDH), or Elliptic Curve finite-field-based Diffie-Hellman (FFDH), or Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) which are currently used in TLS. In 2016, the US Cryptography (ECC) which are currently used in TLS. In 2016, the US
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a
multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be "safe" once multi-year effort to standardize algorithms that will be "safe" once
quantum computers are feasible [PQC]. Initial discussions in the quantum computers are feasible [PQC]. Initial discussions in the
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